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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Parliaments are critical political institutions. And they continue to demonstrate an unparalleled ability to 
adapt their identities and responsibilities to suit the contexts in which they are housed. At their most basic 
core, parliaments are institutions designed to aggregate the needs and preferences of citizens and ensure 
that the government responds accordingly. The prospect of legislative engagement in the budget process 
is thus important because the way in which resources are distributed has a direct effect on people’s lives. 
Understood as the political “skeleton” of the state removed from ideological content (Goldscheid 1917), the 
way in which state resources are allocated has moral and ethical consequences relating to key democratic 
concepts like ‘fairness’ and ‘justice,’ amongst others. 
If influence over budgetary matters is the apex of political control, the historical relationship between the 
legislature and the national budget paints a rather tragic picture. The power parliaments once maintained 
over the public purse dates back to the Magna Carta (1215) when the King was required to obtain approval 
from the ruling estates in order to impose taxes. However, by the 16th century, parliament began to insist 
that approval be preceded by formal funding requests. In this way, the executive began to formulate what 
is understood today as the modern day ‘budget’ (Schick 2002). Once the executive began to draft 
progressively more sophisticated spending requests, the capacity of parliaments to tackle the subject 
matter atrophied over time (Schick 2002: 22). As the budget increased in complexity over time, the 
executive continued to bolster its capacities in fiscal and economic matters, all the while informational and 
technical asymmetries between the executive and the legislature widened further still. In parliamentary 
systems this practice has meant that the budget is mainly negotiated at the elite level amongst party leaders 
outside the legislature. It has also meant that policy changes are made from within the ruling party 
(Hallerberg et al. 2009: 232). Thus, while legislative authority on taxation and spending policy may have 
characterized and shaped the original design of parliament, later developments have served to push the 
institution to the periphery. The result is that today, legislative capacity on budgetary matters is simply no 
match for the executive on the same in most parliaments. 
Such is the legacy of budgetary engagement inherited by African legislatures with a Westminster heritage. 
Most former British colonies in Africa became part of the British Commonwealth of Nations and structured 
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their executive according to the parliamentary model of the UK at independence (Stultz 1968: 482). Several 
practices can be traced back to this institutional tradition, including a parliament void of portfolio 
committees and one in which no budgetary role for parliament is foreseen. As a result, until recently, MPs 
have been effectively “economically illiterate,” with little to no understanding of the budget or its process 
(Barkan 2009: 10-11). 
If the technical capacities of African legislatures on budgetary matters was curtailed as a result their 
colonial histories, their political capacities were equally stunted as a result of the one-party rule that 
characterized much of the continent shortly after independence. The post-colonial governance structures 
that took shape did not include restraints on executive power, which took to combination of repression and 
patronage in order to maintain their positions (Prempeh 2007: 469) (Barkan 2009: 12-15). These 
developments were not only antithetical to the institutional and social development of an active legislature, 
but they likely held potential consequences for the long-term political developments of the countries 
concerned (Fish, 2006, 18).  In the face of increasing demands for an accountable government, the 1990’s 
saw the introduction of political competition through the first multi-party elections (Barkan 2009: 15). But 
the emergence of political competition proved no panacea: “Africa’s post-authoritarian parliaments have 
yet to emerge from the shadows of executive hegemony… the long absence in postcolonial Africa of a 
tradition of parliamentary autonomy has severely handicapped Africa’s legislatures in defining or 
protecting their institutional interests and prerogatives…” (Prempeh 2007: 497-498). 
An introduction to the subject of African legislatures would be remiss not to include mention of the 
development context in which these parliaments are housed. This has a strong bearing on the type and 
number of resources available to the parliament financial, human, or otherwise. The presence of 
developmental constraints means that common challenges faced by parliaments across the globe are made 
more formidable here. Thus, history and context are both critical to an understanding of African legislatures 
today. Between an institutional genealogy that excludes legislative involvement in budget matters, long 
periods of colonial and authoritarian rule, and the developmental challenges faced by African legislatures 
day-to-day, the likely disposition for a parliament in the region is not one postured for autonomous action. 
Yet this appears to be the case. Legislatures in Southern Africa are making public signals that they are 
interested in engaging more vociferously and actively in questions of budget formulation, oversight, and 
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scrutiny. The puzzle thus begs the question: Are these legislatures really becoming more active in 
budgetary matters? And if so, why? 
The study is significant for at least three reasons, each from the vantage point of an alternative discipline. 
In the first case, the political economy literature tends towards the view that the involvement of the 
legislature in budgetary matters will lead to fiscal deficits and national debt. The idea that MPs will be 
motivated to allocate funds toward particular ends has made “Many economists … sceptical of legislative 
participation in budgeting” (Wehner 2004: 3). Though some studies have contested this idea (Wehner 
2001) (Joyce 2005) as Schick notes, “its validity is less important than its widespread acceptance” (Schick 
2002: 16). Whether or not and how the parliaments studied here are engaging in budgetary matters has 
the potential to shed some light on this generally negative view on legislative action in public finance. 
A more positive take on the subject stems from the field of democracy studies. As Fish (2006) contends, 
“The presence of a powerful legislature is an unmixed blessing for democratization” (Fish 2006: 5). If 
legislatures step up their engagement in budgetary matters, there is the potential for the institution to pose 
as a check to executive power “almost by definition” (Posner and Park 2007: 21). While legislative action 
could point to fiscal deficits, the idea of legislative inaction could offer an even less desirable result. As 
Wehner (2004) points out, weak legislative engagement in the budget process can be “detrimental to fiscal 
health where the executive has not thoroughly internalised norms and standards of due process and an 
ethic of performance is largely lacking” (Wehner 2004: 3). And Burnell’s (2010) examination of the 
Zambian case demonstrates “how the absence of effective parliamentary accountability allows these 
endemic shortcomings in the executive to persist” (Burnell 2010: 2). Thus, whether or not the parliaments 
examined here are acting as horizontal checks on government actions is important to the responsible use 
of public finances. 
A final suggestion regarding the significance of this investigation circles back to the field of legislative 
studies, upon which this thesis rests. If legislatures in the region are, indeed, becoming increasingly active 
in budgetary matters, this may point to a broader change in the identity and function played by each. The 
possibility that a given legislature is moving from one particular function to another is accompanied by a 
host of indications. These include external consequences related to executive- legislative relations, voter 
expectations, or even the types of persons who may wish to contest in elections, to name just a few. Such a 
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transformation may also have internal consequences for the effectiveness of the institution, its strength, 
and ability to continue its work. As Schick (2002) argues with regard to increased legislative budgetary 
activism: budget responsibility could weaken rather than empower legislatures given the fact that budgets 
limit what legislatures can do, the fact that budgets have can turn legislative work into a technocratic 
exercise, and the fact that budgets “intrude” on other legislative functions (Schick 2002: 34). Such 
developments could also indicate the need to revisit key constitutional components related to the 
separation of offices.  Though the first two considerations are consequential for studies dedicated to 
alternate disciplines, this study places its focus on the consequences of the latter: namely the consequences 
of the observed institutional changes for legislative identity and life. 
This comparative investigation will proceed in the following fashion: Chapter two (2) provides an overview 
of the scholarship related to the subject to date. This will include studies that highlight legislative 
engagement in budgetary matters from a comparative perspective and will also encompass those studies 
that focus on the underlying determinants of legislative activism for the same. The third (3) chapter will 
introduce the methodology and methods employed by the study. Chapter four (4) will measure and 
document the behavioural and organisational changes in legislative budgetary activity across the five 
parliaments studied on the basis of a snapshot of the 2016/2017 fiscal year. From there, in chapters five 
(5), six (6) and seven (7), congruence tests will be conducted between the dependent variable and each 
three competing theoretical determinants of legislative activism.  Chapter eight (8) will address the role of 
political determinants in legislative budgetary engagement.   Finally, chapter nine (9) will draw conclusions 
on the basis of the comparisons made and make suggestions for continued research. 
Importantly, the data collection phase of this investigation formed a part of a parliamentary capacity 
development project, which spanned the course of 2015-2017. Data was collected as part of the first phase 
of a three-phase effort to support legislative reflection on and engagement in the budget process in 
Southern Africa. The data collection required a large financial investment from UKAID and spanned the 
course of over fifteen months. The project brought to a close nearly a decade of close work with parliaments 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Background 
 
The study of African legislatures is a nearly untouched subject of inquiry. Early case studies like those by 
Engholm (1963), Hopkins (1970) and Hakes and Helgerson (1973) and comparative works like those of 
Baaklini (1976), Stultz (1968) and Mezey (1983) provide important contextual baselines.  But even after 
the introduction of electoral competition across the continent from the 1990’s, scarcely more attention has 
been given to these institutions in more recent years. Today, a limited number of case studies including 
Barkan (2005) Thomas and Sissokho (2005), Melber (2005) and Murray and Nijzink (2002) scatter the 
landscape.  But even of these, few, like Burnell (2002) are published in major peer-reviewed journals.  
Moreover, only a fraction of research conducted on African legislatures is truly comparative in scope and 
approach (Barkan 2009: 5).    
 
Of those published more recently in leading journals, two provides cross-national analysis related 
specifically to African legislatures: Nijzink et al.  (2006) and Azevedo-Harman (2011). Empirical evidence 
has also been greatly enhanced through the African Legislatures Project (Barkan et. al. 2010).  However, 
Barkan (2009) provides the only detailed and systematic study of evolving institutional trends in 
parliaments throughout Africa. Both case study and comparative research on African parliaments and the 
budget process is equally absent. Here again, in leading journals, just one example can be found- Pelizzo 
and Kinyondo (2014) assess the state of Public Accounts Committees in East and Southern Africa.  Barkan 
and Mattes (2014) provide an (implicit) exploration of one aspect of African legislative budgetary 
engagement, namely Constituency Development Funds. Finally, Burnell (2010) contributes a detailed case 
study related to the Zambian Parliament. 
 
Because research on subject is lacking, findings from differing disciplines and methodologies have been 
combined in order to survey the terrain. The focus is placed on comparative studies, though relevant case 
studies are also incorporated. The scope of the review is also largely limited to published works.  
International aid providers, NGOs and other interest groups are well positioned to gather relevant data and 
produce reports on the same. However, these are also vulnerable inherent biases, which can significantly 
skew results. However, exceptions may be made where data is especially lacking. Finally, this work 
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deliberately situates the legislature as the central object of study.  This means that those portions of the 
budget process that do not involve the legislature directly are not included.  The restriction also means that 
I will not review the literature related to the budget process itself. The first portion of this thesis is 
dedicated to determining if these parliaments are, indeed, becoming more active in budgetary matters.  
Thus, I first look for studies that ask the same across differing geographical contexts.  In line with the next 
tier of questioning in this thesis, I then take a closer look at studies that address the question of why.   
 
Before delving in any further into the subject of legislative activism in budgetary matters, however, it is 
important to have a firm understanding of the budget process from a legislative perspective. The annual 
budget cycle can be divided into four phases.  The involvement of the legislature in any one of these phases 
is country specific and will differ slightly from case to case. In theory, however, there are possibilities for 
the legislature to engage in each stage.  Over the course of the formulation phase, for example, a legislature 
can deliberate on and informally influence decisions in relation to particular aspects of the budget.  Budget 
Committees or their equivalent often take on this task. At adoption, parliament can accept or reject some 
or all of the budget in plenary.  During executive implementation, the legislature can monitor government 
spending either through committee site visits, the scrutiny of executive reports, or by calling for expert 
testimony. And finally, at the audit stage, the Public Accounts Committee can scrutinize the audit reports 
compiled by the Auditor General and compile recommendations for change.  This general overview is 
indicative, not exhaustive.  Individual parliaments may apply some variation of these activities within this 
basic framework.  The figure below is illustrative in this regard, and is intended as a point of orientation for 


















         Source: Adapted from Downes and Nicol (2016)  
 
2.2 Evidence of Global Trends in Legislative Budgetary Activism 
 
The question of whether or not legislatures across the globe are becoming more active in the budget 
process is one that has not yielded much scholarly attention. While there is a body of literature dedicated 
to the reach of parliamentary influence over the annual budget (Wildavsky 1961) (Stapenhurst et al 2008) 
(Wehner 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2010) (Lienert 2005), to date, no study has addressed the question of 
institutional change across legislatures in budgetary matters. As an initial starting point, the literature 
makes a clear delineation between the roles played by the Parliament of the UK and that of the US Congress.  
Generally speaking, parliamentary practice in Westminster places a clear emphasis on the audit phase of 
the budget process, while the US Congressional example places an overwhelming emphasis on legislative 
engagement in budget formulation and policy influence. I provide a brief overview of the characteristics of 
these two dominant models of legislative budgetary engagement because assessments of legislative trends 
in budgetary matters are generally measured against each of these two ideal types.  
 
The United States Congress is an attractive model for the legislative branch because of its status as one of 
the most powerful legislatures in the world.  Unlike the case in Westminster, Congress ceded power to the 
executive to create a draft budget only 1921 in response to the need for fiscal discipline in the post war era 
(Schick 2002: 21).  Today, it has unrestricted constitutional authority in fiscal concerns.  In fact, the focus 
Formulation Adoption Implementation Audit






















is placed almost entirely on budget formulation: “Most of the year is spent in an attempt to reconcile the 
competing views of its members, who still often fail to agree on fiscal plans in time” (Schick  2002: 21). The 
committee system of the US legislature is also among the most complex, consisting of a number of 
specialized committees poised to analyse budget issues.  Legislators also have access to a large and well-
resourced Independent Fiscal Institution (IFI), namely the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), established 
in 1975.  
 
In contrast, the Parliament of Westminster is known as among the “least active of all legislatures in the 
developed world” in terms of financial scrutiny (Wehner  2014: 519). 1  Despite the fact that the Glorious 
Revolution (1688) formalized the prerogative of Parliament to control public spending, this practice 
changed over time.  In 1706 the Parliament scaled back its own power  “by adopting a standing order… that, 
with some changes in language, persists to this day: ‘This House shall not accept any petition for any sum of 
money relating to the public service, nor shall it pass upon a motion which would bring about a vote on a 
subsidy or on a charge against public revenues... unless upon recommendation of the Crown’ (Schick 2002: 
19).  Modern budgeting practices were introduced in the second half of the 19th century through the 
Gladstonian reforms, which included the introduction of the Public Accounts Committee.  However, by the 
19th century, Parliament was understood to fulfil just five functions- maintain a popular executive, 
represent its constituents, engage in civic education, act as a broker of critique vis-a-vis the government, 
and give ascent to legislation (Bagehot 1867).   The parliament did not incorporate portfolio committees 
for the purpose of overseeing and legislating across government departments until the 1970’s.   Until today, 
it also does not have a Budget Committee 2 (Jogerst 1993) (Barkan 2009, 9-11) or a Parliamentary Budget 
Office (PBO).3  Budgetary scrutiny places an emphasis on the audit phase where the emphasis is not how 
spending takes place, but rather that spending is ultimately found compliant with its intended purpose and 
is free of irregularities:  “Extravagance they cannot stop… but over irregularity of expenditure they exercise 
a potent control” (Courtenay 1911:90).  
 
For this reason, trends indicative of legislative budgetary activism will be those that are in line with the 
practices employed by the US Congress, not that of the UK parliament.  Survey and other data collected by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Network of Senior Budget Officials have 
enabled some analysis related to its member countries on the subject.  However, the studies that have 
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emerged thus far are somewhat disparate and lack a common analytical framework.  Using the results of 
OECD survey data from 2002, Wehner (2006) measures and ranks over thirty legislatures according to six 
dimensions of parliaments’ formal capacity to influence the budget. 4  As the results demonstrate, with the 
exception of the US congress, legislative power in budgetary matters is overwhelmingly weak (Wehner 
2006).  Though not specifically intended to analyse trends in legislative budgetary activism, Wehner’s 
(2006) results hint at rather bleak prospects for the same on the basis of legal powers alone.  
 
At the same time, there are also signs that legislatures are actually bolstering their role in budgetary 
matters (Schick 2002: 15).  According to Anderson (2009), more than half the countries surveyed in the 
2007 OECD study reported an increase in their budgetary roles from a decade prior (Anderson 2009: 3). 5  
And Posner and Park (2007) combine the results of a 2006 focus group discussion with those of the 2002 
OECD survey on budgeting and they also conclude a “resurgence” of legislative roles and responsibilities in 
budget matters.  Specifically, they find legislatures are creating more time to consider budget requests, 
establishing Budget Committees, tasking portfolio committees with budget reviews, negotiating informally 
with the executive, incorporating independent budgetary analysis into their administrative structures, 
focusing increasingly on executive performance in service delivery, deepening cooperation with Auditor 
Generals, beginning to scrutinize entitlement spending, placing restrictions on executive spending at 
implementation, and  reviewing overarching fiscal frameworks and targets (MTEFs) (Posner and Park 
2007).  While the results offer compelling, starting point, a more systematic treatment of the subject is 
necessary before firm conclusions can be drawn.  
 
In other cases, irrefutable empirical examples can be found.  Van Trapp et. al. (2016) examines the 
proliferation of Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs) in eighteen OECD members states.6  The authors 
demonstrate that within its membership, the number of Fiscal Councils and Parliamentary Budget Offices 
(each IFIs) has more than tripled since 2008. The trend is expected to rise both with the OECD and across 
the globe (Van Trapp et al. 2016:11). In the same vein, Baskin and Mezey (2014) document upward trends 
related to the proliferation of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) in Africa and elsewhere across the 
globe. According to the authors, “CDFs dedicate public money to benefit parliamentary constituencies 
through allocations and/or spending decisions influenced by Members of Parliament... and generally 
become institutionalized in the government’s annual budget” (Baskin and Mezey 2014: 1). While the 
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authors do not treat CDFs in the context of legislative budgetary activism, the evidence they present is 
nonetheless relevant here. 7 
 
Importantly, Araya (2013) also demonstrates the presence (though not necessarily the rise) of budgetary 
activism in his study on the Chilean Assembly. Through interviews with key informants and content 
analysis of written protocols, Araya (2013) finds that informal protocols regulate executive behaviour in 
budgetary matters, committing the government to a variety of tasks including the disclosure of budgetary 
information, the evaluation of programmes, and the reallocation of expenditures, amongst others (Araya 
2013: 74). His finding stands in stark contrast to the prevailing conceptualization of the Chilean Congress 
as a weak institution faced with one of the strongest presidencies in the world (Araya 2013: 77).  I include 
the example here because whether or not we are able to detect trends towards increased legislative 
budgetary activism will depend, in part, on the methodology employed.  The research thus invites the study 
of informal aspects of legislative budgetary behaviour, and emphasizes the limits of those based exclusively 
on formal rules.  
 
Finally, Barkan (2009) puts into question, for the first time, prevailing stereotypes surrounding African 
legislatures as ‘rubber stamp’ institutions on the basis of fieldwork conducted in the parliaments of South 
Africa, Kenya, Benin, Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria. The case studies include longitudinal accounts of the 
political and constitutional context, internal operations, the process of institutional capacity development, 
committee examination of important legislation, the structure and impact of political parties in the 
legislature, and the nature and agenda of “coalitions for change,” in each of the countries studied (Barkan 
2009: 28).  The evidence collected across cases lead the author to conclude that African legislatures are fast 
becoming “institutions of countervailing power” vis-à-vis the executive.  That is, legislative strength in 
Africa is on the rise.  
 
These combined findings suggest that legislatures from across the globe may, indeed, be becoming more 
active in budget proceedings.  However, different conclusions have been drawn depending on the 
methodology employed by the researcher.  Systematic research based on common frameworks of 
legislative activism throughout the budget cycle is needed in order to reach firm conclusions.  Evaluations 
of informal legislative practice in budget matters across geographies are also lacking. Nonetheless, 
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preliminary signals point towards clear trend towards increased legislative participation in budgetary 
matters.   
 
2.3 Potential Explanations for Legislative Budgetary Activism  
 
A review of the literature in the previous section suggests that there are preliminary signs that legislatures 
across the globe are engaging more actively in budgetary matters.  I will now explore what the literature 
has to say with regard to competing explanations for increased legislative involvement in budget 
formulation and oversight.  A theory that encapsulates the drivers of legislative change is not available.  
Mainstream theories used to study institutional behaviour in the neo-institutionalist landscape include 
rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism.  Of the three, 
only the latter is equipped to deal with notions of institutional change because historical analysis 
incorporates the passage of time as a constant (Immergut 2006).   
 
Nonetheless, both rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism offer an important 
foundation for modified approaches.  A theory based on rational choice emphasizes the power of rules to 
shape strategic, utility - maximising choices.  An adapted approach could thus emphasise the power the 
legal reforms- the introduction constitutional amendments or new laws- in spurring on institutional 
change. In highlighting the power of social and cultural norms to motivate specific behaviours, Sociological 
Institutionalism offers the possibility that changes to these could result in corresponding institutional 
changes. Historical Institutionalism, in contrast, offers no comparable explanatory base. But the theory 
does makes a cross- cutting methodological contribution in emphasizing the use of process tracing as a tool 
for identifying the antecedents of institutional change (Immergut 2006).   
 
Some scholars have proposed that legislative oversight is reflective of legislative authority, legislative 
ability, and the collective attitude of the legislature to act. This is otherwise known as the ‘Trinity of A’s’ 
(George and Morgan 1999). 8  I have chosen this basic framework as a preliminary guide to examining the 
determinants of increased legislative engagement in the budget because it offers a high degree of 
parsimony.  While other scholars posit a wider variety of potentially causal elements (Santiso 2004) 
(Lienert 2005), the ‘Trinity of A’s’ constitute an unwavering core. The concept of legislative ‘authority’ 
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refers to the formal powers enjoyed by a given legislature.  The ‘ability’ element relates to its technical 
capacity to conduct its work.  And the ‘attitude’ factor encompasses socially grounded motivations of 
individual MP or its Members as a collective.  Both the legal and sociological elements line up well with 
rational choice and sociological institutionalism, respectively. A theoretical base for technical ability can be 
borrowed from Organisational Theory.  A more detailed discussion related to the theoretical underpinnings 
of this study will be taken up in Section 3.5, dedicated to the independent variables applied in this study.  
 
I have thus chosen this basic template as a guide to the literature. However, save for the study conducted 
by Wehner (2010), no investigation rigorously examines causal variables that have a bearing on legislative 
budgetary influence.  And with the exception of Barkan (2009), no study explicitly and systematically 
investigates the causal antecedents of the emerging ‘strength’ of African legislatures.  The remaining 
literature hints at plausible causes, but these are treated only topically. Posner and Park (2007) point to 
the role of world credit standards, frayed party systems, increased accountability demands from citizens, 
and increased legislative capacity over time (Posner and Park 2007: 23).  Santiso (2004) concludes the 
ability of parliaments to effectively engage in the different phases of the budget cycle depends on 
parliaments’ prerogative to intervene, its technical capacities, whether it possesses the necessary political 
will, and the conduciveness of the governance environment (Santiso 2004: 53).   Lienert (2005) suggests 
legal constraints (e.g. fiscal rules, Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks, spending ceilings, or 
supranational regulations), number and strength of political parties, opposition parties, second chambers 
and coalition agreements all affect the ability of the legislature to engage with the budget.  And in their 
treatment of the Chilean Congress, both Agor (1971) and Hughes and Mijeski (1973) found a country’s 
historical development, public support, standing committees and professional staff important 
prerequisites. Proposed conjectures are many, but systematic empirical data is lacking.  Nonetheless, I 
review what is known about the subject in the sections to follow.  
2.3.1 The Role of Legal Authority 
 
The following sub-section is dedicated to a review of the literature related to the role of formal powers in 
legislative budgetary developments. Specifically: Do legal reforms lead to an increase parliamentary 
activism in budgetary matters? I begin with constitution types because these are understood to have a 
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major impact on legislative-executive roles (Cheibub et al., 2013: 1) and even policy outcomes (McGann 
2006: 443).  Baker (1971) and Hughes and Mijeski (1973) found constitutional powers important for 
legislative budgetary activism in the Latin American context.  Indeed, a study of the Brazilian Congress 
found that once constitutional changes were ushered in, the institution became more involved in the budget 
process (Blondel 1973).    
 
The most broadly held view posits that presidential systems offer legislatures greater leeway over 
executive budgetary policy than parliamentary systems (Lienert 2005).  Wehner (2010) empirically tests 
the power of separation of power systems to in determining the strength of legislative budgetary capacity. 
His findings suggest a robust relationship between separation of power systems and more advanced 
organisational capacities of a given legislature (Wehner 2010: 76-77). However, the ability to predict 
legislative activism in budgetary matters on the basis of constitution types is yet contested in the literature. 
One study finds that there are actually more differences within system types than between them (Cheibub 
et al.  2013). Still other scholars point to the importance of a more nuanced look at underlying 
organisational attributes, rather than merely constitutional frameworks, in shaping legislative behaviour 
(Cheibub and Limongi 2002).  Similarly, Lienert (2005) concludes that country- specific factors take 
primacy in determining budgetary powers of the legislature over constitution types (Lienert 2005: 18).  
 
However, even in the absence of scholarly debate, the use of constitutional categorization schemes to 
predict budgetary and other behaviours in the African context is particularly challenging.  This is because 
the governance models applied in most countries shortly after independence evade standard classifications 
(Diamond 2002) (Cassani 2014). With the introduction of electoral competition in the 1990’s and 
accompanying legal reforms, some scholars posited that legislatures would emerge as stronger institutions 
(Wehner 2004) (Barkan et al. 2010).  But, as Barkan (2009) explains, systemic features served to hinder 
such advancements. The practice of appointing MPs as Ministers and keeping backbenchers “compliant” 
through financial incentives “became the hallmark of neo-patrimonial rule across Africa” (Barkan 2009: 
14).9  Even in the absence of continued ‘neo-patrimonial rule,’ the fact that African parliaments do not 
maintain institutional autonomy means that behavioural predictions on the basis of constitution type are 
likely to be inaccurate. Where substantial overlaps in membership exist between the executive and the 
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legislature, the influence of the latter can be effectively neutralised (Nijzink et al. 2006: 319).  The following 
table is illustrative.  
 
Table 2.2: Degree of Institutional Autonomy by Country and Government Type  









Namibia Westminster* Semi-Presidential 
 
Semi-Presidential/hybrid All Ministers MPs 
Lesotho Westminster Parliamentary Parliamentary All Ministers MPs 
 
Malawi Westminster Parliamentary Presidential Most Ministers MPs 
 
Zimbabwe Westminster Parliamentary Presidential/hybrid All Ministers MPs 
 
Zambia Westminster Presidential Presidential All Ministers MPs 
 
 
*Westminster influence is indirect in the case of Namibia, via South African colonial control  
Source: Constitution Type at Independence and Degree of institutional autonomy (Nijink et al. 2006); Present Constitution Type (IPU 
PARLINE database 2014) 
 
I now examine the role of formal powers, beyond the constitution, in affecting legislative budgetary 
engagement. From van Trapp et al. (2016) we know that supranational agreements have proven 
instrumental in instigating widespread institutional change. Fiscal Councils and PBOs began to proliferate 
once the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (2013) was introduced in the European Union 
(EU) (van Trapp et. al. 2016: 11-12).  And in his comparative assessment of legislative budgetary powers 
Wehner (2006) provides implicit support for the idea that formal legislative amendment powers, 
budgetary reversion and executive flexibility at implementation are critical components for legislative 
activism (Wehner 2006).  In his later work, he concludes that in the absence of formal amendment powers 
legislatures are not able to influence government spending levels (Wehner 2010).  Additional findings also 
suggest a close relation between weak legislative amendment powers and a British colonial heritage 
(Wehner 2010: 76-77).  The conclusion is line with Prempeh who also finds “remarkable continuities” in 
legal and administrative practices between the Parliament of the UK and its former colonies in Africa 
(Prempeh 2013).  The cumulative result of these findings points to the idea that legislatures who are 
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modelled after the British parliament are prone weak amendment powers and that these legislatures, in 
turn, will not influence government spending.   
 
In sum, thus far, with the exception of the example originating in EU, explanations for legislative budgetary 
engagement have posited that this is either the result of constitutional provision or the result of legislative 
powers to amend the budget. There is merit to expanding this list.  We know formal legal powers are widely 
considered crucial drivers of behaviour in studies on institutions, but this corner of the literature offers few 
empirical examples of its weight in legislative budgetary engagement.  
2.3.2 The Role of Technical Ability  
 
The technical capacity of a legislature subsumes a number of financial, human and informational 
considerations, which serve to support the institution in its work. The origins of weak parliamentary 
capacity in budgetary matters date back to the historical development of the budget process itself, in which 
parliamentary engagement in budgetary matters was drastically reduced (Schick 2002).  Over time, 
expertise in economic and fiscal matters began to develop on the side of the executive and information 
asymmetries between the legislature and the executive continued to expand. Meanwhile, the subject of the 
budget has become increasingly more complex. This has meant that parliaments, particularly those with 
short institutional histories, face particular difficulties in this area.  
 
Legislative staff capacity is essential to both the administrative and committee components of a given 
legislature.  As Schick (2002) explains: “The up-staffing of legislatures is not limited to budget work, but it 
is in this area that some of the most dramatic changes are likely to occur… a growing number of legislatures 
are inching towards the view that they cannot truly exercise independent judgment on the budget if they 
do not have expert staff to help them do the job” (Schick 2002: 31). Parliamentary committees rely on the 
information and analysis obtained from support staff in order to meet the wide variety of demands with 
which they are faced. And in instances where there is a strong focus on the ex-ante phase of the budget 
process, legislatures may establish Parliamentary Budget Offices in order to generate the economic and 
fiscal information required by the Members, their Committees or their parties (Posner 2007: 18) (Van 




The importance of specialised staff to the exercise of policy influence is emphasized in early literature on 
legislatures (Mezey 1979). Adequate staff resources are necessary for committees to perform their growing 
oversight functions (Lees and Shaw 1979). In Latin America, Baker (1971) and Hughes and Mijeski (1973) 
found a standing committee system, and committee staff pivotal to legislative budgetary engagement.  
Many African legislatures began their independent institutional histories without parliamentary staff, 
which meant that each MP was left “to exercise his own judgment, supported by whatever meagre supply 
of facts he can discover for himself”  (Stultz 1968: 488).  Oppenheimer (1983) however, finds that a well-
staffed legislature is insufficient on its own to enable a strong legislative policy voice (Oppenheimer 1983: 
580).  
 
Legislatures also require adequate financial resources in order to function. Arguably the most powerful 
legislature in the world, the US Congress provided more than 3.9 billion USD to Congress, or about 7.2 
million USD per year for every Member in 200410 (Owens and Loomis 2007).  In addition, its Members 
employ about 10,000 staffers in their personal offices alone each may spend up to 1.6 million USD per 
annum for travel, office, staff, and communications.  Senators are allowed between 2.2 and 3.8 million USD 
for the same (Owens and Loomis 2007: 266-267).  Such figures are clearly out of reach for most national 
legislatures, but the point still stands: a country’s wealth is an overall determinant of whether or not a 
legislature will have the infrastructure needed to support its activities. However, the role of parliamentary 
finance a support to MP’s engagement in budgetary matters is not treated in scholarly literature.  Barkan 
(2009) incorporates the subject of MP salaries into in his exploration of the antecedents to the general 
strengthening of African legislatures and finds that low salaries combined with systems of patronage were 
responsible for keeping legislatures weak throughout much of their history (Barkan 2009). 
 
The role played by parliamentary committee systems in supporting independent legislative action is, 
however, treated widely.  Committee systems are understood to be at the “heart of legislative influence” 
(Posner 2007: 12) and a necessary condition for legislative influence in the policy making process (Mattson 
and Strom 1995: 250). Portfolio committees offer MPs the opportunity to scrutinize and question the 
executive (Norton 1998).  And these can build upon their experience in their respective of the sector of 
government over time (Ryle and Richards 1988: 167) Legislatures that organize their budgetary review 
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and oversight in specialized committees are able to analyse a large amount of complex information. These 
committees help divide the labour amongst the committees involved and encourage specialisation amongst 
the MPs in areas on par with those of the executive (Posner 2007: 5). That specialized committees are an 
important component of legislative budgetary engagement is supported widely (Mezey 1979) (Baker 
1971) (Huges and Mijeski 1973) (Agor 1971) (Krafchick and Wehner (1998) (Longley and Davidson 1998) 
(Posner and Park 2007) amongst others. In the African context, existing literature does not provide much 
guidance.  While legislative influence was found to be most likely in the relative privacy of committee 
meetings (Mezey 1983: 517) and private rather than public opposition was found to be the preferred mode 
of legislative influence in many emerging legislatures (Hopkins 1970), early reports on African legislatures 
found that while SROs provided for committees, these were rarely used (Stultz 1968: 489).  More recently, 
Pelizzo and Kinyondo (2014) examine the differences in organisation, mandate, and activities of Public 
Accounts Committees (PACs) in East and Southern Africa and compare these with other parliaments across 
the globe. They find low staff quality, lack of committee enforcement mechanisms, and lack of political will 
to be modern day hindrances to PAC performance in these sub-regions (Pelizzo and Kinyondo 2014). 
 
Relations and interactions amongst committees themselves also affect committee operations on budget 
matters.  Schick (2002) outlines three ways in which committees could be structured in order to organize 
their inputs to the budget at formulation.  The first is through a designated Budget Committee alone.  A 
second model includes the engagement of each of the portfolio committees.  And a third model combines 
the two by involving portfolio committees in the review of the relevant budget components with the aim of 
collecting recommendations for consolidation by a Budget Committee (Schick 2002: 29). Wehner (2011) 
surveys the prevalence of these models in a sample of thirty-four OECD legislatures and finds that in most 
cases, the Budget Committee is the only committee involved in budget approval (25/34).  Only in three 
cases are each of the portfolio committees involved (3/34) and five legislatures involve both portfolio and 
departmental committees in the approval process (5/34) (Wehner 2011). He also investigates the 
relationship between budget outcomes and the various styles of committee interaction and finds broad 
agreement in the scholarly community for the tenant that the centralised committee authority helps 
contain spending (Wehner 2010: 81).  However, the power of any one of these models to illicit more or less 




MP education levels can also bolster the technical capacity of a parliament.  Levels of MP education can vary 
considerably both across legislatures and over time.  However, it is assumed that an upward trajectory 
could be expected for most legislatures, in line with educational advancements at the national level. 11  Over 
the first 75 years of the US Congress, for example, the legislative branch was “composed of amateurs, 
transient and poorly educated politicians” (Owens and Loomis 2006: 262).  Today, some 92% hold a 
Bachelor’s Degree with some 38% trained as lawyers (Manning 2011).  According to data taken from the 
African Legislatures Project (ALP) today, we see a similar upward trend in educated MPs throughout much 
of the continent, though there is still significant diversity between cases. 
 
Figure 2.3:  MP Education (University Completed or Better) 
 
Source: Barkan et. al. (2010) 
 
In addition, Mattes and Mozaffar (2011) apply data taken from the African Legislatures Project (ALP) and 
investigate the political consequences of education amongst African MPs.  They find that highly educated 
MPs are more likely to devote time to committee and plenary work in contrast to work in party and 
constituency settings (Mattes and Mozaffar 2011: 12), and are far more likely to use the internet, make use 
of internal and external sources of information, and have travelled abroad more often than less educated 
members Mattes and Mozaffar 2011: 13).  Overall, the conclusion is that “highly educated MPs form the 
prime constituency of legislative reform and legislative strengthening (Mattes and Mozaffar 2011: 16).  
Though yet speculative, the findings may suggest a strong relationship between MP education and 
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Low technical capacities are widely understood to hinder the institutional advancements of legislatures in 
Africa (Stultz 1968) (Barkan 2009) (Nijzink 2006) (Azevedo-Harman 2011).  But information related to 
their technical capacities is overwhelmingly held by donor agencies today.  Aside from data stemming from 
the African Legislatures Project, little to no systematic information is available in the scholarly community 
(Barkan et. al 2010). In a similar trend, idea that legislative capacity development programmes strengthen 
the technical capacities of the legislatures they work with is endorsed by number of scholars (Burnell 2001) 
(Pelizzio and Kinyondo 2014) (Barkan 2009).  While widely assumed to be beneficial, there is no empirical 
backing for this claim.   
2.3.3 The Role of Norm-Based Influences  
 
I now take a look at norm-based explanations for budgetary activism.  Norm based determinants of 
legislatures that become increasingly more engaged in the budget are rooted in the idea that parliaments 
are social institutions and influenced by both internal and external social elements (Best 2014: 57). The 
focus here is on how social factors shape the attitudes of MPs and, ultimately, their collective actions within 
a legislature, extending well beyond, but nonetheless encompassing legislative action in budgetary matters.  
 
Scholarly attention to national level norms as drivers of legislative budgetary behaviour includes a diverse 
supply of speculative arguments alongside few systematic studies.  Norms that emanate from the national 
level include ideas like culture, public opinion and the concept of “political will.”  In the legislative context, 
political will and MP attitudes are closely related.  This is because, here, both individual and collective 
attitudes are disciplined by the constraints of party loyalty. The importance of political capacity is widely 
acknowledged, though not substantiated, in broad number of works including Pelizzo and Kinyondo (2014) 
and Carlos (2004).  (Because the subject is expansive, a more detailed exploration of the role of political 
calculus and party dynamics in legislative budgetary matters can be found in Chapter 8 Political 
Determinants.  In addition, increased demand for transparency and accountability is referenced in Wehner 
(2002) and Posner and Park (2007) as a determining factor.  And the role of public support for legislative 




The first empirical test of the causal power of internal norm-based influence is found in Barkan and Mattes 
(2014). The study investigates the forces driving the proliferation of CDFs specifically throughout East and 
Southern Africa on the basis of both interview and survey data (Barkan and Mattes 2014).  The results 
showed the strongest support for a theory based on a ‘systematic misunderstanding’ between MPs and 
their citizens in representational demands vs. needs.   Nonetheless the possibility that increased citizen 
demands for local development was also conceded to be a plausible explanation on the basis of the data 
collected (Barkan and Mattes 2014: 27).  The study provides the first known large N examination of some 
potential determinants of the proliferation of CDFs in Africa, inviting further probing and analysis.  
 
The importance of culture in deterring legislative action in Zambia is treated on the basis of extensive 
fieldwork in Burnell (2001). Burnell (2001) finds ‘financial indiscipline’ and chronic executive disregard 
for institutional protocols is responsible legislative paralysis in the budget process (Burnell 2001).  The 
case study thus provides a detailed characterization of the political culture as a significant block to 
legislative influence over the budget. 
 
Finally, Barkan (2009) investigates the role of both internal and externally based norms in bolstering 
legislative strength in case studies of six African legislatures.  He explores the role that pressure from 
internal patron-client politics plays in legislative development as well as the influence from “coalitions” of 
reform-minded MPs.  He also investigates role of externally based foreign aid and NGOs in precipitating 
institutional change. The study marks the first attempt to theorise the drivers of African legislative 
development on the basis of research in the field (Barkan 2009: 5-6).  Through the application of extensive 
process tracing, Barkan finds the most support for an explanation based on a ‘coalition’ of reform minded 
MPs. These coalitions, Barkan finds, are conditioned by an influx of international donor and NGO influence 
in the parliaments concerned (Barkan 2009: 27). As he explains: “Reformers are more likely to subscribe 
to global norms and see themselves as the institutions to which they belong operating on these standards. 
Rather than resist the changes that come from globalisation, they embrace them” (Barkan 2009: 233). 
These conclusions offer the first norm-based hypotheses on the determinants of stronger legislatures in 




More recent literature related to legislative change reminds us that parliaments, as institutions, develop 
over time according to a process of ‘political transfer.’ Squire (2012) tracks the historical evolution of 
American state legislatures in a similar fashion and finds their evolution to be closely tied to their 
relationship with the US Congress.  In examining the historical antecedents of parliamentary procedures in 
Finland, Pekonen (2014) highlights the role of peer-to-peer learning in shaping the legislature’s 
development, which has at its core, a competitive element (Pekonen 2014: 19).  Rather than taking on the 
on the colonial blueprint offered by Sweden, the Finnish legislature followed European newspaper 
publications in order to better understand what it was to be parliament and source ideas for its own 
reforms (Pekonen 2014: 21). Finnish parliamentarians also travelled internationally in order to learn about 
the practices of other parliaments and participated in international parliamentary conferences as early as 
1906 (Pekonen 2014: 37-38).  This finding is in line with what we know about “mimetic” isomorphism in 
organisations, in which “organisations tend to model themselves after similar organisations on their field 
that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 152). Indeed, although 
the authors do not focus on legislatures specifically, in trying to understand broad similarities across 
organisations, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) posit institutional similarities come as a result of either 
coercive, mimetic or normative processes (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
 
The possibility that other externally based influences are responsible for legislative activism in budgetary 
matters is otherwise explored only topically in the literature.  Schick (2002) suggests that interest groups 
may be closing in on negotiation space available to a legislature.  Posner and Park (2007) also suggest that 
pressures related to world credit standards could play a role (Posner and Park 2007: 23). While each offers 
compelling explanations, these require empirical backing and further refinement 
 
2.4 Summary and Conclusions  
 
The starting point throughout the literature is that legislatures are of little to no consequence in policy 
formation and remain beholden to the preferences of strong executives in budgetary issues. General 
knowledge about legislative development tells us that the history of legislative-executive relations serves 
to limit a legislatures role in budget formulation and restrict its information supply.  The examples of the 
US Congress and the UK Parliament offer two competing models for legislative budgetary engagement and 
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legislative trends are widely assessed on the basis of where they fit between on a spectrum between these 
two ideal types.  
 
A survey of studies documenting trends in legislative budgetary activism suggests this is on the increase 
worldwide. However, findings differ depending on the methodology employed. Rule-based assessments 
suggest that scope for legislative influence in budgetary matters is limited in most modern democracies 
(Wehner 2006).  Studies that focus on informal legislative behaviours, in contrast, suggest this scope is 
much wider (Araya 2013). Others report that budgetary activism is on the rise on the basis of a broader 
palate of institutional components (Posner and Park 2007) (Anderson 2009) (van Trapp et. al. 2016) 
(Baskin and Mezey 2014).  However, the most extensive longitudinal treatment of African legislatures finds 
that these parliaments are vastly gaining in strength on a number of fronts (Barkan 2009).  
 
A review of the reasons why legislatures are becoming more active in budgetary oversight and formulation 
reveals no clear support for a single conjecture. Changes in governance system types from the 1990’s were 
found to be of little consequence in the African context. And in the absence of amendment powers, Wehner 
(2010) finds that legislatures do not influence government spending levels. Technical ability as an 
explanation for legislative action is less contested in the literature than the role of legal powers.  However, 
the relationship between technical abilities and legislative engagement in the budget process is also barely 
explored.  Sufficient staff numbers and portfolio committee systems are widely accepted as necessary, if 
insufficient, features of influential legislatures. And, in one of the few systematic studies on the subject, 
rising educational levels of MPs were found to be of consequence to parliamentary oversight (Mattes and 
Mozaffar 2011).   
 
Finally, norm-driven elements are amongst the least developed area of inquiry on legislative budgetary 
activism.  Barkan and Mattes (2014) find preliminary support for the idea that citizen demand may be 
instrumental in the establishment of CDFs, though competing conjectures must still be ruled out. 
Importantly, a more general review of the legislative transformation reveals that, at least in the case of 
Finland, extensive peer-to-peer exchange was responsible for the institutional development of the 
legislature over time.  Pekonen (2014) and Squire (2012) demonstrates that legislatures have historically 
relied on one another in order to learn what it is to be a parliament.  However, the most formal treatment 
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of norm-driven influences specifically in the African context is conducted by Barkan (2009) who finds 
international donor influence, combined with MP ‘coalitions for change,’ are responsible for emerging 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
The approach ultimately selected for this study builds upon the collective strengths and limitations found 
in previous research.   To date, no study has documented the changing legislative budgetary dynamics in 
Africa.  There is also a paucity of theoretical and empirical research dedicated to explaining institutional 
developments towards the same. The foundations of this thesis thus rest heavily upon the combined works 
of Wehner (2006/2010) as this pertains to legislative engagement in budgetary matters and Barkan (2009) 
with regard to more recent developments in African legislatures. As a basic point of departure, I share the 
same philosophical-ontological foundations implicit in these two bodies of research: namely that of the 
separation of the subject and object of study (i.e. “mind-world dualism”) and a commitment to both 
observable and non-observable (though detectable) phenomenon (i.e. “phenomenalism”). Each of these 
will be elaborated in the section dedicated to the philosophical-ontological commitments applied in this 
study, to follow.  
 
3.1 Ontological Foundations 
 
The first methodological assumption this study makes is one that relates to the philosophical question of 
the relationship of the researcher to world being researched.12  This is a crucial starting point because if 
the world of the researcher and that of the world on some level mutually constitutive or inseparable, there 
can be no objective investigation in the first place (Jackson 2011: 35). The assumption, namely of “mind-
world dualism” is inherent in most of what we would consider scientific research, though the specific 
epistemic goal will vary from case to case.13  Researchers make a commitment to this basic ontological 
assumption, even though we can never know for sure whether this is, indeed, the true nature of reality 
(Jackson, 2011: 96). An independent social world is thus understood as a “working proposition” and not a 
foreclosed fact (George and Bennet 2005: 136 footnote). In aiming towards a better understanding of 
several legislatures from a distinct, “objective,” standpoint, this study applies the basic ontological 
assumption that the mind of the researcher is separate from that of her object of study.   
 
The second philosophical-ontological assumption of this study, relates to that which is understood to exist 
in the world in the first place.   Broadly speaking, I take a “phenomenalist” standpoint, which includes both 
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observable and non-observable entities (Jackson 2011). Although phenomenalist practices have their 
origins in strictly observable entities, this has been expanded to include non-observables, through the 
availability of a growing array of “detection” tools that enlarge the scope of human experience (Jackson 
2011: 62-63). Thus, phenomenalism is now understood as an investigative commitment to all things that 
are experienced, observed, and measured “whether that experience involves touching it with our bare hand 
or peering at it through a telescope” (Jackson 2011: 36, 61).   This includes those aspects of the social world 
like “democracy,” “states,” and social norms that are detected on the basis of conceptual tools.  In addition 
to such tools, researchers have also expanded their “conceptual equipment,” devising scientifically 
accepted means of stretching the observable data which is available. We see this, for example, in the use of 
public opinion surveys (“a summation of individual mental states”) and the use of small sample sizes to 
represent larger cohorts of the population, to name just two examples (Jackson 2011: 87). 
 
Legislative institutions contain both observable and non-observable components. On the one hand, 
parliaments offer a great degree of transparency, either by virtue of public meetings or through the 
transcription and archival of proceedings, debates, deliberations, and legal foundations. 14   However, 
unobservable elements like questions of attribution (e.g. who really influenced budgetary outcomes) and 
informal modes of activity like ad-hoc budget institutions hold the potential to expose at least equally 
compelling aspects of legislative life.  In fact, as studies of legislative budget behaviour like that of Araya 
(2013) demonstrate, informally agreed protocols between the legislature and the executive have the power 
to significantly alter traditional conceptions of legislative-executive dynamics.  
 
This study places a focus on evidence derived from human subjects in order to gain a deeper and more 
contextualized understanding of the legislatures under study.  Until now, data related to informal or 
unobservable phenomena in the selected legislatures was simply not available.  Because I place primacy on 
informal legislative behaviours and institutions, I rely heavily on proximate measures of both theoretically 
observable but in the moment unobservable (e.g. committee scrutiny of reports) and unobservable (e.g. 
questions of attribution) elements. Non-observable information like informal modes of influence and 
information which is unlikely to be publicly confirmed are not the same types of invisible information.  
However, each can be reached through similar “detection devices,” namely, through human insights 




I also use insider assessments to determine the extent to which each behaviour or organisational attributes 
are be understood to exist in the first place.  And although I do not collect data related to actual budget 
amendments, Hansard transcripts, committee reports, I do subsequently check whether the documented 
behaviours and organisational attributes are indeed backed by legal codes over the course of the first 
congruence test. Some readers may still find the use of primary written sources of data left wanting in this 
thesis.  However, given the nascent stage of this research agenda, there is ample room to test the virtues of 
different ontologies and epistemologies at a later stage. For now, I focus on the what informal elements of 
legislative life can tell us about the present trajectory of legislative budgetary engagement.  
 
3.2 Research Design  
 
The research design incorporates both elements of the case study approach as well as those of a cross-case 
investigation.  Specifically, I apply a Most Similar System Design (MSSD) and study five legislatures in 
Southern Africa over the course of the 2016/2017 fiscal year.  A case is a specifically delineated unit 
observed at a single point or over some period of time (Gerring 2007: 19).  And in this thesis, the institution 
of parliament is the unit of analysis.  It is understood as political workplace consisting of all those employed 
in substantive roles, and who, collectively, comprise the institution. 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, I assume parliaments act as unitary actors with regard to a series of 
budgetary activities that are distinct from those carried out by the executive.  The characteristics of each 
parliament in this study are captured proximately, via interviews and focus group discussion with members 
and staff.  Members and staff were selected purposively on the basis of their budgetary roles and 
responsibilities; they were not selected randomly, and thus do not constitute a ‘representative sample.’ (for 
an overview of all interviewees, see Appendix 2) 15   
 
I focused on full time Members of Parliament in order to garner an exclusively legislative (that is, not 
executive) perspective.  For this reason, input from MP backbenchers and members of the opposition was 
privileged over that of legislative frontbenchers.16  From there, diversity was sought in terms of party 
affiliation, sex and age and chamber (where appropriate).  However, I also move beyond these traditional 
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metrics and incorporate MPs and staff that offer the greatest longitudinal and informational perspective.  
In other words, I sought perspectives from those MPs and staff with long tenures in Parliament and those 
holding key positions.  The former offers a contextualized understanding of the institution based on the 
cumulation of experience over time. The latter is important because key positions offer specialized access 
to information that is useful in understanding the positioning parliament vis-à-vis other institutions. In this 
way, the interviewees selected offer perspectives with a significant degree of depth and breadth. Using this 
broad approach, I emphasised the selection of Chairs of “money” committees including Budget (or the 
equivalent), Economics, or Public Accounts Committees as these are most directly relevant to the question 
at hand. However, related committees (e.g. Local Government, Statutory Corporations, or Parliamentary 
Reforms Committees etc.) were also consulted, in order to broaden the reach of understanding.  
 
I place a focus on a roughly even division between MPs and parliamentary staff within the interviews and 
focus groups conducted.  The combination helps to even out the composition of what is otherwise a highly 
mercurial institution. On the one hand MPs offer a certain degree of continuity: “individual members come 
and go, but the instituting remains- dependent on a certain number of active members, but independent of 
any single individual” (Patzelt 2012: 4).  On the other, MPs take on a broad number of roles, often applying 
more than one role at any given time. “In different situations, or with regard to different types of issues, 
different aspects of an institution become relevant, and different role orientations become salient” 
(Andeweg  2012: 81).  With such changeability within ranks of its Members, the parliament as a single 
entity is difficult to encapsulate.  Parliamentary staff offer a vital perspective on the enduring elements of 
legislative behaviour (as do long serving MPs). Staff with long tenures and those in key administrative 
positions offer the same type of longitudinal and informational “representation” as do Members of a similar 
profile.  However, parliamentary staff offer the added value of a greater degree of objectivity then Members 
simply by virtue of their positioning on the periphery and away from the spotlight. Such distance provides 
a different perspective and additional insights that could otherwise not be obtained from Members alone.  
 
While the data under investigation is comprised of a snapshot of the behavioural and organisational 
attributes of each of the five parliaments over the 2016/2017 fiscal year, I contextualize this with data 
going back to relevant moments over the previous 20-25 years. I also utilize independence as a baseline 
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from which to assess the general “before and after” in relation to legislative change. In doing so, this case 
study portion of the investigation incorporates a distinct historical or longitudinal dimension.  
 
The descriptive portion of this thesis places a strong emphasis on the examination of specific changes 
underway in each of the five legislatures related to their engagement in budgetary matters.  Because so 
little is known on the subject, the characterization of each legislature is conducted with a relatively high 
degree of scrutiny.  In addition to this extensive within-case data, I also investigate a unified set of 
properties related to legislative engagement in the national budget process across cases. In combining these 
two elements, the study takes on a “comparative historical” character, or one in which I investigate both 
within-case properties over time, as well these same properties as across a small number of cases (Gerring 
2007).  The shift from case study to cross case examination is a matter of degree, rather than one of kind.  
As Gerring (2007) explains, “Case study research may incorporate several cases, that is, multiple case 
studies. However, at a certain point it will no longer be possible to investigate those cases intensively. At 
the point where the emphasis of a study shifts from the individual case to a sample of cases, we shall say 
that a study is cross-case” (Gerring 2007: 20).  Using this definition as a guide, my initial characterization of 
the dependent variable is thus more akin to an individualized case study, while the explanatory section 
shifts its emphasis to that of a cross-case study.  
 
Once the explanatory stage of this thesis is reached, the study elevates the level of analysis in order to 
support the search for more generalizable claims. The data related to each of the three plausibility probes 
thus tends to be broader and investigated with somewhat less intensity than the data collected over the 
course of the descriptive portion of this investigation. Outcomes of the plausibility probes are then 
juxtaposed against one another and the attributes of each case are compared across legislatures.  
 
The decision to elevate the level of abstraction in the explanatory section of this thesis was based on a 
number of considerations.  In the first case, the signals that legislatures were engaging actively in budgetary 
matters were not limited to one or two cases but rather appeared to be indicative of a wider trend spreading 
throughout the many parts of (mainly anglophone) Africa. It was thus clear from the onset that an 
explanation emanating from a single unit would be unlikely to account for the proliferation (rhetorical or 
actual) of institutions like Parliamentary Budget Offices, Budget Committees, and Constituency 
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Development Funds across a number of cases. Before undertaking my research, I had therefore 
hypothesized the influence of a socialization process, but needed to be sure that other explanations could 
not account for what I was witnessing as well.  
 
Secondly, prior to the writing of this thesis, I was also professionally involved in the field of legislative 
development in Africa. This work was comparative, and included extensive involvement with questions 
related to the relationship between the executive and the legislature, particularly as this was triangulated 
with the work of international donors.  I thus opted for an area in which I could leverage the most 
experiential knowledge.  This experience was subsequently reinforced by my exposure to seminal works 
in the literature on the development of African legislatures that emphasise the very same dichotomy.  Both 
Barkan (2009) and Polsby (1968) characterize ‘strong’ legislatures as those that demonstrate a high degree 
of autonomy relative to the executive.  Squire (2012), for example, describes the early evolution of 
American state legislatures as “driven by their objective to become more powerful political actors” (Squire 
2012: 323).  Exposure to and experience with these works directed my focus to the question of national 
institutional autonomy and the relationship of African legislatures (here again, as a collective, autonomous 
entities) vis-a-vis a wide range of international actors.   
 
Such an approach also allows for more generalizability (George and Bennett 2005: 243).  While micro level 
explanations present intriguing possibilities to some of the questions posed in this thesis it was simply not 
possible to collect data on every eligible aspect. Furthermore, the conjectures tested here have their roots 
in neo- institutionalist thinking, which significantly reduces the scope for explanations based on individual 
political calculus, almost per definition.   As a result, country level political party dynamics are excluded 
from this research as were alternative micro-level explanations, such as those that relate back to the role 
of parliamentary authority figures in instigating and supporting the process of change (i.e. the Speaker 
and/or the Clerk). 17  (Chapter 8 Political Determinants further elaborates on this subject). These each offer 
fascinating and important propositions, but at some point, a choice had to be made with regard to the 
desired level of explanatory depth.  I ultimately privilege a higher level of abstraction. 
 
Finally, practically speaking, a higher level of abstraction was desired because only such an approach could 
yield information that would benefit those parliaments engaged in a parliamentary capacity development 
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project (designed by this researcher) aimed at reflection on changing engagement of African legislatures in 
the budget process and future reforms. The idea was to facilitate this reflection on the basis of real time 
data so that institutional modifications could be based on strong, comparative, foundations. Generalizable 
claims were simply more useful for this purpose (George and Bennett 2005: 243). 18 
 
3.3 Case Selection  
 
 
This particular number of cases was chosen as a “satisficing” strategy appropriate for a PhD thesis. I wanted 
to examine the greatest number of similar cases that demonstrated the widest apparent variation with 
regard to the dependent variable, consistent with a project that was manageable.  Studying just two or three 
cases would not yield sufficient reason to believe that a particular explanation holds true across additional 
parliaments with similar starting points. In contrast, it would have proved too difficult to conduct such 
intensive interviews and focus groups in the context of a larger sample.  
 
I sought a set of relatively homogenous cases with the understanding that the more background 
assumptions, the more tenuous the resulting inferences (Gerring 2007: 52). The case selection in this study 
was determined, in the first instance, by the presence of apparent signals of legislative budgetary 
engagement across various regions in Africa.  Anecdotal evidence suggested that Budget Committees (BCs), 
Parliamentary Budget Offices (PBOs), and Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) were beginning to 
appear in a number of countries across the continent with no obvious explanations as to why.  
 
Although early signals suggested that each parliament was, indeed, engaging more actively (or had 
rhetorical intentions to so engage), there were also important differences. In two parliaments, signals of 
changing budgetary engagement appeared merely rhetorical (Namibia, Lesotho), while in two cases, these 
appeared to be backed by demonstrable institution developments (Zimbabwe, Zambia), and one case, the 
final tally pointed to a somewhat mixed constellation (Malawi).  This initial variation provided some “causal 
leverage,” leaving ample space to consider a variety of potential explanations for the same (Gerring 2007: 
149).   Cases were not, however, simply selected on the basis of the dependent variable. The Parliaments of 
Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania were also hinting at the prospect of more active engagement 
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in budgetary issues at the time of data collection, for example.  However, because these parliaments did not 
fit the accompanying selection criteria (elaborated upon below) they were not selected for this study. 19 
 
In response to Gerring’s question: “Where do like cases end and unlike cases begin” (Gerring 2007: 53), my 
starting point rests heavily on previous work with African legislatures from an international development 
perspective. 20  The case selection process was thus highly dependent on some basic assumptions about the 
broader population of legislatures across Africa and further abroad (Gerring 2007: 90).   The benefit of 
studying legislatures in Southern Africa is that they have a great deal in common with each other relative 
to other legislatures across the globe. These countries consider themselves “same enough” to be part of a 
well-institutionalized political-economic community, namely the Southern African Development 
Community or “SADC”.   And, overall, the legislatures in each of these countries face very similar day to day 
challenges, making them a relatively homogenous grouping. My work was comprised of parliaments 
housing similar needs and each were positioned in similar compromising power positions vis-a-vis their 
executives and international development actors, more generally.  Based upon what I knew to be similar 
about these cases, therefore, I would have expected to see different levels of budgetary engagement based 
upon technical advancements, changing legal frameworks in line with “democratic” trends, or as a result of 
the influence of any number of powerful international development actors.    
 
I selected legislatures in Southern Africa with a British colonial legacy in order to ensure a similar baseline 
scenario in terms of the types of budgetary practices that could be expected, as well as the characteristic 
legislative-executive ‘mixing’ associated with parliamentary systems of government. On the basis of these 
collective criteria, candidate legislatures thus included: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   
 
In order to limit explanations based on the economic characteristics of each country, I wanted to select only 
parliaments from lower and lower-middle income countries. This left a short list of Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  From here, Swaziland was not selected because it is not a 
multi-party system and is heavily influenced by the wishes of the King.  Practical constraints also gave shape 
to the choices involved.  The Parliament of Tanzania, for example, was ultimately not available to 
participate, given time constraints over the project years concerned (2015-2017).  I thus reconsidered the 
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incorporation of Parliament of Namibia.  Namibia is categorised as an ‘upper-middle income country’ by 
the World Bank (2017) but high-levels of income inequality means that the vast majority of the society is 
poor (in fact, its GINI coefficient of 0.597 makes it one of the most unequal countries in the world).  This 
means that at least at the grass-roots level, Namibia, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia are each 
situated in a similar development context, including a high level of need, and the presence of development 
oriented civil society organizations, and international development agents (donors, international financial 
institutions).   
 
Finally, it was not possible with this number of cases to consider every potentially important variable in 
the case selection process. Two such variables are electoral system, and political competitiveness. The 
selected countries exhibit a high level of comparability in terms of single member electoral systems for 
selected in representative to the lower house in four countries (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Lesotho all 
use plurality methods to select members from single member districts).  In Lesotho however, this is 
supplemented by additional members (40 of 120) who are selected on the basis of proportional 
representation. And in Namibia, in the lower house members (though not the upper) are selected from 
national party lists on the basis of proportional representation (PR).  Given that each of the parliaments 
selected appeared to be engaging more actively in budget matters despite the (relatively minor) variation 
found in their electoral processes, I suspected electoral systems to be less likely to explain the changes that 
were presently unfolding.  Moreover, if both the US and the UK apply single member electoral systems and 
each parliament engages in budgetary matters to drastically different degrees, I reasoned that the electoral 
system alone is unlikely to account for the activity witnessed.   
 
The selected countries also vary in terms of political competitiveness.  Namibia is a classic example of a 
one-party dominant system, whereby a former liberation movement (SWAPO) has maintained a strong 
political majority since independence.  Zimbabwe was traditionally a one-party dominant system, but since 
2000, the once dominant ZANU-PF has encountered strong electoral challenges from the MDC, even losing 
control of the legislature in 2008. In the period under study, however, ZANU-PF remerged as dominant, 
with 73 percent of the seats. In the other three countries, the governing party controlled a minority of 
legislative seats in the period under study. However, because fluctuations in electoral gains and losses are 
ill suited to explain long-term and informal institutional changes, I deemed electoral competition less 
 
 33 
important than other potential explanatory variables.  Ultimately, however, this is an empirical question, 
and in Chapter 8 I will examine whether variations in political competitiveness (specifically, measures of 
democracy, the presence of minority governments, and electoral turnover) helps discriminate between 
levels of budgetary activity.  
 
Five parliaments were thus ultimately selected for this study.  These include the parliaments of Namibia, 
Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia. The composite picture is one in which each of the five parliaments 
chosen are understood to share a great deal of baseline geographic, historic, and socio-economic elements, 
which are known to bear varying degrees of influence the way in which legislative incentive structures 
operate.   
 
3.4 The Dependent Variable 
 
 
When it comes to the comparative analysis of legislative engagement in the budget only Lienert (2005) and 
Whener (2006/2010) offer examples suitable for this thesis.  I focus on that of Wehner (2006/2010) 
because these offer the most extensive treatment on the subject.  Wehner (2006/2010) explores the scope 
for legislative influence in budgetary matters on the basis of both executive and legislative legal powers, on 
the one hand, and the organisational characteristics of the legislature, on the other.  The study places a 
focus on formal institutional arrangements, which are assumed to be reflective of the “budgetary power” 
of a legislature (Wehner 2010: 45).  This does not include “concepts such as culture and social norms that 
might be regarded as ‘informal’ institutions. The stricter definition enables a focus on how formal political 
institutions, in particular constitutional features, affect public policy” (Wehner 2010: 2).21 
 
The dependent variable in this thesis has been designed to mirror that of Wehner (2006/2010) in terms of 
its dual-pronged structure.  However, building on the findings Araya (2013) with regard to the importance 
of informal legislative budgetary practices, I emphasize informal behavioural characteristics of the 
legislatures under study rather than those of a purely legal nature. The decision was based, in part, on my 
analysis of the relative rankings assigned to African parliaments on the basis of Wehner’s (2006) index.  
The 2008 CABRI and African Development Bank report: “Budget Practices and Procedures in Africa” 
(CABRI/AfDB 2008) applies the formal measures proposed by Wehner (2006) in the African context.  
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Findings suggest that the Liberian legislature is amongst the most powerful of those examined. Having 
worked with the legislature rather extensively in 2009, I bore witness to the extreme limitations of the 
institution to complete the most basic of legislative tasks.  My experience thus ran diametrically counter to 
the findings guided by Wehner’s (2006) measurements; not only was the Liberian legislature not situated 
amongst the most powerful in Africa, it was potentially one of the weakest parliaments I had encountered 
to date.  It was thus clear that the index was not suitable for the African context in which legal frameworks 
are often out of sync with actual behaviour. 
 
The discrepancy between legal frameworks and legislative realities also informed my mode of data 
collection with regard to the dependent variable.  While Wehner (2006/2010) collects time-bound, written, 
documentation, I give primacy to data generated on the basis of MP and staff accounts of legislative life. In 
this way, measures of budgetary activism could include elements like relative influence of the legislature 
over the development or recurrent budget, the establishment of ad-hoc or informal organisational 
structures (e.g. CDFs, PBOs), informal modes of committee coordination or legislative consultation with the 
executive.  (Whether or not these practices are embedded in legal frameworks is something I explore in 
Chapter 5, where I conduct the first plausibility probe.)  I also wanted to track real time developments in 
these legislatures in order to make practical use of the data generated amongst the parliaments themselves.   
In basing my data collection efforts in interviews and focus groups, I thus was able to interrogate both 
informal practices as well as dynamics of change with relative ease.   
 
In addition, I wanted to ensure that my measure of budgetary activism included attention to activities 
spanning the full budget cycle because “legislative budget work has as much to do with policy making as 
with controlling executive action…” (Schick 2002, 32).  The variables applied in Wehner (2006/2010) 
encompass the budget cycle in its entirety, but the index affords less attention to legislative activities in the 
implementation and audit phases.  For example, measurements related to the implementation phase are 
limited to legal limitations to the executive’s ability to modify the budget once implementation is underway.  
However, in line with my commitment to focus on uniquely legislative behaviours and attributes in this 
study, I hone in on the activities of the legislature over the course of executive implementation instead.   
With regard to budgetary audit, the index incorporates Public Accounts Committees (PACs) (and thus a 
specifically legislative approach) when assessing committee capacity as a whole, but only as a part of a 
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composite score that includes Budget Committees, Sectoral Committees, and Ex-Post Audit Committees.  
The arrangement serves to downplay the significance of PACs which is unfortunate, as the committee is 
considered a hallmark feature of legislative budgetary engagement in parliamentary systems.  This makes 
the index less than ideal for use in comparing legislative budgetary strength across a diverse set of system 
types. 
 
Finally, I wanted to be sure measurements of legislative activism in budgetary matters were in line with 
African realities.  The characteristics measured by Wehner (20016/2010) are for explicit use in ‘modern 
democracies,’ rendering the components and their scales inappropriate for the African context. The 
thresholds used to asses legislative research capacity, for example, range from [A] up to 10 [B] 11-25 [c] 
26-50 and [d] more than 50.  Most, if not all African legislatures would be hard pressed to exceed the first 
threshold [a].  In addition, hardly any variation is likely to be found in Africa in terms of executive powers 
of the purse given both colonial legacies and authoritarian practices thereafter.  For this reason, 
measurements related to budgetary amendment powers, budgetary reversion, executive flexibility during 
implementation, and timing related to the presentation of the budget at implementation would be unlikely 
to yield new information.  In short, the only category appropriate for the study at hand relates to committee 
expertise based on the presence or absence of Portfolio, Budget and Public Accounts Committees.  
 
In sum, although the index created by Wehner 2006/2010 serves as an essential launching point for this 
study, it is unable to capture the outcomes I am interested in exploring here.  Therefore, I alter these 
measurements towards those suitable for an informal African context and expand substantially upon the 
number of sub-dimensions to include both tools for legislative policy making and legislative control.  While 
apparent signals in Southern African Parliaments point to increased activity in the formulation phase, this 
study includes measurements across all phases of the budget cycle. 
 
In the dependent variable, I thus capture two broad dimensions of change in legislative budgetary 
engagement. These include: (1) changes in legislative behaviour and (2) changes in organisational 
attributes in budgetary matters.  An exclusive focus is placed on the legislature within these two sub-
dimensions. The first component of the dependent variable relates to behavioural changes reported by MPs 
and staff from the parliaments under investigation. These must be repetitive in nature and include a 
 
 36 
component of the collective action of the legislature as a whole. Organisational attributes, in contrast, refer 
to a set of regular procedures or structures that form the institutional backbone of the parliament.  As 
explained, these components build upon the work of Wehner (2006) but I collect data on both formal and 
informal aspects of legislative life.  Informal aspects of legislative life are not limited to behavioural aspects. 
Similarly, formal aspects are not limited to organisational components. The dependent variable thus 
contains both formal and informal components, though the emphasis is placed on behaviours and 
organisational components that are not codified in law.   
 
I place a focus on a snapshot of the fiscal year 2016/2017 in characterizing the dependent variable. 
However, in order to establish a baseline related to the process of change over time, the sub-elements of 
the dependent variable are each compared with behaviours and organisational attributes found after the 
onset of electoral competition in each country.  This includes broad trends that have been in motion since 
the turn of the millennium, or roughly the past 20- 25 years.  The approach allows for the incorporation of 
detailed contextual clues that will contribute to an understanding the sequence of events leading up to any 
observed changes and widens the scope for the identification of potential determinants of the same. 
 
I focus mainly on behavioural and organisational changes that deviate from standard Westminster 
practices as inherited at independence. Therefore, a key assumption is thus that the legislative practices 
inherited at independence remain unchanged over the period of single party rule experienced shortly 
thereafter. In addition, rather than simply documenting practices and organisational attributes that differ 
from Westminster practices, a small number of sub-dimensions could reveal a parliament that is working 
towards expanding the scope of its budgetary scrutiny and influence more generally.  Demonstrations of the 
latter were in included in order to ensure that the full budget cycle was considered.  
 
The first aspect of the dependent variable to be taken into consideration relates to changing behaviours in 
legislative budgetary activism.  These include those behaviours taken up by the parliament as a whole, its 
committee system, or its MPs (predominantly backbenchers and opposition Members).  This element is 
divided into the following six sub-dimensions:  The first sub-dimension documents the ways in which the 
parliament is or is not influencing budgetary appropriations at adoption.  This includes instances where the 
legislature claims to be influencing both the recurrent and development expenditures.  Recurrent 
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expenditure is comprised, in part, of government obligations that have already been authorized through 
existing legislation. These do not require additional approval of parliament on an annual basis, though in 
some cases, statutory expenditure is included in budget overviews and presented to parliament for 
informational purposes.  Recurrent spending generally accounts for the bulk of budgetary allocations in 
the region. Development spending, on the other hand, is more flexible, and can be allocated towards any 
number of purposes on an annual basis. However, the portion of the budget dedicated to development 
spending is typically quite modest in Southern Africa given low economic thresholds coupled with 
relatively inefficient public services. 
 
The second sub-dimension includes consultations organised between representatives from parliament and 
the executive prior to the adoption of the budget. Such consultations may be formally or less formally 
arranged and structured and may take place at any time along the budget’s cycle. The third sub-dimension 
includes the question as to whether or not the parliament has modified the way in which its committees 
coordinate with one another in order to scrutinise the budget before it is adopted.  Important for this sub-
dimension is evidence of structured interaction between the Budget Committee and other committees in the 
house or between chambers.  The fourth sub-dimension relates to the execution of committee scrutiny visits 
to areas where the executive is reported to have plans for implementation or where projects are underway 
or complete. The fifth sub-dimension includes demonstrations that portfolio committees are making a 
practice of scrutinising monthly, quarterly, or annual reports from government Ministries, Agencies, and 
Organisations (MAOs) within their respective remits. Finally, in order to include each element of the budget 
cycle, the sixth sub-dimension relates to the auditory phase. If the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has 
begun to scrutinize local government audits, this is taken to signify that the parliament is endeavouring 
expand upon the portion of budget it oversees.  
 
The second component of the dependent variable relates to changing organisational aspects of legislative 
budgetary engagement.  This dimension is also divided according to six sub-dimensions.  The first sub-
dimension relates to the establishment of a Budget Committee, created for the purpose of supporting 
legislative engagement on issues of budget formulation and monitoring. 22  The second sub-dimension relates 
to the establishment of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs).  As explained by Baskin and Mezey 
(2014), “CDFs dedicate public money to benefit parliamentary constituencies through allocations and/or 
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spending decisions influenced by Members of Parliament... and generally become institutionalized in the 
government’s annual budget” (Baskin and Mezey 2014: 1). This sub-dimension thus takes a closer look at 
this mode of legislative influence over national spending plans.  The third sub-dimension captures the 
interest and ability of the legislature to influence spending plans at the decentralized level.  It thus includes 
whether or not its MPs hold a formal mandate to influence local level appropriations as well as perceptions 
related to their influence over the same. This serves as counterpart to the behavioural sub-dimension 
related to PAC scrutiny of local government audits as changes within each of these are interpreted to mean 
the legislature is becoming more involved in a broader portion of the national budget.  
 
The fourth sub-dimension considers the presence or absence of a parliamentary research department, 
which may or may not include a specialization in economic or fiscal matters. The fifth sub-dimension relates 
to the proverbial ‘smoking gun’ of legislative engagement in budgetary matters, namely the establishment 
of a Parliamentary Budge Office (PBO). These serve as support structures for MPs and committees 
throughout the whole of the budget cycle, though their emphasis is on the formulation stage. Finally, the 
sixth sub-dimension seeks to capture any moves on the part of the legislature to establish additional time 
for budgetary scrutiny before the budget is adopted.23  
 
  Table 3.1: Overview of the Dependent Variable 
Dimension of Changing Legislative  
Involvement in Budget Matters  
 Sub- Dimensions 
Changes in Behavioural Aspects 
 
 
• Influence over Budget 
• Participation in Pre-Budget Consultations  
• Cross-Cross-Committee Coordination at Adoption 
• Committee Scrutiny Visits  
• Committee Scrutiny of Quarterly and Annual Reports  
• Committee Scrutiny of Local Government Audits 
Changes in Organisational Aspects 
 
• Establishment of a Budget Committee  
• Establishment of a CDF  
• Formal Links to Local Budget Formulation 
• Establishment of a Research Department  
• Establishment of a PBO 
• Additional Time for Scrutiny at Adoption 
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3.5 Independent Variables  
 
The explanatory section of this thesis essentially picks up where Barkan (2009) left off: African legislatures 
are “on the rise,” but why? 24  This thesis incorporates some of the conjectures previously explored by 
Barkan (2009) related to legal, technical and norm-driven determinants of legislative strength but I also 
broaden the scope for potential explanations by incorporating trends in legislative budgetary activism 
beyond Africa.  In addition, I reduce the object of study in terms of scope and geography. Rather than a 
general study of African legislative strength, I focus in on legislative activism in the budgetary matters 
specifically in Southern Africa.  This thesis thus asks: Are legislatures in Southern Africa becoming 
increasingly more active in budgetary matters? And if so, why?  
 
A theory that is capable of explaining institutional developments in legislative budgetary activism is not 
available. However legislative oversight is understood to be reflective of its authority, technical ability, and 
its collective attitude towards the same (George and Morgan 1999).  Using these thee concepts as a 
launching point, the explanatory portion of this reverts to a combination of neo-institutionalist and 
organisational theory. Though I apply these loosely, the theoretical start point does have bearing on the 
types of explanations that can be expected. For this reason, the theoretical terrain will be briefly reviewed 
here.   
 
Early studies of political institutions were generally comprised of case studies that examined formal rules. 
These tended to be holistic, historically oriented, and normatively concerned with notions of “good 
government” (Martin  2014: 7-8).  The emphasis on the role of tradition and norms was then replaced with 
a focus on calculations and individual choice with the shift to Behaviouralism in the 1950’s (March and 
Olsen 1984: 736).  A third (and- to date -final) shift in the study of political institutions was precipitated by 
March and Olsen in the early 1980’s, which saw these not only as reflections of society and the results of 
individual behaviour on the part of their Members, but also as autonomous actors in their own right.  The 
application of this modern approach to the study of institutions has consequences for the research 
conducted here. The introduction of concept of institutions as autonomous actors makes it possible to 
imagine, for example, that legislatures can act as players in the global political landscape or engage in social 
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exchanges between and amongst themselves.  The shift also has consequences for the role of political 
calculus in explaining change.  
 
Neo-institutionalism is generally understood as comprised of Rational Choice Intuitionalism, Sociological 
Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism. While each of these apply differing entry points to the 
study of institutions, they all serve to de-emphasize the role of individual calculus. This is because each of 
these are theories predicted on the power of institutions to constrain political behaviour. A discussion 
related to the reach of neo institutionalist thinking across each of the related disciplines is too vast to 
include here.  Suffice to say, the influence of the idea that institutions “matter” has been highly influential.  
Rational Choice and Sociological Institutionalism are used in this study to highlight the ways in which these 
different types of institutions shape the direction of change in each of the parliaments under investigation.  
Institutionalist theory does not yet include consideration for the ways in which technical institutions 
(patterns of professionalisation, trainings, or specializations etc.) shape behaviour.  I thus apply a general 
version of Organisational Theory to the ‘ability’ conjecture along neo-institutionalist lines.  This theoretical 
base is mainly descriptive and focused on systemic attributes, not behaviour per se, so I inject the 
assumption that increased technical ability holds the potential to affect change.   Thus, given the 
intuitionalist theories available today, this thesis takes a look, in sequence, at how legal frameworks 
influence institutional change; how technical or administrative frameworks influence institutional change; 
and how social or norm-based frameworks influence institutional change in the context of five legislatures 
in southern Africa.  
 
These three conjectures will be introduced in the following section and form the foundation for the small 
series of plausibility probes conducted in this thesis. Plausibility probes will thus be conducted in order to 
identify the presence of general causal tendencies (if any) across the cases examined here.  Based solely on 
co-variation, conclusions drawn at this stage are merely indicative of some sort of a relationship. In doing 
so, this thesis seeks to tests the causal waters rather than identify any single “explanation” outright.  This 
is line with expectations related to the reach of cross-case study designs which are inherently broad, elastic, 
and probabilistic and are thus likely to explain only a small portion of the variance with respect to a given 
outcome (Gerring 2007: 54-55).  The explanatory portion of this thesis thus aims for breadth over depth or 
“knowing less about more over knowing more about less” (Gerring 2008: 49).  Some trial and error can be 
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expected given the “protean” quality of this work (Gerring 2007: 39). For this reason, I apply an abductive 
logic of inference throughout each stage.  Abductive inference generates plausible explanations from the 
data available which “should be understood as a provisional claim, pending direct observation or detection” 
(Jackson 2011: 88).25 
 
It is possible, for example, that key explanatory variables may have been omitted. It is also possible that 
different factors or combination of factors could result in similar outcomes (or “equifinality”) to those 
examined here (George and Bennett 2005: 161). The causal terrain is highly complex which makes the 
reach of any causal suggestions resulting from this study inherently contingent on a wide variety of (known 
or unknown) factors.  Nonetheless, preliminary findings can be used to start the conversation on 
institutional change in African legislative budgetary matters.  Similar congruence tests could explore their 
reach and applicability in other developing country contexts.  And more detailed studies could bring us 
closer towards understanding mechanisms with the potential to account for the patterns identified 
(Gerring 2007: 39). 
 
I will now introduce the three provisional conjectures that will be tested against the changing behavioural 
and organisational attributes of the parliaments here. These include changing legal budgetary authority, 
changing technical abilities, and changing norm-based explanations. Finally, I round off this section with a 
brief discussion of the potential interaction affects between and amongst them. 
3.5.1 The Legal Explanation   
 
The first potential explanation understands the legal framework as a key impetus for parliamentary action 
in budget matters.  This theoretical explanation relates to the ways in which rules shape behaviour is a 
well-accepted tenant in the study of institutions.  According to rational choice institutional theorists, the 
formal institutional structure shapes the strategies taken up by MPs and staff towards utility-maximising 
ends (Hall and Taylor 1996: 944-946). Accordingly, it is important to understand the underlying legal 
framework on budgetary matters because formal powers may enable or incentivise the parliament to 
become more actively involved in the budget.  In short, those legislatures that are becoming more active 




The ‘legal’ explanation would thus expect that legislative activism in budgetary matters has occurred in 
those parliaments in which the Constitutions, laws or Standing Rules and Orders have been positioned to 
provide Members with the formal powers to do so.  One would also expect to find substantial evidence of 
compliance with explicit, formal, rules and frequent mention of legal reforms as an explanation for MP 
activism in this regard.  
 
The literature related to legal reforms as a determinant of legislative budgetary activism is focused heavily 
on constitution types and amendment powers.  This presents a limited number of possible entry points for 
legislative action and precludes the investigation of a number of other areas where legislatures can be 
potentially influential. I thus expand the inquiry to include a much broader palette of formal legislative 
powers. However, these are limited to corresponding components found within the dependent variable in 
order to allow for clear comparisons.  
 
The following nine components thus constitute those legislative budgetary powers reviewed under this 
explanatory cluster: (1) budgetary amendment powers, (2) legal provisions for the participation in pre-
budget consultations with the executive, (3) legal provisions for collaboration between and amongst 
committees before adoption, (4) legal provisions for committee scrutiny visits, (5) legal provisions for the 
scrutiny of executive reports, (6) legal provisions for scrutiny of local government audits, (7) legal 
provisions for a Budget Committee, (8) legal provisions for a CDF, and (9) legal provisions for a PBO.   
 
Two sub-dimensions under the organisational component refer to the formal legal powers of parliament, 
namely, formal links to local budget formulation and the establishment of additional time for scrutiny at 
adoption.  So as to avoid repetition, these two aspects will not be analysed a second time here. In addition, 
it is assumed that each parliament maintains the right to structure its own departments. For this reason, I 
do not probe the legal authority to establish a research department.  I also do not include recurrent 
expenditure in the analysis the ability of the legislature to amend this aspect of the budget is assumed to be 
similarly restricted across cases.  These and other components will be expanded upon in the section 
dedicated to empirical analysis to follow.  
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3.5.2 The Technical Explanation 
 
A second argument would offer that regardless of any changes to the legal framework, what really matters 
is the fact that that human, financial, and administrative capacities of the parliaments in question are on 
the rise. Overall, the technical argument posits that where parliaments demonstrate increased budgetary 
activism one will find substantial evidence of an increase in internal organisation, individual skills, and 
organisational resources.  Specifically, one would expect to see frequent reference to the impact of reforms 
that led to greater financial and human capacities, reforms that have attracted better educated MPs, as well 
as reforms towards more sophisticated committee systems and modes of operation. 
 
There are a number of sub-dimensions that could be explored within this theoretical cluster. For example, 
a given parliament’s ability to engage in the budget process may ultimately be dependent on such physically 
demonstrable elements such as office or meeting space, electricity, computers, desks, air conditioning, or 
internet access. However, these elements are considered similarly adequate across the cases studied here. 
ITC developments as well as access to and quality of information may also have an effect on parliamentary 
performance but these complex issue areas warrant further study in their own right and for this reason are 
not included here. Administrative performance and management are also factors worth considering. 
However, data on this subject exceeds the horizon of this study and spills heavily into the realm of human 
resource management, which can easily distract from wider considerations regarding the institution of 
parliament as a whole.  
 
The six sub-dimensions chosen are thus those that can be more easily analysed in isolation. The first sub-
dimension in under this explanation examines (1) staff numbers relative to number of MPs.  Though simple, 
this element is particularly important because MPs require even more staff support than usual when faced 
with an inherently complex subject like the budget. Where staff shortages are evident, this could preclude 
the involvement of MPs in the budget process. The second sub-dimension relates to (2) the number of staffs 
employed relative to available posts. This aspect examines the extent to which the parliament was 
operating at full capacity at the time of data collection. In doing so, this sub-dimension provides some 
insight into the ability of its management to maintain adequate staffing levels in order to execute its duties.  
A third criterion relates to (3) the financial means of each parliament on the basis of the relative financing 
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received from the National Treasury when compared to the country’s population.  Changes in funding levels 
will not be tracked over time as it is assumed that these are in line with national economic developments 
and generally on the rise.  Fourth, (4) the presence or absence of a Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) 
will be documented and explored. The presence of a PSC provides a parliament with a significant level of 
institutional autonomy, allowing the institution to focus its recruitment in line with its changing needs. The 
absence of a PSC, in contrast, could indicate an executive loath to support the institutional strengthening of 
its parliament. In either case, this criterion is examined for its relationship to changes related to legislative 
activism in the budget.  The fifth (5) criteria examines levels of specificity and precision of committee 
oversight in the legislatures concerned. We know that committees are at least a necessary condition for 
budgetary scrutiny. This section will take a closer look at the development of the committee system over 
time as this relates to committee constellations, mandates, and financing. Finally, the sixth (6) element 
reviews the education requirements in each of the parliaments concerned alongside perceptions related to 
changes in the knowledge base of its Members. This sub-dimension is thus reliant on a combination of 
broad-brush trends in combination with anecdotal evidence emanating from interviews and focus groups 
within each of the parliaments concerned.   
 
A word of caution is warranted with regard to the relationship between this theoretical cluster and the 
outcome under investigation here.   Some components under the technical sub-dimension may appear to 
be closely related to the dependent variable.  The process of differentiating the two is challenging, because 
displays of legislative budgetary ‘activism’ can be construed as characteristic of a technical ‘advancement’ 
in the context of a parliament.  A resolution of the apparent overlap rests on two points. In the first place, 
it is important to be clear on the fact that the dependent variable is not intended as a measurement of 
legislative capacity for budgetary engagement and oversight. At no point do I make any claims that 
measures of the dependent variable are indicative of better legislative “performance.”  Indeed, whether or 
not an increase in legislative activism in budgetary matters is even indicative of “progress” is essentially up 
to the reader to decide.   
 
Second, measures of budgetary engagement as found in the dependent variable are demonstrably different 
than those technical elements that actually account for it.  The distinction comes down to differing levels of 
specificity.  The six sub-dimensions of the technical proposition (committee precision, education of MPs, 
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staff numbers to MPs, the presence of a Parliamentary Service Commission, staff postings to vacancies, and 
parliamentary finance) were selected because these constitute broad demonstrations a legislature’s 
professional capacity.  Each technical sub-dimension could be of consequence to a number of alternate 
outcomes related to just about any parliamentary role, including constituency outreach, group decision 
making, conflict resolution, or the review of laws.   And, it is expected that the presence of these technical 
sub dimensions, in various combinations and to various degrees, would be, indeed, sufficient reason to 
suspect an efficient and effective parliament.  However, none of these components relate back to 
advancements that are specifically tied to budgetary activism.  
 
As a consequence, measures of the dependent variable would be far too specific to account for 
developments in the technical explanation.  To provide just one example, the regular legislative scrutiny of 
quarterly reports will not elevate the general state of MP education, create a Parliamentary Service 
Commission, instigate committee reforms towards more individuated Ministerial shadowing, or an 
increase staff numbers or reduce vacancy postings.  Each of these elements are closely related in so far as 
they all comprise parliamentary activities, but that is not the same as saying the relationship is potentially 
causal.   
3.5.3 The Norm-Based Explanation 
 
The third overarching explanation for the demonstrated changes in behaviour on the part of these five 
legislatures argues that normative elements are pushing institutional developments along. Because 
parliaments are social institutions (Best and Vogel 2014), the norm-based argument would thus 
hypothesise that where parliaments demonstrate legislative activism in the budget process, evidence of 
peer-to peer legislative engagement and US- based donor interventions will be found.  Specifically, one 
would expect to see frequent mention of new practices learned from legislators in other countries and 
reference to the importance pivotal moments of US donor influence on legislative reforms.   
 
The role of internally and externally based norms as drivers of legislative engagement in the budget process 
is a territory nearly void of systematic scholarly attention. Given the scarcity of data available on norm-
based drivers of legislative engagement in the budget process, the argument emanating from this 
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theoretical cluster was determined on the basis of a holistic review of the literature thus far.  Global trends 
in legislative development suggest that parliaments may be taking a more active role in budgetary matters 
(Posner and Park 2007).  And public signals indicate that the parliaments studied here may also be taking 
up related puzzling actions, particularly in the formulation phase of the budget process.  
 
At the same time, we also know from the literature that external aid providers engage regularly in 
legislative strengthening efforts in developing countries (Hudson and Wren 2007).  Barkan (2009) 
concludes that many of Africa’s legislatures are becoming stronger, in part, as a result of external donor 
influences (Barkan 2009).  International donors tend heavily toward the application of their own cultural 
practices as a starting point when considering the strategies for reform they intend to support.  The United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been active in parliamentary capacity 
development since 1970’s with a heavy focus on “financial oversight and efforts to tackle corruption” 
(Hudson and Wren 2007: 22-24).  Another US-based institution, namely the World Bank Institute, includes 
as one of its three pillar of operations “strengthening the capacity of parliaments to oversee the allocation 
and use of public funds” (Hudson and Wren 2007).   Other, non-US based donor agencies are also involved 
in the promotion of ‘good financial governance.’ Examples include, but are not limited to the German 
Development Cooperation (GTZ/GIZ), UKAID (DFID), the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA), and 
multilateral bodies like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This includes the basic 
subscription to a host of internationally accepted principles like transparency, legitimacy, and 
accountability that are subsumed in many elements of the US approach to legislative budgetary practices.  
While any one or combination of these may have also been somewhat influential to the parliaments studied 
here, their understanding of good financial governance is likely to be less prescriptive, and less specific to 
the US model under investigation here.  Given the public signals that legislatures in Southern Africa are 
increasingly engaging in the formulation stage of the budget process, the investigation of norm-based 
drivers of legislative budgetary engagement will focus specifically on evidence related to US -based 
influence on these parliaments.  
 
In addition, we know that peer-to-peer learning was pivotal in shaping the early institutional development 
of the Finnish (Pekonen 2014) and American state legislatures (Squire 2012).  Peer-to-peer parliamentary 
exchange is an important component of parliamentary life in Southern Africa. Today, MPs and 
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parliamentary staff travel extensively abroad, and partake in an unrelenting supply of conferences, 
meetings, and networking opportunities per year. 26  I complement the focus on US donor intervention with 
available data related to this peer-to peer element.27  In contrast to many other norm-based drivers of 
behaviour, each of these components is suitable for comparative purposes. The data necessary for such an 
argument is also with reach under the confines of the methodology applied. These and other elements will 
be elaborated upon in the section dedicated to empirical analysis.  
 
Before rounding off this section, a brief discussion on interaction effects is warranted here.  Due to the 
inherit complexity, comparative research involves multiple causal pathways. This means “Positive cases 
often can be classified according to the general path each travelled to reach the outcome. Each path, in turn, 
can be seen as involving a different combination of relevant causal conditions” (Gerring 2007).  Each of the 
provisional explanations posited here could be a part of a wider causal complex in which each influences 
the outcomes according to different causal weights. It is also possible, that a particular sequencing is 
involved; perhaps changes begin with norm-related elements, spurring on technical and legal reforms that 
ultimately complete the story.  There is much of scope to imagine that the causal story is different than any 
single provisional explanation would suggest.  It is also possible that the true causal direction ultimately 
differs from the one suggested on the basis of this thesis.  
 
Based on the general neo institutional theoretical foundations applied in this thesis, there is little reason to 
anticipate legal frameworks, technical innovations, or new norms would interact in a meaningful way.  
However, the empirical world is far removed from the loose theoretical constraints applied here, and offers 
a host of additional ways to imagine the causal landscape at hand.  I thus outline some preliminary ideas as 










Table 3.2: Potential Interaction Effects Between Explanations Explored 
 
Explanation 1 Explanation 2 Influence of Explanation 1 → Explanation 2 
 
Norms Technical Norm-based influence can spur technical reforms 
 
Norms Legal Norm-based influence can spur on legal reforms  
 
Technical Norms Technical advancements can concretize norms over time  
 
Technical Legal Technical advancements can necessitate changes to legal frameworks 
 
Legal Norms Legal frameworks can shape incentives and norms 
 
Legal Technical Legal frameworks can enable further technical developments 
 
 
Beginning with norm-based elements, one could imagine changing norms could spur on technical or legal 
reforms.  In response to increasing societal demands to reduce corruption, for example, technical units and 
regulatory frameworks may be developed. At the same time, technical reforms can serve to change or 
concretize norms over time.  Although empirical tests have not been conducted, a new (or renewed) 
priority may be afforded to financial scrutiny from within the legislature as a result of the introduction of 
Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs).  Technical advancements- like new forms of committee interaction 
or gradual changes in the educational backgrounds of MPs could also necessitate changes to legal 
frameworks creating more regularity in these areas.  And finally, legal frameworks hold the power to shape 
norms as well.  In the absence of budgetary amendment powers, for example, Members may come to believe 
that they do not have a role to play in budgetary matters as a whole.   And once laws are adopted, these can 
also enable further technical developments and formalized procedures that build on each other over time.  
The different causal tendencies explored in this thesis can be detected at different times and to different 
extents, depending on the choices made by a researcher in terms of research design.  Regardless of the 
point of emphasis, however, the possibly for interaction effects between and amongst these elements 
cannot be dismissed.   
 
Finally, while political calculus is not explicitly examined in this study, it is clear that that this element will 
also play a role in the wider causal complex studied here.  Its influence will certainly be found at the 
individual and sub-national levels, but also in the international arena, whereby powerful development 
actors precipitate changes to their own benefit.  Additional probing is necessary. Indeed, the extensive 
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interplay found between each of these (and other) elements necessitates ongoing research in differing 
contexts (geographic, temporal, ontological) so that a fuller understanding of the intricacies can be attained.   
 
In sum, there may, indeed, be reciprocal relationships between the three explanatory variables and the 
object of study, or interaction effects amongst the three explanatory variables. But these can be addressed 
in future research, across a larger number of cases. My purpose here is to check for corroborating evidence 
for an initial account of what may account for changing budgetary engagement from amongst the 
parliaments selected. 
 
3.6 Data Collection Methods  
 
 
In order to collect the necessary data for both the dependent and independent variables, a number of 
primary data collection methods were employed.  These include the execution of semi-structured 
interviews with over 170 MPs and staff, the convening of dedicated national focus group discussions for 
each parliament and the collection of targeted documents for analysis.  Owing partly to the fact that this is 
an exploratory study, a total of ten broad categories of inquiry were selected for data gathering purposes.  
These included each parliament’s (1) history, (2) committee capacity, (3) staff capacity, (4) incentives faced 
by MPs (5) external influences, (6) time available for budgetary scrutiny at adoption, (7) formal powers 
with regard to budgetary matters, and (8) informal powers of budgetary influence both available and used 
by MPs (9) budgetary information and (10) parliamentary finance.  As a general rule, data requiring more 
abstract or non-observable data was sourced from the interviews and focus group discussions.  Interviews 
proved to be good sources of more detailed information while focus groups later aided in the development 
of consensus around particularly contentious or ambiguous topics.  Data based upon legal frameworks or 
that buttresses up against comparisons between formal (i.e. explicit) and informal (i.e. non-explicit) 
practices were mainly derived from the available documentation.  
 
The process of data collection began with at least 30 semi-structured interviews with a diverse sample MPs 
and staff in each parliament. 28 Each interview was conducted for a minimum of one hour, and was be 
accompanied by real-time transcriptions and summaries of the responses fielded.  Interviewees were 
selected through a combination of initial requests by the researcher, those suggested by parliamentary 
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leadership, and the interviewees ultimately available to meet.  The pre-selected list suggested by the 
researcher consisted of key informants most likely to be privy to the information required.  Such persons 
include the Presiding Officers, Deputy Speakers, Budget and PAC Committee Chairs, Other Committee 
Chairs, Women MPs, MPs with long tenures in Parliament, youth MPs, and Clerks of Parliament, Committee 
Clerks, and research staff.  Attention was placed on garnering maximum diversity in terms of respondent 
types, with particular attention to party affiliation.  While at each parliament, key documents were collected 
including constitutions, Standing Rules and Orders, various training tools, and parliamentary journals, 
amongst others.  Ultimately, the selection of documentation was guided by suggestions collected from key 
informants, because their contextual understanding aided in an understanding of the relative significance 
of these along with their availability.  
 
At the close of each interview, data was electronically coded along the lines of the eight broad categories of 
inquiry listed above. Once the interviews were complete and all relevant documents were collected, the 
data was then collated in the form of an electronic ‘country report.’  The electronic report, consisting of a 
series of slides related to each of the categories of inquiry was then used as a report-back mechanism and 
applied at each national focus group meeting.  As soon as scheduling allowed, the focus group, consisting 
to the greatest extent possible of those same persons already interviewed, was convened amongst some 
20-30 senior MPs and staff.   
 
In this way, the data could both be shared, discussed, and vetted over the course of two days and the results 
recorded in a meeting report.  Country reports were then adjusted accordingly from there.  The collective 
results of each of the final country reports were then be brought together and presented over the course of 
a high-level regional seminar from amongst senior Members and staff in each of the five parliaments.  The 
final feedback obtained over the course of the seminar was then incorporated into the composite results, 
and incorporated into the analysis.  The following table provides an overview of the data collection methods 
across both the dependent and independent variables. Each of the three predominant forms of collection 







Table 3.3: Overview of Variables and Methods of Data Collection  
 
Dimensions of Change 
in Budgetary Activity 
Sub-Dimensions Method of Data Collection 
Changes in Behavioural 
Aspects  
Influence over Development or Recurrent Budget 
Participation in Pre-Budget Consultations  
Cross-Committee Coordination at Adoption 
Committee Scrutiny Visits  
Committee Scrutiny of Quarterly and Annual Reports  







Establishment of a Research Department  
Establishment of a Budget Committee  
Establishment of a CDF  
Establishment of a PBO  
Formal Links to Local Budget Formulation 






Sub-Dimensions Method of Data Collection 
Authority Budgetary Amendment Powers 
Legal Provisions for Committee Site Visits 
Legal Provisions for the Scrutiny of Executive Reports 
Legal Provisions for Scrutiny of Local Government Audit 
Legal Provisions for a Budget Committee 
Legal Provisions for Cross-Committee Collaboration 
Legal Provisions for a CDF 




Ability Staff Numbers Relative to MPs 
Staff Numbers relative to Available Posts 
Financial Means of Parliament 
Parliamentary Service Commission 
Specificity and Precision of Committee Oversight  




Attitude US-based Donor-Driven Influence  










In this investigation, the process of primary data collection included a combination of in-depth interviews, 
focus group discussions and the analysis of various forms of documentation. Although great value was 
placed in interviews as primary sources of information on individuals’ interpretations, attitudes and 
characters, there is little information available on the subject in the field of legislative studies (Bailer 2014). 
Interviews are also employed substantially less than surveys, owing to the high costs involved, including 
large time investments.  Despite these practical challenges, data collection by way of personal interviews 
with the both Members and parliamentary staff still represents an unrivalled method of coming closer to 
an understanding of the institution at hand, along with its on-going evolution.  Interviews and surveys… 
“deliver the most direct measure of the thoughts and intentions of politicians, making them one of the most 
valuable sources of data for the study of political behaviour” (Bailer 2014: 167). Such a method is also 
befitting to the particular study at hand, given that it represents an area of inquiry which has been 
previously unexplored. As Bailer notes, “interviews are particularly recommended as an exploratory 
strategy for the analysis of areas that have not been previously researched,” laying the groundwork for 
subsequent studies (Bailer 2014: 167).   
 
There are, however, drawbacks to this approach. In practice, often-conflicting information is provided. As 
Bailer explains: “truthfulness of the interviewee’s responses is extremely challenging, especially since 
interviews are usually conducted when there is not a lot of prior knowledge on a certain topic” (Bailer 
2014: 176). In order to minimise the possibility for the collection of false information or anomalous 
impressions, a diverse set of interviewees were selected to include some fifteen MPs and fifteen 
parliamentary staff.  In addition, maximum diversity was sought with regards to political party affiliation, 
gender, tenures in parliament, age, chamber, committee membership, administrative hierarchies and staff 
departments.  (A general overview can be found in Appendix 2).  The convening of focus group discussions, 
to be elaborated upon further in the proceeding section, also allowed the information to “sift” through a 
variety of authorities and viewpoints until a consensus or median response could be reached. It is expected 
that these measures have helped to mitigate some of the challenges related to inconsistent responses, 




Overall, the interviews were conducted on the basis of the eight categories outlined above and were limited 
to one hour each.  However, different points of emphasis were freely allowed to emerge, depending on the 
expertise or special interests of the interviewee. In this way, a combination of structure and depth could be 
achieved.  Interviews were transcribed in real time and then subsequently “coded” according to these same 
eight categories of inquiry. This allowed for some ease in sorting through the data once the analysis phase 
had commenced.  
3.6.2 Focus Groups 
 
In contrast to the individual interview, a focus group discussion presents a more “natural” research 
environment because participants “are influencing and influenced by others - just as they are in real life” 
(Finch et al. 2003: 171). For this reason, focus groups allow more scope for spontaneity resulting from the 
stronger social context and allowing for the emergence of information and perspectives that would 
otherwise remain hidden over the course of a one-on-one discussion. Because data in focus groups is 
generated through on-going interactions among participants, responses can be refined and a group 
dynamic formed, which encourages a continuous flow of information and perspectives.  
 
As Finch et al. (2003) note, in a focus group setting the researcher guides the discussion. Over the course 
of this type of social interaction, discussions tend to pass through a series of phases including “forming, 
storming, norming, performing and adjourning” (Tuckman 1965). In the first phase, focus group 
participants become comfortable with their peers, the subject matter, and the format of the discussion. 
From there, the subject matter is explored and debated until conclusions are reached. Where questions are 
left unanswered, the researcher probes further and encourages the group to go deeper in unearthing its 
dimensions and causes. The unique dynamic of the focus group environment is well captured in the 
following description: 
 
“In responding to each other, participants reveal more of their own frame of reference on the subject of 
study. The language they use, the emphasis they give and their general framework of understanding is more 
spontaneously on display. As all this emerges from discussion within the group, the perspective is less 
influenced by interaction with the researcher than it might be in a one-to-one interview. In a sense, the 
 
 54 
group participants take over some of the 'interviewing' role, and the researcher is at times more in the 
position of listening in” (Finch et al. 2003: 171). 
 
With such a group dynamic, participants may be inclined to veer off topic. For that reason, I had to pay 
careful attention to assuring that the discussion remains focused on the subject but also that diverse arrays 
of participants are taking active part in the exchange. The latter element is particularly relevant to the focus 
groups in this study given the presence of various hierarchal constellations including: ruling party and 
opposition Members, MPs and staff, as well as women and men. In a political context, behaviour patterns 
formed on the basis of long-standing hierarchies and roles from amongst these dyadic pairs can be difficult 
to break. Along similar lines, some caution was exercised in the interpretation of data emanating from these 
groups. Presiding Officers or administrative hierarchies can give a seamless impression of a “consensus” 
where what may actually be taking shape is a “falling in line” through the norms of appropriate, rule-
abiding, behaviour.  
3.6.3 Document Analysis 
 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, documents were collected from 
a variety of sources. These included fundamental political contracts like country Constitutions and Acts. 
The most relevant for the study at hand include any Budget Acts or broader Public Financial Management 
Acts, Decentralisation or Local Government Acts, and Audit Acts. Crucial to an understanding of how the 
parliament interprets and applies these overarching political arrangements are the parliamentary Standing 
Rules and Orders (SROs), and various incarnations of them, where available. The available versions of these 
were thus collected for each chamber. In addition, parliamentary journals or other internal newsfeeds were 
sometimes applicable, as were parliamentary capacity development strategies, parliamentary reform and 
individual committee reports. Each of these documents provided a unique angle from which parliament’s 
engagement in the budget process was interpreted and understood. Over the course of the analysis phase, 
preference was given to those documents holding the highest political weight (i.e. constitutions and laws) 
while those of a more ad-hoc or informal nature were scrutinised with a close eye towards the context in 
which they were written, the purpose of drafting, and the individuals and groups behind their development. 
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Now that the data collection methods have been described, the following section now turns to a description 
of the empirical analysis. 
 
3.7 Empirical Analysis  
 
As a first step, data related to (1) changes in legislative behaviour and (2) changes in organisational aspects 
of legislative life on budgetary matters in each of the five parliaments were documented in detailed 
narratives. References to interviews conducted with Members and Staff of the Namibian Parliament are 
indicated with an ‘N,’ those from the Parliament of Lesotho, an ‘L,’ those from the Parliament of Malawi, an 
‘M, those from the Parliament of Zimbabwe a ‘Z’ and finally, those from the Zambian Parliament are 
indicated with ‘ZAM.’  A number will follow each country reference, and is reflective of the person with 
whom the interview was conducted.  In referencing interviews according to an alphanumerical code, 
respondents’ identities are kept confidential. Also, where reference is made to a focus group discussion, 
this is indicated by a ‘FG,’ and where reference is made to the regional dialogue, a ‘R’ will follow the quote 
or paraphrase.   
 
That data is thus provided in narrative form on the basis of the sub-dimensions already described. As a 
complement to this, I then developed a set of rank-order scores in order to systematically track the relative 
developments in each legislature according to these twelve (12) elements.   Measurements range from zero 
(0) to three (3). The rank order scores are associated with short verbal descriptions, each tailored to the 
unique characteristics of the sub-dimensions explored.  The behavioural dimension of the dependent 
variable is thus conceived as follows: a rank order of zero (0) indicates no evidence of behavioural change. 
A one (1) indicates that minor or burgeoning behavioural changes are underway, though these are less 
substantive, or less consistent or less collective than those of a higher rank.  A rank order of two (2) 
indicates changes that are somewhat substantive, or somewhat consistent, or somewhat collective. And 
finally, a rank score of three (3) indicates substantive, or consistent, or collective behaviour, backed by 
perceptions of growing institutional norms.  
 
Similarly, the verbal ranking of the organisational dimension consists of the following: a rank of zero (0) 
indicates no evidence that the organisational attribute has been established. A rank of one (1) indicates a 
rhetorical commitment to the institution or a situation in which the basic tenants for the institution have 
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been established in principle, but not necessarily acted upon. A rank order of two (2) indicates an 
organisational change that has been somewhat established and somewhat functioning or functions 
inconsistently or on a more general basis or at limited capacity. And finally, a rank of three (3) indicates 
that the institution has been fully established, or is highly specified, or functioning on a consistent basis.  
 
All ordinal rankings are based on fixed and explicit decision rules.  They are, nevertheless, judgmental 
rankings for which a number of caveats apply.    I apply a loose understanding of ‘fuzzy set logic’ to each of 
the rankings throughout this thesis (Ragin 2000). In doing so, the components of each sub dimension are 
assessed individually on the basis of whether or not these are necessary or sufficient components to the 
item at hand. In other words, these rankings are not intended to measure the effectiveness of the sub-
dimensions, but rather the extent to which the selected behaviours and organisational components can be 
said to exist in a meaningful sense.  It is important to remember that the ordinal rankings indicate which 
parliaments are doing less or more, they do not denote knowable intervals or distances across parliaments. 
There is also no reason to believe that verbal categorisations have an inherent quantitative value. False or 
misleading conclusions are thus possible.29  In addition, I have also not attempted to differentially weigh 
the sub-dimensions within each approach. That a high degree of influence over the executive budget is 
more significant in term of outcome than say, the establishment of a particular department appears 
obvious.  But we are at early stages of the systematic assessment of many of these concepts and lack explicit 
guidance from the literature for more precise measurements. I selected particular sub-dimensions because 
regardless of individual weights, each indicates a particular direction of change, namely increased 
legislative activity in budgetary matters.  
 
All rank orders beyond zero (0) in any sub-category represent a significant departure from those legislative 
practices found after the onset of multi-party electoral practices in each of the legislatures concerned (ca. 
1995-2000).  Some may also be indicative of an interest on the part of the legislature to expand its influence 
and scrutiny of the national budget to local levels. All data is recorded until the close of the 2016/2017 
fiscal year. At some point in the data gathering process, it was not possible to keep up with the rapid 
changes taking place in each of these parliaments on the subject, even if such information has subsequently 




Once each legislature was ranked on along each of individual sub-dimension, broad rank-order categories 
were developed.  These categories range from that (1) no change, (2) minor change, (3) moderate change, 
to (4) substantive change.  The sum of a legislature’s relative ranking for each sub-dimension determines 
its placement in this category range.  Legislatures with a total score between zero (0) and four (4) in the 
behavioural change dimension are those for which ‘no change’ could be detected. Those with total scores 
between fifteen (15) and eighteen (18), in contrast, are those for which ‘substantive change’ is understood 
to be underway. The remaining two categories are situated between these two endpoints.  The placement 
of each legislature in a particular category range allows for simplified comparisons with each of the 
competing explanatory variables.  
 
Once the characterization of the dependent variable was complete, the analytical process moved on to an 
exploration of the potential determinants of the changes documented. I began with the explanation related 
to legal powers and then move on to the technical and norm-based explanations, respectively. The process 
required multiple reviews of all data according to each explanatory lead.  Only the most extreme and unique 
aspects of the data have been highlighted. These aspects are also located at relatively superficial levels.  
This approach is in line with the distinction that Hall (2003) makes between historical analysis and political 
analysis: the latter “seeks generalisations that are both more simple and more portable than those at which 
historians typically aim” (Hall 2003: 395). 
 
In order to assess the explanatory power of the legal hypothesis, I first compiled an overview of budgetary 
powers for each parliament.  The analysis includes only legislative powers on budgetary matters and only 
those related to the behavioural and organisational sub-dimensions treated in the dependent variable.30  
These include the following nine components: (1) budgetary amendment powers, (2) legal provisions for 
the participation in pre-budget consultations with the executive, (3) legal provisions for collaboration 
between and amongst committees before adoption, (4) legal provisions for committee scrutiny visits, (5) 
legal provisions for the scrutiny of executive reports, (6) legal provisions for scrutiny of local government 
audits, (7) legal provisions for a Budget Committee, (8) legal provisions for a CDF, and (9) legal provisions 




Not all sub-dimensions of the dependent variable are included in this analysis. Those that refer to the legal 
powers of the legislature are excluded. These include powers related to legislatures’ involvement in local 
spending plans as well as the formal provisions for more time to scrutinize the budget before its adoption. 
In addition, it is assumed that each parliament maintains the basic authority to establish its own internal 
departments, such as those created for research or legal purposes. 31  Each of these three aspects of the 
dependent variable are thus not called into question or examined in the legal analysis. In contrast, the first 
sub-dimension related to budgetary amendment powers actually subsumes three legal powers for 
examination, including the power to increase (I), decrease (D) or amend the development budget across 
votes (A).  However, because there are no formal legal provisions to increase or decrease the recurrent 
budget across cases, this aspect is not included. 32 
 
Formal legislative powers can be found in country Constitutions, its laws, or the Standing Rules and Orders 
(SROs) of each legislature. It is assumed that the content of both existing laws and parliamentary SROs are 
guided by the legal provisions found in country Constitutions. They are thus each weighted equally. The 
rank order itself also assumes no contradictions between constitutions, laws, and SROs.  Where 
contradictions are, found, these are treated more extensively in the narrative section. The rank-order 
scoring under the legal hypothesis follows a simple template:  If a legal provision is present in the country 
Constitution, law, or SRO, a full score of one (1) is assigned. If no legal provision could be found, a zero (0) 
is placed in its stead.  Once a ranking for each individual legal provision was made, a rank order category 
was once again devised.  These proceed as follows: Those parliaments that hold between 0-2 formal powers 
fall under the category of ‘little to no’ legal authority. Those that maintain between 3-5 are understood to 
hold ‘minor’ legal authority. Those with ‘moderate’ legal authority are those legislatures holding 6-8 formal 
powers. And finally, those with ‘substantial’ legal authority are those that hold between 9-11 formal 
powers. Once each legislature was assigned to a particular category, these scores were then compared with 
the combined behavioural and organisational rank categories.  An analysis of the findings thus followed, 
and therein, the legal hypothesis assessed for its explanatory reach.   
 
The technical explanation was next explored.  Current and longitudinal trends related to six sub-
dimensions were first documented for each legislature in a narrative overview. These include (1) staff 
numbers relative to number of MPs, (2) number of staffs employed relative to available posts, (3) the 
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financial means of parliament, (4) the presence or absence of a Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC), 
(5) levels of specificity and precision related to committee oversight, and (6) the educational capacity of 
MPs in context.   
 
On the basis of the detailed narrative descriptions provided, rank orders were also developed.  As in 
previous chapters, scoring increments took on a hierarchical character. A rank of one (1) indicates a 
parliament of insufficient financial means, one with low staff numbers, high vacancy rates, no 
Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC), no or highly general committee oversight, or low levels of 
educational attainment amongst MPs. A rank order of two (2) indicates a parliament of average financial 
means, sufficient staff numbers and reasonable vacancy rates, a Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) 
established in law, but not in practice, committees with a moderate degree of targeted oversight, or the 
employment of some educated MPs. A score of three (3) indicates a parliament that is well financed, well-
staffed both relative to MPs and overall posts available, one that maintains a fully operational 
Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC), committees with a high degree of targeted oversight of MOAs, or 
high levels of educational attainment amongst its MPs. These rank orders are relevant for the African 
country context. They may not be relevant for other developing countries and are not comparable with 
OECD institutions.  Here again, once the individual rank orders were determined, rank order categories 
were devised.  These are characterized as follows: ‘low’ technical capacity is associated with a rank sum of 
0-4. Parliaments understood to have only ‘minor’ technical capacities are those with sums totalling between 
5-9. Those with ‘moderate’ technical capacities have rank sums between 10-14.  And those parliaments 
with ‘high’ technical capacities are reflective of sums between 15-18.  Once the technical rank categories 
were established, these were then compared with the combined behavioural and organisational change 
rank categories found in the dependent variable and preliminary conclusions drawn. If legislative change 
correlated consistently with increased technical capacities of the parliaments explored, the ‘ability’ 
hypothesis was upheld. 
 
Finally, I test the norm-based explanation. I began by reviewing interview and focus group transcripts in 
order to compile a narrative overview of US-based donor interventions that were emphasized throughout.  
I also consulted a number of proposals and reports related to reform processes initiated in each parliament. 
External aid providers were responsible for the drafting of some of these, while others had their origins in 
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the Reform Committees of the parliaments themselves.   An empirical overview of every US-based donor 
intervention over time was beyond the scope of this thesis.  Instead, only those interventions related to the 
budget process that were frequently mentioned as consequential in shaping the direction of future 
legislative developments were included. These instances provided sufficient evidence of political norm 
transfer spurred on by the interventions of development agents.  A score of one (1) indicates no evidence 
of US based donor interventions and no evidence of substantial interventions on the part of other donors 
on budgetary themes while a score of two (2) indicates little to no US based donor intervention or the 
modest presence of non-US based donor interventions related to budgetary matters while a score of three 
(3) references strong evidence of US based donor interventions pertaining predominantly to budget 
matters with comparatively little, if any, support  from other donors.  
 
I also documented and reviewed instances where peer-to-peer exchange was mentioned, particularly when 
changes in the legislature were attributed to such interactions. 33   Given the common membership status 
amongst parliaments in Southern Africa to various parliamentary networks, each parliament in this study 
is assumed to engage more or less equally in peer-to-peer exchange. 34   In addition to the regular 
participation of each parliament in institutionalized regional and international parliamentary platforms, 
however, legislatures also participate - to greater or lesser degrees - in bilateral exchanges. Reported 
variation in individual exchange patters thus also formed part of the concluding analysis but was not 
included in the rank scores.  
 
Data related to peer-to-peer legislative exchange serves as a complement to the data related to US influence.  
This is because unlike donor interventions, whose aims are targeted, public, and well documented, general 
legislative exchanges are mainly untargeted, internal, and significantly more difficult to trace. The 
combination of these factors precludes the establishment of a causal relationship with specific legislative 
developments. Moreover, sequencing matters here. African Parliaments may engage in exchanges with 
other African Parliaments that have already been exposed to donor interventions related to targeted 
parliamentary practices. The first Parliamentary Budget Office on the continent was established in the 
Parliament of Uganda, for example, and initially began with donor support.35  Since that time, its PBO has 
served as an example to parliaments in Southern Africa and may be seen by neighbouring legislatures as a 
local development.  Influences emanating from external donors operate under different incentive 
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structures than those that are communicated by other African Parliaments.  While both are forms of 
‘political transfer’ (Velde 2005), the role played by external donors also includes a hierarchical element.  
Once a rank order score was determined for each parliament, and sufficient data had been gathered in 
relation to peer-to-peer legislative activities, these were compared with the rank order categories found in 
the dependent variable. Where congruence was found, this provided sufficient evidence to support the 
norm-based explanation for legislative change.  Finally, in each section I review the extent of each general 
causal tendency was then reviewed through process tracing, the positing of a counterfactual, or the 
development of a strong argument to support the relevance of the posited rationale (George and Bennett 
2005: 183-184).  In such a way, the pathways responsible for the hypothesised relationship(s) between the 
dependent and independent variables were further delineated and understood.  
 
3.8 Ethical Considerations  
 
In order to assure that the research was conducted both ethically and transparently a number of steps were 
taken in preparation for the data collection. The data was collected under the auspices of a capacity 
development project implemented by the Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA), 
under my management, and funded by an international development agency (DFID). It was thus necessary 
to inform the organisation, DIFD, and the staff that the first phase of the project would entail the collection 
of data for both project and academic use.  I was provided with explicit permission to use the data I collected 
for the purpose of academic analysis and potential publication. 36  
 
Despite the fact that the data was used for academic purposes, it was always intended for consumption by 
of each of the Members and staff of the parliaments included in the study.  In fact, the absence of available 
data on the subject served as the original impetus for the project which was ultimately aimed at 
empowering parliaments in the region with information that could inform and enrich their current 
institutional development. For this reason, the information garnished was recounted and released at 
regular intervals throughout the data collection process, in particular through each of the national focus 
group discussions but also on the occasion of a regional seminar upon completion of the data collection and 
collation phase.  Comparative data was also shared over the course of a three-day discussion in March 2017 
amongst a diverse sample of each of the parliaments in this study. The data’s, secondary application was 
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thus for use in the academic sphere, with the express purpose of making a modest contribution to the 
existing literature on legislative behaviour and the budget process in Africa.  
 
In order to make the aims of the project, and the data collection element of the project, open for discussion, 
a “research coordination meeting” was convened in February 2016, which included the administrative 
heads of those parliaments who were available to attend, along with the leading academics in the field.  
Thus, the discussion included the Clerks of both the Parliaments of Namibia and Zimbabwe as well as the 
Deputy Clerk of the Parliament of Lesotho. There, permission was garnered from amongst participants to 
proceed with the data collection phase of the project in line with the dual aims expressed. This was done in 
the name of the Speakers of the Parliaments included in the study, in absentia (as per parliamentary 
protocol). Still two parliaments were unable to attend this meeting, namely representatives from the 
Parliaments of Malawi and Zambia because of administrative delays on the part of the former, and the fact 
that the latter had not yet been incorporated into the project fold. Subsequent meetings with both the 
Deputy Clerk in Malawi and the Clerk of Zambia served to remedy this gap.  
 
From there, meetings with the Speakers of each of the five Parliaments ensued, whereby the project aims 
were further outlined, and approval to proceed with both individual interviews and focus group meetings 
were obtained verbally, and recorded in meeting reports. Though the express permission of the Speaker 
would normally suffice for the purpose of engaging with members of Parliament and parliamentary staff in 
the name of a donor-funded capacity development project, permission from each individual for the use of 
the data was also obtained verbally at the onset of each interview. With requests for permission conducted 
in this way, interviewees did not necessarily know that their responses would be used for academic 
purposes (though the fact was never withheld), but interviewees were fully aware that they were 
participating in research, whose results were intended for their own consumption. Upon the 
commencement of each individual interview, the purpose of the project was laid out, along with assurances 
that the responses obtained and recorded would be held in confidence. This meant that their names and 
positions would not be used in either the subsequent written documentation on the subject or revealed in 
the focus group setting where a variety of opinions and perspectives garnered from the interviews were 




Confidentiality was a subject of some sensitivity in at the individual level, and thus discussion time was 
afforded to the topic as was necessitated on a case -by -case basis. Though quite rare, one or two 
parliamentary staff were fearful of being identified for having criticised management or for commenting 
on items that may be tantamount to challenging the executive.  A small number of opposition Members 
approached some of the subjects with equal trepidation, though this was clearly tempered by the nature of 
the positions they held as Members and comforted by their rights of expression as per the rules of the 
House.  Once anonymity was assured, and verbal permission to continue was given from the interviewee, 
each discussion proceeded in an open and cordial manner.  
 
The potential for harm was a subject that was well reflected upon by the researcher both in the research 
design and throughout the data collection process. Having worked in the parliamentary environment for 
many years, the project at hand formed a natural continuation of the practice of taking political 
considerations into account when engaging in communications or reporting with parliaments. This 
awareness was only heightened over the course of the data collection phase, where the potential for harm 
was considered at a number of levels. In the first place, the potential to harm the parliament as an 
institution was brought into the fold in the approach to the project and the use of the data ultimately to be 
collected. African parliaments have experienced periods of exploitation by donors and civil society 
organisations whose mission has overwhelmingly been to merely ‘extract’ data for their own consumption. 
I wanted to ensure, instead, that the data collected could be readily applied by these same parliaments, 
given the time and effort both staff and MPs provided throughout the data collection phase but also because 
they are the most obvious beneficiaries of such knowledge. For this reason, priority was given in this 
research project to cycle the data collected directly back to participating parliaments so that they could be 
the first to benefit from the labours of their collaboration. 
 
Secondly, with regard to questions of individual attribution, the potential for harm was viewed from both 
the perspectives of both Members and staff, but also with regard to political parties. Given the established 
hierarchies within the institution, care was taken to be sure that both those at the top of the hierarchy and 
those with less influence were given equal consideration in terms of confidentiality. Names were not used 
during the coding process, but rather, replaced with country and number codes, so as to safeguard this 
commitment. As a presentation tool, and as a means of instigating debate and discussion with regard to the 
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data, over the course of the focus group meetings, individual quotes were extracted and presented in the 
group setting without attribution. It was clear, gauging from the responses of the individuals present in the 
meetings that this form of presentation was both useful and in line with assurances with regard to 
confidentiality. In some cases, Members or staff chose to freely identify themselves as those having made a 
particular comment, though such cases were limited.  
 
It is understood that the potential for harm is a real threat to the livelihoods, standings, reputations, and 
daily work lives of each of the interviewees concerned. If controversial opinions or beliefs were released 
without care for confidentiality, the risk for punishment, particularly amongst parliamentary staff could be 
high. Equally precarious would be the release of confidential information that could only be known by one 
or few of the interviewees concerned. The unveiling of this information alone could have severe 
consequences in such an environment, potentially leading to anything from informal, workplace, bullying 
to explicit disciplinary action.  
 
For this reason, I agreed to obtain retrospective written consent from any interviewee if their information 
is used before publication. This includes both direct quotes or paraphrasing that can be attributed to a 
single person.  Such written permission will include details of whether or not the interviewee agreed to be 
named, or whether s/he prefers a functional (i.e. ruling party vs. opposition member) or occupational (i.e. 
staff or MP) reference instead.  Any personal details included in the research will be used in aggregate form 
only, in the form of a collective opinion expressed on the occasion of a focus group discussion or regional 
seminar, so that interviewees are not personally identified. 
 
For the purpose of avoiding potential harm to any of the interviewees, the relatively deep contextual 
understanding garnered through the data collection and project execution process was of assistance. 
Armed with such an understanding, private information, or that was revealed to the researcher in 
confidence, has remained so. Of course, such estimates and assessments are imperfect approximations, 
which means that the risks involved cannot be completely ruled out.  For this reason, in cases where I had 
any cause to doubt, or in cases where anecdotal evidence would benefit from attribution as in, for example, 
where a Speaker has made an express commitment to follow through with a particular action, or where 
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historical anecdotes could have only been made by a person who could be easily identified, I have agreed 
to seek written permission with those persons, as outlined.   
Chapter 4: Assessing Change in Legislative Budgetary Activism 
 
This thesis explores changes in legislative engagement in budgetary matters. In Chapter 1, I outlined a 
series of developments undertaken by parliaments in Namibia, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia 
including the creation of CDFs, Budget Committees and PBOs.  These observations are surprising given the 
Westminster heritage of these parliaments with little to no tradition of legislative activity in the formulation 
stage. But before beginning to investigate possible reasons behind such changes, the investigation must 
first establish whether or not these notable advancements are anecdotal, or piecemeal, or whether they 
reflect an underlying trend of greater legislative engagement in the formulation stage of the budget.  
 
The data explored in this section covers two overarching dimensions of legislative. These include changes 
in (1) behavioural and (2) organisational aspects of legislative life related to budgetary matters. Together, 
these dimensions represent the dependent variable to be explored. Subsumed under each of these two 
dimensions are a number of sub-dimensions that will be examined further in each parliament. Those falling 
under the behavioural dimension include legislative influence over budgetary allocations, participation in 
pre-budget consultations, cross-committee coordination at adoption, committee scrutiny visits, committee 
scrutiny of quarterly and annual reports, and committee scrutiny of local government audits. 
Organisational sub-dimensions of legislative life incorporate: the establishment of a Budget Committee, the 
establishment and maintenance of a Constituency Development Fund (CDF), formal links to local budget 
formulation, the establishment of a research department, the establishment of a Parliamentary Budget 
Office (PBO), and the establishment of more time for legislative scrutiny of the budget at adoption. The 
following figure provides an overview of the placement of each of the behavioural and organisational 
components of the dependent variable across the budget cycle. Some of these sub-dimensions are 
applicable over the course of multiple stages with the budget cycle. Their placement in the following figure 





Table 4.1: Sub-Dimensions of Legislative Engagement in the Budget Cycle 
 
Budget Cycle Component Sub-Dimensions of Dependent Variable Examined  
Budget Formulation  • Budget Committee  
• Constituency Development Fund 
• Local Budget Formulation 
• Parliamentary Budget Office 
• Influence over National Budget  
• Pre-Budget Consultations 
Budget Adoption • More time for Scrutiny of Budget 
• Cross-Committee Collaboration 
Budget Implementation 
 
• Committee Scrutiny Visits 
• Committee Scrutiny of Quarterly and Annual Reports 
• Research Department  
Budget Audit • Committee Scrutiny of Local Government Audits 
 
The methodology selected allows for the collection both formal (rule-based) and informal (non-rule based) 
behaviours and organisational attributes under each of these overarching dimensions. As reviewed in the 
methodology section, both the behavioural and organisational dimensions are expected to reveal formal 
and informal changes. These changes are measured against the baseline activity expected at the onset of 
multi-party politics in each of the parliaments examined. Given the common institutional heritage of each, 
the baseline is thus synonymous with those legislative budgetary practices found within the ideal type 
Westminster system parliament.  To highlight the scope of change, I focused my data collection on those 
practices found in the 2016/2017 fiscal year. However, additional data will be collected in order to better 
contextualize changes witnessed from some 15-20 years prior. 37   The composite data related to each of 
these dimensions has been compiled in a series of summary tables, each found below.  
 
In order to track the relative developments of each legislature systematically, I developed a basic set of 
rank-order scores. The rank orders serve as an important advance over and complement to pure narrative 
description and will later function as the empirical foundation upon which the relevance of competing 
explanatory theories treated is assessed.  Any positive ranking represents either a significant departure 
from those legislative practices found at the onset of multi-party democracy or an expansion of a 
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legislatures scope for budgetary influence. All ordinal rankings are based on fixed and explicit decision 
rules.  They are, nevertheless, judgmental rankings for which a number of caveats, already outlined in the 
methodology section, apply.  The measurement proceeds as follows: a zero (0) signifies no action or sign 
related to that particular sub-dimension, a single point (1) indicates that some developments were in play, 
but that these are more suggestive of the ‘seeds’ of change rather than a full expression thereof. A two (2) 
indicates some change is evident, but that this has not fully blossomed and finally a three (3) is indicative 
of a change that has come to ‘full bloom.'  A more detailed verbal description will be included for each 
dimension before comparative data is presented.  
 
This section begins with an examination of the behavioural changes underway in each of the five 
legislatures under examination. To follow, organisational changes will be explored.  Finally, the concluding 
section will provide a summary judgement of how each parliament ranks according to the full range of sub-
dimension across both dimensions of change. 
 
4.1 Dimensions of Behavioural Change 
 
The following section reviews behavioural changes in each of the five legislatures studied.  This dimension 
of the dependent variable is conceived as follows: a rank of zero (0) indicates no evidence of behavioural 
change. A one (1) indicates that minor or burgeoning behavioural changes are underway, though these are 
understood as less substantive, or less consistent or less collective than those of a higher rank.  A rank of 
two (2) is indicative of those changes in progress that are somewhat substantive, or somewhat consistent, 
or somewhat collective. And finally, a rank of three (3) indicates substantive, or consistent, or collective 
behaviour, backed by growing institutional norms.  
4.1.1 Influence over Development or Recurrent Budget 
 
The first sub-dimension address whether or not parliament is influencing budgetary appropriations at 
adoption.  This will speak to the way (s) in which amendment powers (if any) are being interpreted or 
informally applied. The sub-dimension will be measured on the basis of anecdotal accounts from those who 
know the history, the process, and the political context of the parliament. Budgetary influence is not 
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something that can be easily documented or traced. Instead, it is assumed that MPs and staff of the 
parliaments concerned are best placed to assess the level of significance attached to the behaviours 
witnessed in this sub-dimension.  
 
Seen collectively, three out of five parliaments are reported by Members and staff to have significantly 
influenced the executive budget in the 2016/2017 fiscal year. The Parliaments of Malawi and Zimbabwe 
each informally amended the development budget as tabled by the executive for the first time over the 
course of the 2016 and 2017. In Malawi, MPs across party lines banded together in order to decrease the 
budget allocated to the District Development Fund (DDF) and, instead, increase the Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF).  As on MP described “There was a rare situation where the budget was increased 
because parliament pushed; they took more from one area and reallocated it for the CDF” (M4).  Such re-
allocations are not formally announced but rather deferred until negotiations between the Ministry of 
Finance and the Assembly are conducted, where the amendment is “quietly taken care of” (M3). The 
Parliament of Malawi also increased its own institutional budget for the 2016/2017 fiscal year. Such 
initiatives have become increasingly more prevalent over the past decade. As one interviewee explained, 
the National Assembly began to get involved in the budget process in 2008 when it pushed for government 
to support an agricultural subsidy programme and won. From that point on, MPs became actively involved 
in the budget process.  Today, it is no longer easy for the Ministry of Finance to defend its budget (M7).  
 
In Zimbabwe, the Parliament insisted that the executive maintain separate budgets for individual 
commissions established under the newly drafted, 2016 constitution. Parliament also instigated a “host of 
additional changes,” amounting to over thirty proposals, including a significant increase in the budget 
allocated to parliament.38 According to one senior staff, the 2013-2018 parliament is the only parliament 
in the country’s history in which Members have made changes to the national budget. Legislative staff had 
to research the procedure required for amending the budget because it was so new that, “no one could even 
remember” (FG).  
 
In Lesotho, although the development budget was not ultimately modified, 2016 saw over twenty 
recommended amendments, which marks the greatest number tabled by the parliament in the memories 
of senior staff (L9 and L10).  The initiative was reported to signal a significant increase in budgetary 
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activism from year’s prior, whereby the few amendments to the budget came predominantly from the front 
bench. In the case of the recurrent budget, only the Parliament of Lesotho has made significant amendments 
in this regard. In March 2016, the parliament reduced the government deficit from 9.7% to 7% (L4). And 
though this was not the first time, it was “the most drastic” (L9 and L10). In addition, the parliament 
rejected the budget in February 2017. 39   No other country in this study reported amendment to its 
recurrent spending.  
 
The Zambian and Namibian Parliaments have not influenced executive budgets.  While interviewees in 
Zambia noted that this had been done before, such amendments were “not significant,” indicating that 
members of the executive may have been amongst those proposing changes. For this reason, the parliament 
receives a low ranking under this sub-dimension. The Namibian Parliament, in contrast, has had no history 
of amending the budget in any form.  
4.1.2 Participation in Pre-Budget Consultations 
 
Parliaments may also be holding consultations with the executive prior to adopting the budget. In order to 
be considered significant as part of this ordinal ranking, the exchange must be convened between the 
parliament and the executive for the purpose of discussing budgetary policy and plans. If consultations are 
held at the committee level, these are more modestly weighted because these could be interpreted simply 
as manifestations of committees’ powers to summon executive officials. However, when conducted for the 
purpose of a discussion related to the budget as a whole (as opposed to individual issues) these are be 
interpreted to form a fully-fledged, pre-budget consultation.  
 
The most vivid example of legislative-executive consultations prior to the tabling of the budget is found in 
the case of the Parliament of Zimbabwe in which the whole legislature is engaged. The parliament 
instigated the informal practice already in 2000, whereby Members and Ministers would meet in Victoria 
Falls for a two-day discussion on the budget and the state of the economy.  The tradition was somewhat 
formalised in the 2009 Public Financial Management Act and later in the 2013 Constitution (Z32). 
Provisions for the activity relate back to the idea that the executive may consult with a parliamentary 
committee on the budget prior to adoption. Thus, there is no formal legal provision that explicitly describes 
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or mandates the consultation process. Since that time, the practice continues to be re-shaped and 
streamlined in order to maximise the effectiveness of the exchange. When the talks first began, for example, 
experts and interest groups were also invited to take part. However, this was found to overshadow the 
participation of Members, who did not arrive equipped with the same analytical or informational support. 
MPs at the time tended to shy away from vociferous participation as a result.  In Malawi, the Minister of 
Finance presents and publishes the Economic/Fiscal Policy Statement and economic forecasts for the 
preceding two fiscal years prior to the tabling of the budget, no later than 1 April (Public Finance 
Management Act (4) (2003)). Informally, this provides the Assembly the chance to debate budget policy 
with the executive before the budget is tabled. The material is interrogated at the committee level when 
committees break into groupings of three to four. Though the process is formalised Public Financial 
Management Act (2003), as one interviewee explained, “the pre -approval consultations do not change 
anything. When the MoF tables the document, for two weeks committees consult government 
departments... but nothing changes because of the laws…. they don’t have that mandate. It must be MoF 
who does that” (M5).  Because the consultations take place at the committee level, a mid-level ranking is 
assigned.  In Lesotho, there is an executive-led National Planning Committee, which contributes to the 
budget formulation process. Participation is ensured from across the private, NGO, national and local 
government sectors but Members of Parliament are not invited to take part.  The Parliament, may, however 
exercise some influence over the budget as Ministers meet with Committee Clusters prior to budget 
adoption.  The Parliament thus also receives a mid-level rank. Such meetings are related to committee 
coordination efforts already discussed in the first sub-dimension of the dependent variable. However, this 
sub-dimension places its emphasis on consultations with the executive and not between the committees 
themselves. 
 
Pre-budget consultations in Zambia are conducted though the Expanded Committee on Estimates, which 
has a two-week window in which to call on members of the executive to discuss particular votes prior to 
adoption. Because this process is mainly a reflection of the Parliament’s ability to call witnesses for 
information, it does not constitute a fully-fledged consultation process separate from the committee 
collaboration stage. It therefore receives a mid-range score. The Namibian Parliament does not engage in 
pre-budget consultations either as a Parliament or at the committee level.  However, a practice of holding 
“pre-budget hearings” was recently introduced in 2012 or 2013, whereby Ministries began to lobby for 
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support on the budgets for which they were seeking approval. When the Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
organises its budget hearings in cooperation with the National Planning Commission, all fourteen Regional 
Councils are invited to participate. However, this is a “procedural practice” and not put down in law.  
Interviewees emphasised that not all Councillors ultimately attend their respective hearings, but, in 
principle, the procedure does allow Members from the upper house to question ministries on progress 
related to regional capital (infrastructure) and development projects and interact with Ministers directly 
on budgetary matters more generally (N13).  
 
In sum, pre-budget consultations between the legislature as an entity and the executive was reported in 
just one case, namely that of Zimbabwe.  In Lesotho and Zambia, committee level consultations have 
become a staple practice, moving beyond a single-issue discussion with executive authorities and into a 
detailed consultative process between the legislature and the executive on the budget as a whole.  
Interviews suggested that consultations were of somewhat greater depth in the case of Malawi though 
frustration still exists with regard to the utility of the exercise. The Parliament of Namibia has recently 
introduced an informal practice of engaging Members of its Upper House via the Regional Councils, though 
this is representative of only a minor or burgeoning change. 
4.1.3 Cross-Committee Collaboration at Adoption 
 
The third sub-dimension addresses whether or not the parliament has modified the way in which its 
committees coordinate with one another in order to scrutinise the budget before adoption.  Important for this 
sub-dimension is evidence of structured interaction between the Budget Committee and other committees in 
the house or between chambers. Budget Committees may take on mandates that limit or expand upon their 
scope or engage with other sub-committees in order to complete their work.40 Interaction between the 
Budget Committees and other portfolio committees may take on a centralised, dispersed, or mixed character 
(Schick 2002: 29).  In the absence of a dedicated Budget Committee, cross-committee collaboration will also 
be considered as part of this sub dimension so long as the nature of the interaction relates back to the national 
budget at the approval stage.  Individual committees or committee constellations may be utilising the time 
provided in different ways.  They may, for example chose to centralise or devolve reporting on budget matters, 
speeches may be kept to a particular length, and meetings with internal or external experts may be facilitated. 
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Such individually tailored time management strategies utilised from amongst committees or in the Committee 
of the Whole will also be incorporated into descriptions of the dependent variable with this sub-dimension, 
where this data is relevant for measurement purposes.  However, the most salient feature relates to whether 
or not committees convene in new ways in order to analyse and provide feedback on the draft budget. 
 
The Parliaments of Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho each engage in their own unique process of 
cross committee collaboration at the adoption stage of the budget. Overall, in terms of committee 
coordination, what is perhaps most significant from the data gathered (aside from the fact that this is, 
indeed, taking place) is the diversity with regard to approach. The various models represent innovative 
designs reflective of specific human, financial, and other influences affecting each parliament. As such, each 
of the five cases represents a significant departure in terms of procedure from the rest. The most 
centralised model is perhaps illustrated in the case of the Zambian Parliament with its expanded Committee 
on Estimates, followed by Malawi whose committee cluster meetings feed into the reporting of the Budget 
Committee and Lesotho whose Estimates committee delegates the scrutiny of particular ministries to the 
four remaining subject clusters. Zimbabwe appears to be the most disparate, with the Budget Committee 
operating almost independently from the (extensive) process of committee interaction between the upper 
and lower chambers as well as with the various ministries before the budget is tabled in parliament. 
Namibia represents an anomaly here, in which there is no review by the parliament prior to adoption. In 
the face of such variation in terms of approach, few conclusions can be drawn in terms of direction, although 
one can say that in four out of five cases, parliamentary committees are coordinating with one another in 
order to scrutinise the executive budget though with differing levels of collaboration.  
 
Table 4.2: Overview of Models of Cross-Committee Collaboration Prior to Budget Adoption 
 
 Zimbabwe Malawi Zambia Namibia Lesotho 
















More specifically, in Malawi, portfolio committees are informally clustered into groups of three for the 
consideration of the budget, each of which ultimately submits reports to the Budget Committee for 
presentation on the floor. At cluster meetings the Budget Committee, Public Accounts Committee and 
Government Assurances Committee meet together and call in the Ministry of Finance for questions (M25). 
Experts’ analyse budget material parallel to the cluster committee meetings whose findings feed into the 
report ultimately produced by the cluster committee.  “Since 2014 the committees are clustered and given 
opportunity to interact with officials from line ministries, these are very high-tension discussions and this 
allows cross fertilisation of ideas on budgetary scrutiny across the various committees…” (M8) 
Interviewees did, however, report that it is difficult to attract members’ participation.  “Attendance of MPs 
at cluster meetings is very low…. Though the true reason for absenteeism not clear” (M12). Nonetheless, 
committee ‘cluster meetings’ are a formal institutional event prior to the adoption of the budget and are 
well coordinated.  
 
In Zambia, the Budget Committee began the practice of expanding its collaboration with other committees 
in order to scrutinise the budget before adoption in 2006. From this time the Expanding Committee on 
Estimates-which includes all Members of the Estimates Committee and the Chairs of all other portfolio 
committees - scrutinises the budget for ten days prior to adoption. The Expanded Committee invites 
experts during this time and calls on representatives from the executive in order to clarify issues. It is 
envisaged with the introduction of the Budget Planning and Policy Act (BPPA), that all committees will one 
day be involved in budgetary scrutiny (ZAM 2).  The arrangement is, nonetheless, also accompanied by 
some difficulties. “It is not sustainable. There are 22 MPs and because they are all Chairs it’s difficult for 
them to focus on all the relevant issues…. and there are also issues in terms of respect…” (ZAM4). 
 
In Zimbabwe, Members of the Senate’s thematic committees join with the Assembly’s portfolio committees 
in order to participate in pre- and post- budget consultations with the executive as well as any bilateral 
meetings held with the Ministries within the committee’s ambit.  When the committee system first began, 
all committees would present their reports to the Budget Committee and this would be consolidated into 
one report. Today, individual portfolio committees present their own reports for each ministry (Z18). 
There was some criticism that the Budget Committee is not visible throughout much of the year. As one 
interviewee put it: “Parliamentary committees are only really engaging in the budget process at the time of 
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pre- and post-budget debates. The legal powers are there, but no one is monitoring the budget regularly” 
… (ZIM 13) Thus, although coordination is taking place a mid-range coding is appropriate.  
 
In Lesotho, from 2012-2015 all committees were mandated for the first time to scrutinise the budget before 
being considered in the House. Each Minister thus consults with the appropriate cluster committee to 
discuss the budget in February, two months prior to the 1 April start of the fiscal year. Once the House 
refers the budget to the Economics Cluster Committee prior to adoption, the committee then delegates 
specific votes to one of the other four cluster committees so that they may scrutinise these and provide 
feedback prior to the budget’s adoption. “Committees are quite influential at that stage” (L13). 41  However, 
there were repeated reports that the cluster committees are overstretched, along with the capacities of the 
MPs that support them: “MPs are spread too thin because they have to participate in too many committees… 
at budget time they have to choose which committee to go to” (L6).  In sum, despite some effort on the part 
of the Economics Cluster Committee to coordinate with the others, this is inherently limited due to the 
general nature of the cluster system employed.  In Namibia, the committee system has not yet made a 
practice of reviewing the budget in advance of adoption; it is therefore coded at null.  
4.1.4 Committee Scrutiny Visits 
 
The fourth sub-dimension relates to the execution of committee “site,” “verification,” or “oversight,” visits 
to areas where the executive has plans for implementation or areas where implementation is already 
underway or complete. 42 Visits conducted by any number or combination of committees will be considered 
in the coding though the visit must be conducted for the purpose of overseeing some aspect of the 
implementation of executive plans. Not all site visits will be weighed equally because the focus of such 
activities is interpreted broadly across parliaments. Those committee visits that focus exclusively on 
scrutinising the implementation of some aspect of the national budget will be afforded the most weight. 
Also, committees that simply engage in ‘orientation tours,’ intended as a learning experience for Members 
of the committee, are afforded less weight than those focused on the scrutiny of executive implementation 
and performance. If funding is not available for such visits, the parliament will also fall on a lower scale, 
though balanced against an assessment of the incentive on the part of the committee system to conduct 
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such work. Site visits conducted by the Public Accounts Committee are not be included, as these would be 
for use in the compilation and drafting of PAC reports over the course of the audit phase.   
 
Overall, MPs and staff point out that the ability of committees to conduct scrutiny visits is highly dependent 
on funding, which continues to be irregular. Reasons behind financial constraints differ from case to case. 
In some cases, the causes relate to the internal (mis) management of funds, in others this relates mainly to 
lack of funding from the Treasury, or fluctuating support from external development agencies.  In addition, 
there is no clear trend related to committee mandates when it comes to scrutiny visits. Regional and global 
norms in this regard do not appear to have coalesced from which Parliaments may model their behaviour. 
As a result, some parliaments chose to focus their on-site work on ex-ante oversight of executive 
implementation (Namibia), while others on ex-post.  Some focus on thematic issues (Zambia), while others 
may oversee progress related to government projects (Zimbabwe). Overall, however, there appears to be 
little focus on specifically overseeing the executive budget, as outlined in the Appropriation Act; committee 
mandates are yet poorly aligned to the scrutiny of executive budgets. In fact, Budget Committees 
themselves are tasked mainly with a mandate for public outreach on budget priorities (Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Malawi).  And in some cases, like that of Zambia, the parliamentary calendar also limits the ability of the 
parliament to make these a practice. However, despite the many variations, four out of five parliaments are 
carrying scrutiny visits, in some form, on a relatively regular basis. The Parliament of Lesotho remains the 
one exception.  
 
More specifically, committees in the Namibian Parliament are not focused on scrutinising the executive 
budget per se, but do conduct site visits for the purpose of orienting themselves with executive 
implementation prior to its start.  Overall, both MPs and staff say they would like to be conducting more 
visits, but poor internal planning appears to be hindering progress. In addition, much overlap is currently 
in play between the site visits conducted by the upper and lower chambers, whose committees focus on 
similar issues. This leads to a duplication of efforts in the monitoring process that is readily observed even 
by constituents. For this reason, the Parliament receives a mid-range coding. In Zimbabwe, funding from 
the Treasury is divided equally amongst all portfolio committees for visits that pertain to constitutional 
provisions. These include provisions for public hearings on bills and public consultations conducted by the 
Budget Committee (Z29). The Budget Committee normally goes out once a year to conduct public hearings, 
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consisting of “outreach on budget priorities,” (Z8) in line with its constitutional mandate, but for the first 
time in 2016, the parliament was able to send the Agriculture Committee, as well as Mines and Energy and 
Gender Committee, because “these contribute a lot to fiscus” (Z29).  External donor support was 
forthcoming for the latter, which places a clear focus on ‘money committees’ or those that relate most 
directly to the executive budget.  “Fact finding missions” as well as committee site visits related to topical 
issues like those conducted by committees of the Senate, are similarly dependent on funding from external 
sources in Zimbabwe, whose support, staff concede, is essential for the execution of such oversight 
activities (Z29) 
 
In Malawi, legal provisions for oversight visits were incorporated into the legal framework from 2013 in 
both in the Constitution and Standing Rules and Orders (SROs), though these remain general.  Funding 
appeared to be one of the main constraints to action, which is prioritised differently for different 
committees, but is lacking overall. “We can’t go out and conduct verification visits. It’s in the Standing 
Orders to do so, but we can’t without any funding” (M4). Informally, the parliament did conduct monitoring 
missions in 2006, however, only during the period of time in which external development agencies were 
providing financial support for the development of the parliament’s committee department. Given the ad-
hoc nature of these visits, the Parliament is thus coded as mid-range.  
 
The Parliament of Lesotho is similarly constrained by funding and has not received the same level of 
support from international donors enjoyed by other parliaments in this study.  Moreover, committee visits 
are not included in committee work plans, precluding the provision of funding in periods in which budget 
is available. Though such initiatives are legally available to committees according to SRO (95) (1), this is 
“not an institutionalised practice and needs lots of improvement.” The exception to the funding rule 
appears to be the Zambian Parliament, whose committee system enjoys significant funding form the 
Treasury, though some focus group participants were quick to add that the allocations are still not optimal. 
On an annual basis, committees are engaged in study tours, whereby each committee selects a particular 
issue to focus on for that year.  Though these are normally topical, there is nothing to stop committees from 
incorporating budgetary considerations into their work.  As one staff suggested: “The topics should be more 
focused, so you can see how many resources, whether what they are doing is effective etc….” (FG). Even 
when committees do conduct study or verification visits, time available for these is limited.  Given the 
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design of the parliamentary programme, committees can only do so in the first quarter of the year based 
on their calendar restrictions. (FG) On the basis of these collective factors, the parliament is thus awarded 
a mid-range coding.  
4.1.5 Committee Scrutiny of Quarterly and Annual Reports 
 
Included within this sub-category are demonstrations that portfolio committees are making a practice of 
scrutinising monthly, quarterly, or annual reports from government Ministries, Agencies, and 
Organisations (MAOs) within their respective remits. Though the presence of committees that shadow 
particular government organs alone could give some indication of the intention to oversee government 
ministries, what is interesting here is whether or not the committees are actively involved in scrutinising 
information related to the budgets of their MAOs.  More weight will be afforded to those parliaments that 
engage their whole committee system in the scrutiny of executive reports. Those in which only the Budget 
Committee is involved will be coded on lower scale. In addition, because the provision of Ministerial and 
other reports is at least partly a reflection of executive capacity to create them, some caution will be 
exercised here when considering the reasons behind any lack of activity in this area. 
 
In general, it appears that the practice of scrutinising executive reports is becoming the norm even if this is 
yet at a nascent stage. We can also observe from the legal framework that rules, which are related to the 
submission of annual reports, predate those of the provision of quarterly reports. The Parliaments of 
Namibia represents an outlier in this regard as no such legal provisions are available and no attempt to 
scrutinise executive reports on implementation are made. In Malawi, the executive is similarly not 
compelled to provide any financial reporting over the course of implementation, but here, the Budget 
Committee still collects and scrutinizes budget documents that amount to the same.  In Lesotho the 
converse is true: the battle for legal backing with regard to executive reporting has been fought and won, 
but the Parliament is not yet able to follow up with systematic action. Thus, in this sub-dimension, three of 
the five parliaments examined appear to be scrutinizing executive budget reports in some form.  
 
The Parliament of Zimbabwe began to scrutinise annual and quarterly reports informally in 2004 across 
all portfolio committees. Formal authorisation to do so came with the entry of the 2009 Public Financial 
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Management Act. However, presently, the committees themselves are not requesting the information on a 
regular basis, which has meant that the Clerk of Parliament has been left to take up this task in the interim.  
In addition, at the time of data collection, the scrutiny of quarterly reports had become, practically speaking, 
a futile exercise given a situation in which the government was not disbursing funding to its line ministries 
in 2017. Reports did not contain figures for parliament to scrutinise.  Given that the process is now gaining 
traction and popularity (despite obvious economic setbacks), the Parliament ranks high in this sub-
dimension. A similar pre-empting of the legal authority to scrutinise annual and quarterly reports was 
found in Zambia from 2002, though only with respect to the “quarterly reviews” conducted by the Estimates 
Committee. “The Estimates Committee relies on the constitutional prerogatives to oversee the executive to 
request quarterly reports” (ZAM3). The legal requirement for each ministry to submit annual reports to 
parliament came in the 2004 Public Finance and Accountability Act (PFAA) and 2005 SROs but at the time 
of data collection, standard portfolio committees had not been making a practice of regularly scrutinising 
these. As one staff explained: “The annual reviews are not submitted and the parliament itself has not taken 
that up so… they (ministries) just don’t do them” (FG). Because the scrutiny of executive reports is limited 
to that of the Budget Committee, the parliament is assigned a mid-range coding.  
 
In Lesotho the parliament pushed for greater executive accountability for the use of expenditures, resulting 
in the incorporation of executive submission of annual and quarterly reports for parliamentary scrutiny in 
the 2011 Public Financial Management and Accountability Act (PFMA). Committees’ mandate to scrutinise 
annual reports was formalised already in 2008 in the Standing Rules and Orders, though the actual scrutiny 
of annual reports did not begin until 2013.  Committee scrutiny of quarterly reports has not been a practice, 
though reasons for this are still debated. Some in the focus group discussion have pointed to 
incompatibilities between formal template regulations and the requirements of parliament: „We need to 
follow International Public Sector Reporting Standards. Accountants only focus on the report to the 
Accountant General. The reports to parliament are not the focus.”  Others point to lack of committee 
initiative: “The practice is not yielding results…Some committees are really on their way, but then you see 
others that don’t have the capacity to follow up” (FG). Thus, the Parliament of Lesotho receives a null rating 
in this sub-dimension.  Similar patterns of activity are found in the Parliaments of Namibia and Malawi. In 
Namibia, both the (1990) Constitution and the (2015) SROs contain provisions for the scrutiny of reports, 
but parliamentary committees have not taken up this task, thus it receives a null scoring as well. In Malawi, 
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the (2013) SROs allow for a broad interpretation whereby any committee may make any inquiry into 
executive activities: “Each committee shall study, asses, and analyse the relative success of their respective 
assigned ministries as measured by results obtained compared with stated objectives.”   In reality, however, 
committees are not conducting examinations of quarterly and annual reporting, with the exception of the 
Budget Committee. There is yet no legal requirement for the provision of either annual or quarterly reports 
by the executive.  However, given that some scrutiny is taking place within the framework of the Budget 
Committee, and given that the Chair takes such scrutiny particularly seriously, the parliament is awarded 
a mid-range coding.  
4.1.6 Committee Scrutiny of Local Government Audits 
 
Finally, as part of the sixth sub-dimension of the dependent variable, the audit component will be examined. 
The assumption here is that if the PAC has taken up the scrutiny of local government audits this represents 
a significant behavioural advancement in the breadth of auditory scrutiny. However, as with the scrutiny 
of (unaudited) executive reports, the provision of local government audits assumes both the capacity of 
local government to produce the relevant documentation, as well as the capacity of the Auditor General to 
audit the figures submitted. Thus, if the parliaments studied here are scrutinising local government audits, 
this element is understood to form part of a system-wide expansion of the capacities of the state in the 
management of public funds. For this reason, more weight will be afforded to those parliaments having 
established a dedicated Local Government Committee with the mandate to scrutinise these reports. The 
presence of this committee supports an assessment of the legislature’s role in scrutinizing local level service 
delivery as distinct from the performance of other institutions in the system. Because Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) scrutiny of regular audit reports at the national level is a standard part of the work of the 
PAC (and because PAC work is also a standard part of the Westminster heritage) it is not necessary to 
include these as part of an investigation targeting novel behaviour. The assumption is that these are 
occurring, even if backlogs are noted due to capacity or other constraints. 
 
In general, it is clear from the data that the scrutiny of local government audits has only very recently come 
into play in the parliaments examined. Three out of five parliaments engage in the practice; only the 
Parliaments of Namibia and Lesotho do not. Across all cases, the capacity of the Auditor Generals to 
 
 80 
incorporate local government audits into their preview was called into question. In addition, the ability of 
local government to account for their spending was also indicated as a source of difficulty. Theses 
constraints notwithstanding, the initiative to incorporate local government spending into the fold of 
parliament’s oversight mandate for the first time appears to be a significant development, particularly as 
this relates back to the potential for an upward trend, system-wide, in the management of public finances. 
 
In Namibia, the mandate to submit audited local government accounts can be found as far back as the 1991 
Finance Act. In it, the Minister for Local Government is tasked with the provision of an audit report to the 
National Assembly.  However, until recently, practice has not followed in step.  The PAC began receiving 
local government audits in July 2008.  Even then, the Auditor General was tasked with conducting a total of 
130 audits across fourteen regions, which includes some fifty-four local authorities. Backlogs continue to 
be an issue. This means that local audits, though periodically forthcoming, remain exceedingly rare.  For 
this reason, the Parliament of Namibia is assigned a low code in this sub-dimension. A similar lag can be 
found in Malawi, whereby the 1998 Local Government Act requests local authorities to submit their ledgers 
to the Auditor General (AG) for auditing. With the 2013 SROs, a Local Government Committee was 
incorporated into the committee system in 2014. By 2016, the first local government report made its way 
to the committee, though audited reports are still several years behind. As one interviewee explained: “The 
Local Government Committee was created in 2014 because more and more funding was going to local 
authorities and there was no one overseeing them. Some Local Councils didn’t like it because they had never 
before been asked how they spend their money. And so far, they [the Local Government Committee] has 
found that there are any more problems there than on Capitol Hill” (M26).  A Local Government Committee 
has, nonetheless, been established. But because it is so new, and because local government audits are only 
beginning to come in, the parliament receives a mid-range ranking in this sub-dimension.  
 
The Parliament of Zimbabwe had provision for this in the 2009 Audit Act as well as the 2013 Constitution, 
but the practice of scrutinising local audits only began in 2016. “With the 2013 constitution, the Auditor 
General (AG) was obliged to conduct audit reports on some ninety local authorities, ninety parastatals, and 
twenty-seven in central government. Prior to this we weren’t looking at local government” (Z13). The 
Auditor General is “really overwhelmed” (Z26) with limited abilities, capacity was cited as a chronic 
problem. In response, there is reportedly an agreement to expand the AG office staffing because of the new 
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mandate with regard to local government audits, but also because MPs are demanding forensic audits 
(Z13). Capacity constraints were reported to extend beyond the realm of the AG and into the parliament’s 
committees: “If the Committee for Local Government were to receive reports from local government it 
couldn’t be individual report; it would have to be an overview of all local authorities” (Z28). The same is 
true for the Ministries as well: “75% of all audit reports are qualified, and for local authorities typically its 
100%. There are the same issues year after year, including inadequate documentation and 
misappropriation. There’s probably a capacity problem within the ministries” (Z13).  Nonetheless, a Local 
Government Committee is in place and functioning. Despite clear staffing constraints, the Parliament of 
Zimbabwe receives a mid-range coding.   
 
In Zambia, a Local Government Accounts Committee was established in 2016 for the purpose of overseeing 
local finances. The committee’s establishment accompanies a recent shift in the management of public 
finances at the local level whereby internal auditing practices are being replaced by external audits, 
bringing local governments in line with national PFM requirements for the first time in the country’s 
history. It is expected that the scrutiny of local government audits will begin in 2018. “Soon it will be too 
much for the [Local Government Committee] to look at budget formulation, budget monitoring, and audits. 
The plan is to divide the country into smaller parts to make it manageable…” (ZAM 16) However, given that 
this is not yet a practice, only a mid-range coding can be awarded.  The Parliament of Lesotho does not 
make the scrutiny of local government audits a practice. Local Government Audits appear to be mired with 
capacity issues, whereby local authorities are not yet fully able to account for their spending. Local 
government audits, where these are conducted, do not make their way to parliamentary for scrutiny unless 
found “lumped together” with audits from the Ministry of Local Government itself. As one staff remarked: 
“You always hear stories about how councillors are embezzling money but you cannot track this because 
of how they report to the Ministry” (FG). For these reasons, the Parliament of Lesotho is allotted a null 








Table 4.3:  Changes in Behavioural Aspects of Legislative Life Related to Budgetary Matters  
 

































3 3 2 3 3 2 
Malawi 
(14/18) 
3 2 3 2 2 2 
Zambia 
(12/18) 
1 2 3 2 2 2 
Lesotho 
(8/18) 
3 2 2 0 0 1 
Namibia 
(3/18) 
0 1 0 2 0 0 
Totals 10/15 10/15 10/15 9/15 7/15 7/15 
 
The overarching rank order for the dimension of the dependent variable related to behavioural change is 
organised as follows. ‘No change’ is understood for country code totals between 0 and 4. ‘Minor changes’ 
are understood for those parliaments with collective codes between 5 and 9. Parliaments understood to be 
undergoing ‘moderate change’ are those that score between 10 and 14. And finally, those understood to be 
incurring ‘substantive change’ in this dimension are those that rank between 15 and 18. The rank order 
categories were designed to ensure a relatively equal distribution. Because a perfectly equal numeric 
distribution was not possible, in order to help avoid an overestimation of the changes at hand, the category 
‘substantive change’ is the only category that includes just four scoring possibilities, namely 15, 16, 17 and 







Table 4.4: Rank Order Categories in Behaviour Change Across Cases 
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4.2 Dimensions of Organisational Change  
 
This section will explore the dimension of the dependent variable related to organisational change.  This 
dimension consists of the following ordinal ranking: a rank of zero (0) indicates no evidence that the 
organisational attribute has been established. One (1) indicates a rhetorical commitment to the institution 
or a situation in which the basic tenants have been established in principle, but not necessarily acted upon. 
A rank order of two (2) is indicative of an organisational change that has been somewhat established and 
somewhat functioning or functions inconsistently or on a more general basis or at limited capacity. And 
finally, a rank score of three (3) indicates that the institution is fully established, or is highly specified, or 
functioning on a generally consistent basis. That is, the organisational attribute appears to be stable and 
accompanied by specific norms.  
4.2.1 Establishment of a Research Department 
 
This sub-dimension relates to the presence or absence of a parliamentary research department. Although 
research departments may or may not house staff with specific budgetary expertise, their presence is 
indicative of an interest on the part of the parliament in increasing information flow and supporting the 
work of parliamentary committees. Such institutions have the potential to act as a pre-cursor to the 
development of more specialised staff contingencies in the parliament. For this reason, this element has 
been included here. The staff contingency of the research department will be probed for indications of the 
number of staffs equipped with budgetary expertise, their respective areas of expertise, as well as the 
department’s tenure in the parliament thus far.  The most salient feature of this sub-dimension however, is 
whether or not there is evidence of an institutional commitment to the research department and the 




Overall, research departments appear to be growing in each country. All five parliaments did host at least 
two researchers at the time of research, representing a significant advancement from a baseline of null. The 
Parliament of Lesotho the most recent ‘latecomer’ in this area though the two available researchers are not 
yet incorporated into the fold of parliamentary work. Zimbabwe and Zambia have well established research 
departments with staff contingents of ten or more. Malawi’s research department, though small, has also 
endured over time. And while the Parliament of Namibia does host a research department, its operations 
are more akin to communications and reporting than research per-se. 
 
The parliament with the longest history of a viable research department is that of Zambia. Established in 
1971, the department employed 10 staff as of the time of data collection, though the expertise of the 
researchers is non-specialised and its work yet driven by the fluctuating demands of MPs.  However, the 
parliament still is assigned a high coding here given the resources assigned to the department and the 
duration of its establishment. The Parliament of Zimbabwe recruited its first research team in 1993, 
consisting of three staff. The department now employs nine staff and one Director. One researcher has a 
background in economics though budgetary expertise, specifically, is lacking. Here again, however, the 
coding is reflective of a well-established, well-resourced institution.  Research staff also displayed a high 
degree of motivation with regard to their work over the course of the interview process.  The Parliament 
of Malawi has taken a similar trajectory with regard to its research capacities, though on a smaller scale. In 
1999, the Parliament recruited its first researcher and roughly one staff has been added to this contingent 
every fifth year.  Currently, the Parliament hosts three researchers, each with varying experience on 
budgetary matters (M13). The committee clerks’ responsibilities are mostly administrative while the 
researcher’s job is more technical.  Members rely on researchers to draft motions (M13).  
 
 The first researcher to come on board with the Parliament of Namibia was recruited in 2011. Interviewees 
noted difficulties in the recruitment of research staff because of the limitations presented by the staff 
recruitment process, which is not designed to meet the parliament’s recruitment needs. At the time of 
research the both the Assembly and the Council employed one researcher, and neither were equipped with 
economic or financial expertise. Rather than researching topics at the request of MPs or committees, the 
department is mainly responsible for the internal communications of the institution, reporting meetings 
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and publishing these in a monthly journal. Given this orientation, the department is characterized as 
somewhat established and somewhat functioning. In Lesotho, the first researchers for both National 
Assembly and the Senate came on board in 2016.  While the researcher in the Assembly is a generalist, that 
of the Senate has a legal background.  Committees in the Assembly were not yet utilising the newfound 
research capacity available at the time data was collected. Given that the staff recruited are not yet a part 
of a fully-fledged research department, the assigned coding in this sub-dimension is low, representing only 
the ‘seeds’ of change.   
4.2.2 Establishment of a Budget Committee 
 
One of the most telling demonstrations of change with regard to the way a given parliament is engaging in 
the budget process relates to the incorporation of a Budget Committee into its committee system.  Budget 
Committees, also known as an “Estimates” or “Finance” Committees, are usually standing committees created 
for the purpose of enabling the legislature to participate in budget formulation and monitoring.  Though 
specific mandates will differ from case to case, a Budget Committee will be considered a valid component of 
this sub-dimension if the committee places its focus on questions related to the formulation and continued 
scrutiny of the national budget. If a Budget Committee has been established but its function is yet unclear 
or does not fit the traditional function of a Budget Committee, then it will be afforded less weight in the 
coding. Similarly, committee systems in which a Budget Committee is not yet established but for which 
another committee plays the role of such a committee at budget time will also not receive a high ranking 
but will count towards the measurement of change within this sub-dimension, nonetheless. Budget 
Committees that are both established and function as outlined will be awarded a full ranking.  
 
Overall, all five of the parliaments examined are understood to house some form of a Budget Committee 
from the time of data collection. Though their officinal mandates currently relate mainly to public outreach 
on budget priorities, their establishment represents a significant step towards greater budgetary oversight 
and scrutiny.  The same can be said to the continual transformations of both their official and unofficial 
mandates, which are inching towards greater powers of scrutiny and policy influence over time. The early 
Budget Committees found in Zimbabwe and Malawi began with significantly weaker mandates than is seen 
today. Zambia introduced its Budget Committee significantly later, and the Parliament of Namibia was in 
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the process of establishing such a committee only at the time of data collection. Though not a fully-fledged 
Budget Committee, the Economics Cluster in Lesotho serves a similar function, at least at the budget 
adoption phase. 
 
The Economics Cluster Committee in the Parliament of Lesotho was established in 2008, though the 
committee plays the role of a traditional Budget Committee only when the budget is tabled. Nevertheless, 
because it fulfils the role of a Budget Committee, particularly at budget time, the parliament is assigned a 
mid-range ranking. At the time of data collection, the Parliament of Namibia was in the process of 
establishing a Budget Committee, though it was due to be fully operable only in 2018. Originally, the 
committee’s Terms of Reference maintained a limited focus on the Parliament’s budget (as would a 
housekeeping committee), though over the course of the 2017 calendar year, this appears to have evolved 
to include an additional focus on the national budget itself.  Because the ‘seeds’ were planted and rolled out 
in 2017, only a low ranking can be assigned. The Parliament of Malawi hosts a Budget Committee whose 
work and mandate has only recently come into focus. “The Budget Committee is an old committee, but it 
never got off the ground” (M25). Nonetheless today, the committee is both driven and active as would be 
understood from a traditional Budget Committee.  It also represents one of the longest standing Budget 
Committees in the region, established in 1994.  It therefore receives a high ranking.  The Parliament of 
Zimbabwe began its first session with a Budget Committee, though budgetary scrutiny was conducted 
through sub-committees, which placed their focus on “wasteful or unnecessary expenditure” by the 
executive. Between 1990 and 2000, a system of four cluster committees replaced this establishment, 
though it was similarly unable to adequately scrutinise all government ministries.  It was not until 2000 
that the Budget Committee was “reborn” in Zimbabwe, whose revised and current mandate was revised at 
the same time departmental committees were formed (R).  It thus receives a similarly high ranking. The 
Parliament of Zambia established its Budget Committee in 2002, and its mandate according to the 
parliament’s SROs, amongst other tasks, is to “carry out regular examination and scrutiny of budgets, 
estimates and management thereof; and conduct budget hearings.”   The committee is also reported to rely 
on corresponding committees to monitor budget allocation and expenditure for their own ministries as 




4.2.3 Establishment of Constituency Development Fund  
 
Whether or not a parliament has established and maintained a Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is 
addressed in this sub-dimension. 43 As Baskin (2014) explains, “No two CDFs are structurally identical.” 
They vary according to a host of terms, including their amounts, origins, purposes and management 
structures, amongst other attributes (Baskin 2014: 6).  CDFs are often criticized by international donors 
and NGOs.  Some make the argument that these funds open doors for the MPs to use the funding for private, 
rather than public, gain. Others base their criticisms on theoretical grounds, arguing that MP’s should not 
be involved in the implementation of the budget, because this task constitutes the reserve of the executive.  
Still others prefer more far-fetched explanations: African executives deliberately provide funds to MPs in 
order to keep them sufficiently busied, in order to distract Members from their oversight responsibilities.  
While criticisms are many, requisite evidence lags behind. Moreover, recent research conducted by Harris 
and Posner (2019) challenges prevailing assumptions characterizing CDFs as vehicles for clientelist 
practices.   The issue will not be resolved here.   For the purpose of this research, I take a value neutral 
approach to the subject and neither promote nor denounces the use of CDFs.   I also make no attempt to 
judge their performance or structural attributes.  
 
For this reason, the following minimalist definition applies: CDFs are funding streams appropriated by 
Members of Parliament at or before the formal adoption of the national budget for the purpose of benefiting 
MP constituencies in the form of small to medium scale development projects, across party lines. What is 
important for this characteristic is whether or not there was demonstrable intention to initiate a CDF on 
the part of the parliament, backed with actions to continue the practice. Even in instances where CDF 
distribution may be on hold, these are considered CDFs so long as there is a history of implementation that 
is expected to continue. In general, Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) have been instituted in four 
of the five parliaments examined here. Because Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia have had several years of 
experience with CDFs, the focus in these Parliaments is now on streamlining the ways in which this 
appropriation is managed.  
 
The first parliament in this sample to have established a Constituency Development Fund is the Zambian 
Parliament.  Provision for a CDF was made in the 1994 Local Government Act and Parliament approved the 
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establishment of a CDF in 1995, where it has been running continuously without legal backing since that 
time. More recently, the 2016 Zambian Constitution provides for the establishment of a CDF, which would 
bring the appropriation into the legal fold. To these ends, the 2017 Parliament submitted new CDF Bill, 
which was under review by the legal department at the time of research.  Also at this time, much debate 
ensued around the CDF because disbursement had been delayed in some cases over the course of 2015 and 
2016. Nevertheless, the Parliament ranks high in this area given that the fund enjoys widespread support 
and is firmly institutionalised. In the Parliament of Zimbabwe, a CDF was in operation from 2010-2013, 
though only on an informal basis. The fund was discontinued as issues related to the parliament’s ability to 
account for the resources began to arise. At the time of research, the parliament was working on guidelines 
to help reintroduce the operation of the CDF.  The 2013 constitution provides for the establishment of a 
CDF and a bill towards these ends was sitting with the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs while the data 
collection process was still underway. In Malawi, a CDF is in operation, though provision for its 
establishment is also not set in law.  The CDF was established as a result of a resolution of the House in 
2006, and since then it has “survived because all the MPs want it” (M25). The fund continues through to 
today, though CDFs were also reported to be difficult to audit and questions of just where to house and 
administer the resources were still under debate. Still, a high coding is assigned. Despite some signals from 
the Lesotho Parliament that a CDF would be desirable, both staff and MPs concede, that there is not enough 
funding in the country to avail one (L30). For this reason, it is coded at null. Finally, while there is no CDF 
in Namibia, a Constituency Development Fund Bill was tabled in 2015 by the National Council. The bill is 
currently under executive consideration. Should the bill pass, it could mark the first time a CDF has been 
established on the initiative of an upper house on the continent.  Thus, the parliament is assigned a low 
rank in this area, as the seeds of change have been planted 
4.2.4 Establishment of a Parliamentary Budget Office  
 
The proverbial ‘smoking gun’ of legislative engagement in budgetary matters may be the establishment of 
a Parliamentary Budge Office (PBO).  PBOs are support structures for MPs and committees in the ex-ante 
stage of the budget.  When established in tandem with a Budget Committee, PBOs serve as a counterweight 
to the ex-post focus of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) 
relationship. Such bodies can take the form of Fiscal Council, falling under the statutory authority of the 
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executive or the form of a PBO, which falls under the authority of the legislature. Important for this sub-
dimension is that it falls under the statutory authority of the latter. Indeed, established Fiscal Councils or 
their corollaries may point to an increase in executive activism on budgetary matters and not that of the 
parliament. PBOs may also function without a legal mandate.  For this reason, even offices where no explicit 
legal backing is found will be considered fully established so long as the office actively plays a demonstrable 
role in providing independent economic and fiscal analysis of the executive budget. Additional services 
beyond the fulfilment of this basic will not be examined as the level of sophistication in the African context 
is expected to be minimal. In addition, where parliaments have made demonstrable efforts to establish a 
PBO, even where the office is not in full operation, this will be assigned a mid-range code considering the 
difficulty of establishing such institutions in general, and even more readily, in Africa.  
 
Parliamentary Budget Offices are slowly becoming an institutional norm. The most established and 
extensive PBO is found in the Parliament of Zambia, with Zimbabwe on track to develop a similarly 
structured institution. The Parliament of Malawi is actively seeking funding from development agencies in 
order to re-instate its PBO.44  The Parliament of Lesotho does not host one. A PBO is under discussion and 
planning at the highest levels in the Parliament of Namibia, though at the time of data collection, the office 
was not yet established. Thus, the data indicates that three out of five parliaments are currently active in 
this sub-dimension. 
 
The Zambian Parliament offers the most robust example of a Parliamentary Budget Office. Established in 
2014, the office was operational shortly thereafter. The current staffing is at four, but the office is designed 
to house twelve. The Parliament established the office based on its constitutional right to establish its own 
departments. The PBO is supported by external donor funding, namely that of the European Commission. 
Given its firm establishment, the Parliament ranks highly here. The Parliamentary Budget Office of the 
Parliament of Zimbabwe operates on the basis of the same, general, constitutional mandate. Established in 
2016, the office currently houses a staff of two. Like the Zambian example, the parliament took advantage 
of a broad donor-funded (World Bank and African Development Bank) public finance initiative targeting 
the “whole system” to lobby and secure resources for a Budget Office in the Parliament itself. Malawi offers 
a counter example in that while it currently does not house a functioning PBO, the Parliament was the first 
of the parliaments studied here to establish one. Using existing staff, and operating (again) under no legal 
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backing aside from the constitutional autonomy of the legislature over its own human resources, the 
parliament pulled together a small budget office from 2004-2006 and again from 2012-2014 using 
available staff from various departments. However, the PBO was ultimately not sustainable because it did 
not enjoy the support of all Members, which grew suspicious and unsupportive of its undertakings, 
eventually deeming it inoperable. The Parliament of Lesotho does not have a Parliamentary Budget Office 
nor does the Parliament of Namibia. However, at the time of research the Parliament of Namibia had 
assigned the task of its establishment to the new Secretary General. Given the strong support from both the 
Speaker and others at the highest levels in the ruling party (the current President, for example), there is 
some potential that the legislature could move from rhetoric to action on this point in a relatively short 
period of time. For these reasons, Namibia is assigned a low rank, while the Parliament of Lesotho is 
assigned a null.  As a general observation, Parliamentary Budget Offices seem to be appearing in 
parliaments where research department have had significant histories. These support structures may thus 
prove a precursor to a more specific focus on budgetary matters though further research is necessary.  
4.2.5 Formal Links to Local Budget Formulation 
 
Whether or not Members have formal links to spending decisions made at the local is a little explored area 
of Members’ sphere of influence on budgetary matters. Nonetheless, this sub-dimension is considered in 
order to cover the potential breadth of parliamentary reach on budgetary matters outside official 
chambers. Such a mandate provides MPs with the opportunity to influence appropriations and plans in 
more or less structured ways before ministries have the opportunity to concretise their spending plans. 
The mandate itself may also spark an MP’s interest to engage in later stages of the budget process at the 
national level. When MPs participate in budgetary discussions at the local level, national level budgetary 
inputs are perceived as being backed ‘by the people,’ providing additional gravitas to Members’ 
interventions.  
 
For these reasons, the nature of the mandate to engage in local budget formulation as well as the ways and 
frequency with which MPs are engaged in local budget planning will be examined.   The former can be found 
in the legal framework. The latter will be determined from a combination of interview and focus group 
responses.  The determining factor in this aspect will be the emphasis placed on this form of influence in 
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individual or group discussion. Where the process and level of influence is de-emphasised or hardly 
mentioned, MPs influence in local budget formulation will be considered minimal or void. On the other 
hand, where there is emphasis placed on the process and where interviewees and focus group members 
point to local level engagement as a particularly influential used by Members of Parliament, this will be 
counted positively towards the coding in this sub-dimension. 45 
 
Overall, although the potential appears to exist for Members of the Parliaments of Malawi and Zimbabwe 
to influence the budget at an early stage, responses related to the subject were too thin to amount to any 
clear conclusions.   The strongest cases were made in Zambia and Namibia in this regard, where both 
Members and staff emphasised the potential influence available to MPs via this entry point along with some 
recent efforts in this regard. However, the interpretation of any data related to this sub-dimension is highly 
dependent on the overarching budget policy of the country concerned. A country, whose budget is 
formulated from the ‘bottom up,’ as appears to be the case (at least rhetorically) in Namibia, for example, 
will offer MPs significantly different entry points from those countries that practice a ‘top down’ approach, 
as in Malawi.  This sub-dimension thus requires additional research and attention. Available data is, 
nonetheless, outlined below. 
 
The National Council is the only chamber that offers entry point to decentralised decision making in 
Namibia. This is because Council Members also retain their membership in Regional Councils, where they 
are then elected to the national level. This forum offers Councillors the opportunity to take part in Regional 
Development Coordinating Committees (RDCCs) which are tasked with preparing, coordinating, and 
evaluating development plans for the region as well as supervising, monitoring and evaluating the same.  
Though weakness yet exist in terms of the capacity and dedication of some RDCCs and accompanying local 
committees to develop agendas in a systematic, coordinated fashion, a clear entry point for Council 
Members remains.  The framework offers Members a strong formal link to the formulation of local budgets 
and this was emphasized in the data collection process. The Parliament is thus awarded a high rank in this 
sub-dimension. Zambia also holds the potential for MPs to influence the budget from the local level. Much 
like Namibia, in Zambia, local level committees tasked with planning and budgeting provide entry points 
for MPs to influence policy outcomes. MPs may participate in both District Development Coordinating 
Committees (DDCCs) and Provincial Development Coordinating Committees (PDCCs), the latter of which 
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submits budgetary requests directly to the National Planning Commission.   Zambia has recently instituted 
constituency offices with requisite staff across the country. These offices offer an additional incentive for 
MP participation in constituency activities, which are often associated with high out-of-pocket costs. As one 
interviewee shared: “If a district has four constituencies and there are four officers representing four MPs 
who can sit in the DDCCs. There is big potential for MPs to be involved in that stage…MPs have quite an 
input there” (ZAM28). Given these strong links, the Parliament is assigned a mid-range coding in this area 
even if this was only somewhat emphasized in interviews.  
 
In addition, in Malawi there are district, town and city assemblies in which MPs are free to participate as 
non-voting members.  Such participation allows MPs to contribute to District Development Plans in line 
with provisions found in the Local Government Act. However, there was very little emphasis placed on this 
mode of influence in interviews and focus groups. In Zimbabwe, “There is room to influence the budget at 
the local level. MPs attend the Ward Council meetings and they can provide input into spending priorities.  
The district administrator then collects the information and passes it on to the provincial administrator” 
(Z33). The bid for influence also appears also to function here in reverse: “All of the ward councillors report 
to MPs so that he can defend the issue they prioritise in parliament” (Z33). However, this level of 
engagement was not emphasised in either interviews or the national focus groups in Malawi or Zimbabwe. 
The Parliament of Lesotho did not report any engagement at the local level in terms of decision-making 
processes, though the twenty-two Principal Chiefs of the Senate have the potential to be highly influential 
in local negotiations where these do take place, albeit informally.   
4.2.6 Additional Time for Budget Scrutiny at Adoption 
 
When a parliament creates space for additional time to scrutinize the budget at adoption, this is an 
important signal that the institution is pushing for more influence.  There are at least three important 
components to explore here. In the first place, there is the actual time created by the parliament for 
budgetary scrutiny.  The second aspect involves just how the parliament chooses to utilise this time. The 
former is an objective measure of time available, while the latter has already been discussed in the 
behavioural dimension of the dependent variable related to committee coordination.  Rather than focusing 
on the actual time made available for scrutiny, this sub-dimension places its focus on whether or not 
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parliament has taken the initiative to create more time at the adoption phase. Thus, there is a clear 
emphasis here on an expanded timeframe as sign of increased interest in scrutinising the budget.  Because 
the focus is on incentives, in cases where more time has been garnered but this time has not been taken up 
by parliament, this will be coded accordingly low. 
 
Overall, in three out of five parliaments studied, more time has been requested and granted for budgetary 
scrutiny in recent years.  However, importantly, the data revealed that time for budgetary scrutiny is a 
complex subject. Even where more time was awarded, as in the case of Zimbabwe, the benefit to the 
parliament is unclear when combined with its extensive pre-budget consultations with the executive. In 
the case of Malawi and others, many interviewees noted the need to improve parliament’s application of 
the time already available.  Interviewees suggested this could be achieved through, for example, more 
effective committee reporting, speech delivery styles, and committee coordination efforts. Such elements, 
even more than the duration of time itself, was reported to be an area for continued improvement across 
the all cases.  In addition, the case of Zambia highlights the fact that even in cases where the parliament 
enjoys constitutionally mandated time for scrutiny, the institution itself may not chose to implement this 
prerogative in practice. The legislature’s inactivity in this regard is particularly puzzling. 
 
The Parliament of Malawi increased their time for budget scrutiny at adoption in 2013 in their most recent 
Standing Rules and Orders. Prior to this time, the budget was debated on the floor for fifteen working days 
(three weeks).  Now, ten days are dedicated to committee scrutiny of the budget -where committees are 
informally gathered in groups of three-and another ten days are dedicated to the debate on the floor for a 
total of four weeks (M10). This can be compared to earlier periods where the budget was passed in one day 
“even in the multi-party dispensation” (M7).  Thus, the institution has displayed a clear desire to increase 
its scrutiny of the budget. The Parliament of Namibia continues to allocate four weeks for the budget review 
in the Assembly and four weeks in the Council. And though some Members expressed a desire for more 
time to debate, some were quick to emphasise that the quality of scrutiny is what really matters: “Time is 
not an issue. What are we going to do with more time, when, at the end of the day, the budget goes through 
as it comes in? We can talk about time, when we reverse what we are currently doing” (FG). Given that 
more time was not secured and interest in more time is still a contentious issue, the Parliament receives a 
null coding. In Lesotho, interviewees repeatedly expressed an interest in more time for budgetary scrutiny: 
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“We have two weeks to scrutinise the budget and we are advocating for one month” (L11). The Senate, in 
particular would like to increase its time for scrutiny from ½ day a full week. Currently, 22.5 working days 
are reserved for the Parliament as a whole, which includes 10 days for committee scrutiny. However, as in 
the case of Namibia, though some interviewees conceded that more time would be a futile exercise in the 
absence of stronger committee Chairs (L11) and better-equipped Members (L9 L10). Besides, as others 
explained: “They call it budget scrutiny period, but they actually only scrutinise the budget speech” (L14).  
 
In Zimbabwe, the previous Standing Rules and Orders (SROs) (1995) allowed 85 hours for debate.46 With 
the 2015 SROs, six consecutive days are available for debate and twelve days for the Committee of Supply. 
Though the additional time garnered serves as a clear display of the Parliament’s incentive to better 
scrutinize and oversee the executive budget, it has proven of less utility than expected. This is because the 
pre-budget process has had the “unintended effect” of reducing the debate in the House (FG).  In the 
Zambian Parliament, despite provisions in the new Constitution that provide the Parliament with three 
months to scrutinise the budget before adoption, the newly drafted 2017 Standing Rules and Orders did 
not include changes to this effect. “There is a need to align the new Standing Orders with the constitution. 
We are not really happy with them” (FG). As another staff noted: “It is up to the parliament to look at its 
procedure. Now we have the budget three months before the start of the financial year, but we still follow 
the same procedure as if we received it in January” (FG).  Other feedback suggests that the time allotted to 
committee scrutiny is really the issue: “There is not sufficient time given to analyse the budget particularly 
for the Estimates Committee. They need more than ten days they are given” (FG). However, because the 












Table 4.5: Rank Order Categories in Organisational Change Across Cases 
 
 
With the individual rankings captured in the table above, I move on to an analysis based on the overarching 
rank order of each of the parliaments concerned. The overarching rank order for the dimension of the 
dependent variable related to organisational change is organised as follows. ‘No change’ is understood for 
country rank totals between 0 and 4. ‘Minor changes’ are understood for those parliaments with collective 
codes between 5 and 9. Parliaments understood to be undergoing ‘moderate change’ are those  that score 
between 10 and 14. And finally, those understood to be incurring ‘substantive change’ in this dimension 
are those that rank between 15 and 18. As was the case in the behavioural section, each category is of equal 
size with the exception of the category on ‘substantive change,’ which is slightly narrower in scope. The 
table to follow provides a visual overview of each of the four stages of change along with the relative 









































3 3 3 3 1 3 
Malawi 
(15/18) 
3 3 3 2 1 3 
Zambia 
(15/18) 
3 3 3 3 2 1 
Lesotho 
(3/18) 
1 2 0 0 0 0 
Namibia 
(8/18) 










Table 4.6: Changes in Organisational Aspects of Legislative Life Related to Budgetary Matters  
 
 
As a final step, I place each parliament in a particular category according to the composite stage of change 
representing both the behavioural and organisational component of the dependent variable.  A parliament 
is categorized as ‘no change’ if the collective ordinal measurement falls between 0 and 9. Those parliaments 
undergoing ‘minor change’ are those coded between 10 and 18. ‘Moderate change’ heads the category of 
those parliaments having accumulated ordinal measurements between 19 and 27. And finally, those 
understood to be in the process of undergoing ‘substantive change’ are those that score between 28 and 
36. Each category allows for ten different rank orders with the exception of the category on ‘minor change,’ 
which contains nine possibilities.  Here again, the intention behind the scoring arrangement is to avoid an 
overestimation of changes found in the dependent variable.  
 
The table below thus depicts the relative placement of each parliament across both dimensions of the 
dependent variable. This categorization will serve as the foundation against which the three potential 
explanations for change will be measured.  As explained in the methodology chapter (3), one of the core 
assumptions of this study is that functional changes in a legislature are based on the combination of both 
behavioural and organisational attributes. This does not rule out the possibility, however, that either one 
of the two dimensions of change may reveal a stronger relationship independently than the other with one 






 No Change  
(0-4) 
Minor Change  
(5-9) 

























Table 4.7: Rank Order of Behavioural + Organisational Change Across Parliaments  
 
 No Change  
(0-9) 
Minor Change  
(10-18) 




















4.3 Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
As the measurements suggests, the Parliaments of Zimbabwe (32) Malawi (29) are undergoing substantive 
changes in budgetary matters, while the Parliament of Zambia (27) appears to be making moderate 
changes.  The Parliaments of Lesotho (11) and Namibia (11) are amongst the least active of the five, 
undergoing only minor changes in the collective sub-dimensions explored. Notably, while these 
parliaments rank similarly, Namibia demonstrates more change with regard to organisational matters, 
while the converse is true for the Parliament of Lesotho. This suggests that the Parliament of Lesotho may 
host more of an ‘appetite’ for budgetary engagement than that of the Parliament of Namibia, despite 
preliminary evidence of stronger organisational features.  
 
Overall, the Parliament of Zimbabwe has proven itself capable of rapid transformation since the turn of the 
millennium, informally influencing the budget in demonstrable ways both through the work of its now well-
developed committee system as well as via the Parliament as a whole over the course of its annual pre-
budget meeting with the executive. Organisationally, the Parliament has maintained and continues to 
further develop its research capacities, a CDF, a PBO and the management of its time with regard to 
budgetary matters.  Still some shortcomings observed at the time of data collection relate back to local level 
participation in budget formulation and oversight. The Parliament of Malawi has also proven itself capable 
of rapid change, particularly over the past ten years. The Parliament has demonstrated its ability to 
influence the national budget, in part through its extensive cross-committee collaboration prior to 
budgetary approval, though the Budget Committee takes a clear lead on the subject. The Parliament has 
recently created a Local Government Committee in order to make good on its longstanding (1998) 
commitment to scrutinise decentralised operations and appears to be approaching the subject with much 
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gusto. Both committee oversight visits and the scrutiny of quarterly and annual reports similarly appear to 
be prioritised, but constrained by lack of finances and legal compliance on the part of the executive.  Overall, 
the Parliament houses the same organisational attributes found in Zimbabwe, though on a more modest 
scale. The Zambian Parliament appears to be poised to scrutinise the budget, though not yet interested or 
able to actually follow through.  Unlike Zimbabwe and Malawi, it has not yet taken the initiative to influence 
budgetary outcomes though its committee system has taken demonstrable steps forward in terms of 
coordination and collaboration over time.  Pre-budget consultations are conducted much like those in 
Malawi, falling short of a true exchange between the legislature and the executive as countervailing 
institutions. Committee scrutiny visits remain topical and the Budget Committee appears to take on the 
bulk of the responsibility in monitoring quarterly and annual reports from the executive. That said, the 
Parliament has been able to maintain and grow a strong research department, PBO and CDF, paving the 
way for future participation in the budgetary oversight and scrutiny once sufficient political interest to 
engage with the budget has been garnered. 
 
The Parliament of Lesotho, while scoring significantly lower on sub-elements related to the behaviour of 
its committee system and organisational elements, has made significant advances with regard to its interest 
and ability to influence the national budget as a Parliament. The recent upsurge in budgetary amendments 
and the influence displayed over the recurrent budget of 2016/2017 were reported with enthusiasm from 
both its Members and staff. Its committees are collaborating at the adoption phase, which facilities some 
informal pre-budget discussions with the executive. However, despite some efforts on the part of the 
Economics Cluster to act as a Budget Committee, the committee system is not yet conducting oversight 
visits or scrutinise executive reports. Engagement with local level auditing of local government is yet out 
of reach and the recently recruited researchers have not yet been met with interest from its Members, at 
least in the House. The Parliament of Namibia is an outlier with regard to its interest in engaging in 
budgetary matters.  Data obtained particularly through the interview process revealed a Parliament that 
remains unaware of the possibility to engage in budgetary matters as an institution. Essentially, the 
Parliament is of the opinion that the executive budget is simply none of its business. In contrast, the focus 
group discussion indicated a strong interest in bolstering parliamentary engagement on the subject, albeit 
via the enthusiastic support from the Speaker himself.  At the time of data collection, however, committees 
were merely engaged in topical orientation visits, which were poorly coordinated both within the house as 
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well as between the upper and lower houses where much overlap in execution was found.  That said, there 
are clear signs that organisationally, the Parliament will be moving in the direction taken by the other 
parliaments investigated here.  A Budget Committee was created in 2017, a Bill for the establishment of a 
CDF was under consideration by the executive at the time of data collection (from the Upper House) and a 
PBO appears to be in the pipeline.  However, the Parliament has yet much ground to cover in terms of 
orienting and motivating both its Members and staff to engage in budgetary matters if it is to prove 
influential in future.   
 
Overall, there appears to be an emerging trend in terms of both behavioural and organisational changes 
witnessed within parliaments related to budgetary matters in the region. The parliaments under 
investigation were slightly more active in terms of organisational change than those sub-dimensions 
related to behavioural modifications but the difference is minimal. It is worth repeating that this is a modest 
depiction of the changes underway.  If intermediate codes were interpreted as full score (representing 
strong deviations already from behaviours and organisational patterns at the onset of multi-party 
democracy) the scoring would yield more drastic results. Thus, when compared to behaviour patterns 
typical for a Westminster style parliament at the onset of multi-party democratic practices, the data 
demonstrates clear burgeoning changes in terms of legislative behaviour in budgetary matters.  The data 
also speaks to growing demonstrations that these parliaments would like to widen the scope of their 
involvement in budgetary matters in order to influence and scrutinize local level spending. Naturally, this 
is true to varying degrees for each parliament as the data have highlighted.  
 
The findings suggest a particular sequencing with regard to the institutional development of a legislature 
in budget matters. Constituency Development Funds appear to have been the first, historically, to emerge, 
followed by Budget Committees with mandates to scrutinise the executive budget. A final step appears to 
be the establishment of a Parliamentary Budget Office. In addition, committees appear to growing 
substantively in their engagement with the budget over the course of the implementation phase (scrutiny 
visits and scrutiny of quarterly and annual reports) which stands in contrast to the tradition focus on either 
budget formulation akin to the US Congressional model or the emphasis placed on the audit phase as per 




Chapter 5: Legal Authority as an Explanation for Action 
 
The first explanation to be tested against the data relates to whether or not a country’s legal framework 
serves as a key impetus for parliamentary action in budget matters.  It is important to understand the 
underlying legal framework because formal powers may enable or incentivise the parliament to become 
more actively involved in the budget. Those legislatures that are becoming more active may be those that 
have the legal space to do so. Therefore, the hypothesis reads that if a legislature holds legal authority to 
engage actively in the budget process, one would expect to find a corresponding degree of activity in the 
legislatures examined here. 
 
This chapter compares the formal legal powers of each parliament with the emerging behaviours and 
organisational developments explored in the dependent variable. The review of the literature in Chapter 2 
revealed that scholars of modern legislatures tend to emphasise the role of formal rules in explaining 
institutional behaviour on budget matters. As the EU example attests, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance (2013) sparked the proliferation of Fiscal Councils and Parliamentary Budget Offices 
across the region (van Trapp et. al. 2017).  However, scholarly emphasis is overwhelmingly placed on the 
role of constitution types and legislative amendment powers in determining legislative budgetary 
influence. I expand on this list substantially.  
 
In order to assess the explanatory power of the legal hypothesis, I compile a baseline overview of the 
budgetary powers for each parliament. 47 The table to follow thus includes those legislative powers on 
budgetary matters that relate specifically to the behavioural and organisational sub-dimensions explored 
in the dependent variable. These include (1) budgetary amendment powers, (2) legal provisions for 
committee site visits, (3) legal provisions for the scrutiny of executive reports, (4) legal provisions for 
scrutiny of local government audit, (5) legal provisions for a Budget Committee, (6) legal provisions for 
cross-committee collaboration, (7) legal provisions for pre-budget consultations with the executive, (8) 
legal provisions for a CDF, and (9) legal provisions for a PBO. 
 
The first sub-dimension related to budgetary amendment powers is represented by three specific legal 
powers in the following section. These include the power to increase (I), decrease (D), or amend the 
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development budget across votes (A). Those sub-dimensions of the dependent variable not tested here are 
those that already relate specifically to legal powers namely those that relate to participation in local 
budgeting and the formal establishment of more time for budgetary scrutiny prior to adoption. In addition, 
it is assumed that each parliament retains the authority to establish its own internal departments and for 
this reason, this element is not examined here. 48 Finally, recurrent expenditure is not included in this 
overview because amendments are similar restricted across all cases (see Endnote 32 for additional detail). 
 
We generally understand legal authority to be found in national constitutions, statutory law, and 
parliamentary Standing Rules and Orders (SROs). In principle, these could be weighted according to their 
legal gravitas whereby constitutional provisions are afforded the strongest powers, followed by national 
laws and finally parliamentary SROs. However, the following overview assumes that these three legal 
sources follow a cascading hierarchy in which constitutional provisions are subsumed in both laws and 
SROs. They are thus weighted equally. The respective rankings also assume no contradictions between 
constitutions, laws, and SROs.  I will explore any identified contradictions in the subsequent section. The 
overview below includes a rank order scoring system that is compatible with that applied within the 
scoring of the dependent variable. This follows a simple schema:  If a legal provision is present in the 
country constitution, law, or SRO, a full rank of one (1) is assigned. If no legal provision can be found, a zero 
(0) is awarded in its stead. 
 
5.1 Analysis of Legal Authority Across Parliaments 
 
The first important observation on the basis of the data as presented is that there is little variability in 
legislative legal authority across cases. The pattern is suggestive of a common legal framework across 
parliaments. The presence of these strong similarities means that formal legal authority alone is unable to 
explain the variation found in the dependent variable.  As per the table below, all parliaments maintain the 
legal authority to decrease the development budget while none hold the formal power to affect increases. 
Only the Parliament of Zambia has the right to amend the budget across votes. Each parliament also 
maintains the authority to conduct committee site visits, and scrutinize both executive reports and local 
government audits. Budget Committees have legal backing in all but one case, namely that of the Parliament 
of Namibia. Collaboration across committees on budgetary matters is formally codified in the Parliaments 
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of Zimbabwe and Malawi but not in the Parliaments of Lesotho and Namibia. These parliaments also share 
a lack of authority in a number of areas. None hold the formal legal authority to hold pre-budget 
consultations with the executive, establish a CDF or a PBO. 49  Overall, the presence of these strong 
similarities means that the formal legal authority alone is unlikely to constitute a satisfying explanation of 
the variation found in legislative budgetary activity.  
 
Table 5.1: Rank Order of Legal Authority Across Parliaments in Budgetary Matters  
 
 
Second, the overview demonstrates that four of the five legislatures under investigation do hold moderate 
legal authority on budgetary matters. The rank categories have been devised as follows: Those parliaments 
that hold between 0-2 formal powers fall under the category of ‘little to no’ legal authority. Those that 
maintain between 3-5 are understood to hold ‘minor’ legal authority. Those with ‘moderate’ legal authority 
are those legislatures holding 6-8 formal powers. And finally, those with ‘substantial’ legal authority are 
those that hold between 9-11 formal powers. Thus, given the relatively high number of legal powers across 
these elements, one might also expect to see some of the behavioural or organisational changes outlined in 
the dependent variable. Nonetheless, the variation found between them remains unexplained under this 
theoretical approach as the table, below, demonstrates. 
 - Decrease 
- Increase 































(D) 1  
(A) 1 50 
 
















(D) 1 72 173 1 74 1 75 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 5.2:  Relationship between Legislative Change and Legal Authority Across Cases  
 












No Change in 
Budgetary Activity 
(0-9) 
    
Minor Change in 
Budgetary Activity 
(10-18) 




Moderate Change in 
Budgetary Activity 
(19-27) 












According to the composite rankings of the dependent variable, the Parliament of Zimbabwe is undergoing 
‘substantive change’ in terms of behavioural and organisational attributes while Lesotho, for example, is 
undergoing only ‘minor change.’  Legally speaking, however, there are essentially no differences between 
them. Dimensions of change reported in the Parliaments of Lesotho and Namibia appear to be in line with 
their formal authorities. However, the Parliaments of Zimbabwe and Malawi appear to be outperforming 
their legal prerogatives and the Parliament of Zambia underperforming in this regard.  It is thus clear from 
the data that changes related to parliamentary behaviour and organisation are more than simply the result 
of incentives brought on as a result of the legal prerogative to act. 
 
While useful in understanding the reach of the legal hypothesis, the above analysis does complete the story 
between legislative behaviour and legal frameworks in the African context. As the variation found within 
the dependent variable would attest, many of the legal provision outlined above were found to be at odds 
with behaviour and organisational developments in these same legislatures.  Such discrepancies provide 
important clues into the behaviours and tendencies of the parliaments studied here. For this reason, this 
remainder of this section will examine the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
constitutional, legal and parliamentary provisions found in each legislature. Only the most striking 




5.2 Inconsistencies Between Legal Authority and Legislative Behaviour 
 
Perhaps the most notable example of parliamentary behaviour at odds with constitutional authority is 
found in the case of Namibia. While the 2014 Constitution (as amended) allows for budgetary amendments 
in principle, the Parliament remains largely unaware or unconvinced that it is permitted to amend the 
budget in any form.  While a number of MPs expressed an interest in having a voice in how state monies 
are appropriated, both the interviews and focus group discussion revealed significant disagreement 
amongst MPs and staff regarding the powers of the parliament to amend the budget in the first place.  Over 
the course of the focus group discussion, nearly half of the respondents remained convinced that the 
parliament is legally permitted to amend the budget, while the other half were equally as convinced that 
parliament has no amendment rights whatsoever. The deep-seated division on the subject and resulting 
legal ambiguity has precluded any movement on the part of the Parliament to influence the budget. No 
attempts to amend the budget have been made to date. 76  
 
Other contradictions are more far reaching. In the constitution of Malawi (2010), the legislature is referred 
to the supreme law-making institution, despite the fact that its main activities revolve mainly around the 
process of executive oversight. As one interviewee described, from independence, the Assembly began its 
work with a focus on law-making but now this has shifted to that of executive oversight. Presently about 
25% of the time the Parliament is seized with legal matters; the remaining 75% the institution focuses on 
overseeing the executive.  In Lesotho, a similar contradiction applies, as the Parliament is referred to as the 
supreme law-making body while its SROs task committees with an oversight role.  As the Parliament 
experienced in early 2016, there is also no clear constitutional statement on what happens if the budget is 
rejected by parliament.  Some see the refusal to pass the budget as a continuation of parliamentary 
negotiation with the executive because MPs “want to be heard” (FG). While others believe that if the 
National Assembly does not approve the budget, the government will dissolve (L12 and FG).  
 
In contrast to the cases outlined above in which the law-making function of the legislature is given primacy, 
according to the Zambian Constitution (2016), the first function of Parliament is to ensure equitable 
distribution of resources and scrutinise public expenditure. 77 However, portfolio committees have not 
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made a practice of scrutinising their ministries or the budget, opting instead to focus on the learning 
element of their committee work along topical issues.  The exception to this is found in the case of the 
“quarterly reviews” conducted by the Estimates Committee. Informally, the Estimates Committee leverages 
its general constitutional power to oversee the executive in making requests to Ministries for their 
quarterly reports (ZAM3).  In addition, the Parliament of Zambia has not made use of the increased time 
made available for the scrutiny of the budget (now at three months) as provided for in the new Constitution 
(2016), opting rather to continue their budget scrutiny efforts as per the status quo.  And finally, the (1994) 
Constitution of Malawi does not allow for budgetary increases, though the Parliament not only regularly 
appropriates a Constituency Development Fund, but also increased its allocation in 2016.  That the 
Parliament of Malawi increased the institution’s own budget in the same year is significant as well, though 
this appears to be formally permitted under the constitutional prerogative to increase funds falling under 
the “Protected Fund,” which includes executive expenses as well as costs related to Parliament.  Overall, 
there is a clear call for change with regard to the legal framework. As one interviewee summed up: “The 
constitution is an old thing. We need to revisit the legal framework so that the Parliament can live up to the 
changing times” (M5). 
 
A number of behaviours exhibited by the parliaments examined in this chapter have been proactive, and 
pre-date enabling legislation. 78  The Parliament of Zimbabwe has exemplified this tendency on a wide 
number of fronts.  Pre-budget consultations were instigated by the parliament in 2000 in the absence of any 
legal authority until the 2009 PFM Act, which (only weakly) encourages the executive to consult with 
parliamentary committee prior to the adoption of the budget.79 In addition, the Parliament of Zimbabwe 
appropriated a Constituency Development Fund for the years 2010-2013 without formal statutory authority. 
A provision for a CDF was only first foreseen in the 2013 Constitution and the legislation enabling its official 
establishment is still under discussion. While Parliament is permitted to govern its own administration 
according to the 2013 Constitution (via its Committee on Standing Rules and Orders which doubles as a 
Parliamentary Service Commission) there are no further legal provisions for the Parliamentary Budget 
Office established in 2015. 80 Finally, while the 2009 Public Finance Act contains provisions for the scrutiny 
of monthly and quarterly reports, committees were scrutinising annual reports informally already from 
2004. As one interviewee explained: the work of the Budget Committee hasn’t really changed with the new 
Constitution because the Parliament was operating in the same way under existing laws while provisions 
 
 106 
in the new Constitution just reinforced these (Z18). The Budget Office of the Parliament of Zambia operates 
under a similar, tenuous, legal standing as the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Both base the establishment of 
their PBO on their administrative autonomy; they may create their own departments.  
 
In terms of the budget itself, the Parliament of Lesotho reduced the government deficit in 2016 despite the 
fact that the Parliament is not legally mandated to examine recurrent expenditure according to the Lesotho 
Public Financial Management and Accountability Act (PFMA) (2011).  Also housed in the PFMA is the 
parliamentary mandate to scrutinise local government audits as well as quarterly ministerial reports, 
though this is not carried out in practice. Annual reports from public enterprises suffer the same fate.  “The 
problem lies with self-awareness,” notes one focus group participant, “The MPs don’t know who they are 
or what their powers are especially in relation to the laws. They don’t read” (FG Lesotho). Others pointed 
to the legal framework itself, noting that a number of laws were obsolete (L33). The same holds for the 
Parliament of Namibia, in which the State Finance Act (1991) provides for the scrutiny of local government 
audits and annual reports, though the Public Accounts Committee did not begin to receive local government 
audits until 2008. The Parliament of Malawi also holds many similarities with other Parliaments examined 
here along these lines.  Like Lesotho, since 1998, a provision for parliamentary scrutiny of local government 
audits could be found in the Local Government Act, though this practice did not begin until 2016.  As in 
Zimbabwe, there are no legal provisions for the Constituency Development Fund established by the 
Parliament of Malawi, yet the appropriation continues through to today. The same can be said for its 
Parliamentary Budget Office, which was operational in the Parliament of Malawi from 2004-2006 and again 
from 2012-2014, with no legal provisions backing its operations.  
 
Together, these tendencies suggest that some of the parliaments studied here (namely, those of Malawi and 
Zimbabwe) are becoming more active than their country’s constitutions and legal frameworks would 
suggest. The case of Zambia, however, points in a different direction. On the one hand, the Parliament is 
purporting to wait for official legislation before beginning to act on budgetary matters.  Both Members and 
staff are placing its stock on the ability of the Budget Planning and Policy Act (BPPA) to empower its 
Members with the necessary budgetary prerogatives.  However, where legal prerogatives are provided, as 
in the case of time for scrutiny and the leeway given to committees to conduct site visits and scrutinise 
executive reporting, the Parliament has yet to take these up meaningfully.  Whether Parliament is waiting 
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on enabling legislation or choosing to ignore its legal rights in this regard, the result is a general sense of 
inaction.  This means that the legal explanation is not adequate in the case of Zambia, though for reasons 
which potentially differ from that of the other parliaments examined here. Instead of superseding its legal 
framework with action, the Parliament of Zambia appears to be in a state of inactivity that is not 
commensurate with its legal framework. 
 
Discrepancies can also be found between committee mandates found in the Standing Rules and Orders 
(SROs) and actual behaviour of the parliaments examined.  In these cases, the general trend points towards 
inaction or inability of parliamentary committees to fulfil their roles as outlined rather than instances of 
pro-active behaviour noted in some of the examples above. The cases of Zambia and Malawi are most 
notable. In Zambia, according to the 2005 SROs, portfolio committees may make recommendations upon 
scrutinising government activities, studying government management and operations or policies. 
Committees are also are mandated to examine annual reports from respective Ministries.  In practice, 
committees practice topical oversight over executive ministries and this excludes an examination of the 
respective budgets of their ministries.  As one interviewee noted: “[We are] still waiting for the Planning 
and Budget Bill. But there is nothing that stops committees from scrutinising their ministries” (FG). In 
Lesotho, there was a noted need in the focus group discussion to update the Parliament’s Standing Rules 
and Orders given the number of discrepancies between substance and form. The Economics and 
Development Cluster Committee was given the mandate to scrutinise the executive budget prior to adoption, 
for example, which includes the convening of public hearings from 2008. However, the mandate overlooks 
the fact that there is not enough time built in to the process at the adoption phase for the committee to do 
so. The task of reviewing the budget prior to adoption was expanded from the unique remit of the 
Economics Cluster Committee in 2012-2015 to include all cluster committees, though these guidelines are 
not yet housed in the SROs.  Additionally, the provision was made for a Parliamentary Reforms Committee 
in the 2008 standing orders, but the committee has not yet convened.  
 
Finally, in the Parliament of Malawi, the 2013 SROs provide the Budget Committee with the power to 
conduct public hearings: “The Budget Committee shall create public awareness and involvement in 
formulation of budget, financial and economic policies.”  The Budget Committee does not, however, exercise 
this prerogative.  In addition, in Malawi, the Budget Committee “shall engage Minister of Finance in the 
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process of formulating the Budget and monitoring the budget throughout its cycle.”  But, to date a “window” 
for this has not been forthcoming.  In Namibia, the Committee on Economics and Public Administration in 
the National Assembly holds the duty to “monitor, enquire into, and make recommendations to the 
Assembly on matters that may directly or indirectly affect the economy of the country.”  The Standing 
Orders of the National Council are actually more explicit on the subject, giving its Committee on Public 
Accounts and Economy the power to scrutinise the government’s financial proposals and fiscal policies and 
advice the Council.  However, the evidence is scant that this is done in either chamber, in practice. 
Parliament does not make a habit of requesting or scrutinising quarterly financial or annual ‘accountability’ 
reports of the various government institutions either at the committee level or before or during the annual 
budget speech.  
 
Because constitutions and other laws are products of political compromise, parliamentary actions that 
exceed formal mandates point to increasing legislative political capacity. This is evident in Parliaments like 
Malawi and Lesotho where the role of parliament is generously interpreted within its SROs to take on a 
strong oversight role, in stark contrast with constitutional provisions that point to a strictly legislative 
function. Contradictions in the laws feature in one form or another in all countries under examination, 
which can create frustration amongst MPs and staff.  As one MP from Lesotho summarized well: “The law 
which contradicts itself is no law” (FG Lesotho). 
 
National constitutions set out the larger governance framework in a polity, but the legislature is free to 
develop its own institutional framework through its parliamentary Standing Rules and Orders (SROs). The 
SROs must be compatible with the constitution and as such, they serve to amplify and implement some of 
the broad guidelines outlined.  These rules serve several purposes in legislative life. Overall, they lend 
order, stability, and predictability to the way in which the legislature conducts its work. They define the 
protection given to the opposition in the legislature against unbridled use of majority power; allocate 
responsibilities and powers among members and the organisational units within the legislature; and 
determine relations between the legislature and other state institutions as well as its constituents (Bach 
2009: 2-3).  As Wehner (2010) discusses in his explanation on the simultaneous appearance of both 
stability and variance in formal parliamentary rules, because SROs are inherently easier to change than 
constitutions, these can be more responsive to changing social tides. Using this logic, it could be that 
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parliamentary SROs are more reflective of the social expectations placed upon parliament by its 
constituents and citizens, at least to a much greater degree than constitutional provisions are able to reflect. 
However, as outlined above, some country constitutions and legal frameworks, as in the case of Zambia 
more so than parliamentary SROs- appear to be highly reflective of “international best practice” and other 
global norms. This indicates that these overarching legal frameworks adopted may pre-empt parliaments’ 
(and thus the SRO’s) ability to respond to social tides in some cases. This also suggests that international 
influence may lie behind Zambia’s relatively progressive legal framework.  
 
In addition, this evidence suggests that contradictions emanating from parliamentary SROs and actual 
behaviour may point to altogether different conclusions than discrepancies between behaviour and the 
(exogenous) legal framework. In contrast to the body of national law, which is both vast and not readily at 
the disposal of MPs given the variety inherent in their work, the fact that printed copies of SROs, are 
available to every MP and staff should further ensure compliance with their content. In those parliaments 
where behaviour does not conform to the constitution and other legal provisions, this may point to a low 
level of political capacity in the parliaments concerned to negotiate successfully with the executive. In the 
case of Zambia, the fact that portfolio committees are not conducting their work in a manner conducive to 
budgetary oversight likely points to a continuation of a general political inertia (as already demonstrated 
in the discrepancy between its constitutional provisions and actual behaviour). The same could be said for 
Namibia, where executive dominance within the legislature is particularly high. However, in other cases, 
where parliament does demonstrate a strong interest in scrutinising the government but SROs do not 
conform to behaviour, this may an indication that the internal mandate may be yet out of parliament’s 
reach. In particularly low-income countries like Malawi, or Lesotho, discrepancies with the SROs and 
committee activities suggests the strong potential that financial, administrative, or other capacity 
constraints are holding them back.  McGann (2006) makes the argument that because SROs are endogenous 
to a legislature they are poor candidates for explaining legislative outputs. However, when compared on 
the basis outlined above, SROs may be especially valuable in understating legislative outputs that are 
attributable to capacity constraints, particularly when non-compliance is juxtaposed against other forms 




Given that legal prerogatives in other geographical contexts like those of Central and Eastern Europe are 
able to explain behaviour (Andrews 2014), some reflection is owed to potential contextual explanations 
related to the counter-examples examined in this study. Formal legislative powers have remained largely 
unchanged since independence in most cases analysed here until very recently.  This is true even as the 
system types have evolved from pure parliamentary to the various hybrid constellations seen today. As 
mentioned earlier, Wehner (2010) finds a strong correlation between colonial legacies and the formal 
powers of a parliament to amend the budget in the OECD countries he examines (Wehner 2010: 64-77) But 
in the cases examined here, while formal powers may still, indeed, shape the incentive structures available 
to MPs in the budget process, they do not appear to be responsible for determining present behaviour.  
 
There is also good reason to believe that the real underlying cause of institutional change, regardless of any 
legal framework lies in other incentive structures. “The OECD survey indicates that constraints on 
legislative influence arise more out of political considerations than from formal restrictions on its power 
to amend the budget... in some countries, robust, behind-the-scenes negotiations between the government 
and legislative leaders give Parliament some opportunity to influence the budget at the margins” (Schick 
2002: 25).  Thus, in the African context, rule-based colonial legacies may be best understood to form what 
could be described as a behavioural “backdrop” from which legislatures are presently emerging.  That is, in 
the context of legislatures that are at a yet nascent stage of their development like those in this study, formal 
rules are telling us much more about where legislative-executive relations once were, rather than where 




In addition to key elements related to the historical context of the countries involved, other factors also 
undermine the ability of the legal framework to determine behaviour. These include process-related 
elements of legislative life like institutionalisation and legalisation. Institutionalisation is understood here 
as a point at which “legislative structures and routines gradually achieve stability, permanence, 
distinctiveness, and sustainability in a polity based upon cognitions, agreed-upon norms, and the 
embeddedness of the legislature’s patterns in a supporting social system” (Mauricio 2013). One aspect of 
this is legalisation. “We understand legalization as a particular form of institutionalisation characterised by 
three components: obligation, precision, and delegation” (Abbott et al. 2000: 401).  Although the authors 
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purpose their definition of legalisation for the setting of international law, the same basic premise can be 
applied in the domestic legal context.  In applying the three criteria of obligation, precision, and delegation 
to the cases at hand, we are better placed to understand some of the reasons for discrepancies between the 
law and actual practice.  
 
The concept of obligation as refers to the idea that “rules and commitments contained in legalised… 
agreements are regarded as obligatory, subject to various defences or exceptions, and not to be disregarded 
as preferences change” (Abbott et al. 2000: 409). Different shades of obligation exist between the two end 
points of binding and non-binding agreements.  In the country context, for example, the constitution acts 
as the supreme law, under which all other laws are subsumed.  Legislation is also legally binding, though 
breaches thereof are less grave than those of a constitutional nature.  Finally, the Standing Rules and Orders 
of parliament are mainly binding within the institution, though these also spell out the relations between 
the legislature and other parties like executive and the populace.  For this reason, the case of the 
constitution of Malawi is an interesting example.  While the constitution defines the legislature in terms of 
its law-making function, this stands in stark contrast to its actual function.  Contradictions of this nature, 
point to the idea that laws are not (yet) respected to their fullest degree in the countries concerned. Or, in 
the authors’ terms, there is a low level of obligation with regard to the law.   
 
A rule’s level of precision also “narrows the scope of reasonable interpretation” because “clarity is essential 
to the force of law” (Abbott et al. 2000: 412, 413).  If wording is ambiguous or contradictions are found in 
the legal framework there can be no consensus around rules upon which to base the parliament’s actions.  
In the case of Namibia, for example, the constitutional wording around legislative powers to amend the 
budget has meant that these rules remain in-operable. In other cases, like that of Zimbabwe, legal 
prerogatives may not be explicit with regard to the establishment of an additional organ like that of a PBO, 
but the parliament interprets this lack of clarity in its favour. While legal ambiguity can be useful in the 
short to medium- term in order get a particular initiative started, the situation may become more tenuous 
with time. In both cases, lack of precision with regard to the law is unlikely to prove sustainable.   
 
The third dimension of legalisation relates to delegation.  This element refers to the extent to which 
“authority to interpret and apply the rules has been delegated to third parties acting under the constraint 
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of rules” (Abbott et al. 2000: 418).  The practice helps “to elaborate imprecise legal norms, implement 
agreed rules, and facilitate enforcement (Abbott et al. 2000: 417).  SROs already represent interpretations 
of constitutional and other laws into the legislative sphere.  However, it is possible to imagine delegation 
occurring at the level of committee chairs and staff because they represent the persons responsible for the 
interpretation and application of parliamentary SROs in the first place.  In assigning responsibility to a third 
party (or parties) to interpret and implement these rules, one knows just where to look for answers when 
contradictions emerge.  For example, in Lesotho, where committees are supposed to overseeing ministries 
and their respective budgets but are not, one can look to the parliament’s MPs and staff to find out where 
there may be financial or human capacity constraints.  If it were possible to image that these same rules 
would be implemented as per design if delegated to a fully equipped team of MPs and staff, for example, we 
know the analysis is on the right track.   
 
In the countries considered here, legal prerogatives for parliament to engage more actively in budgetary 
matters are either not forthcoming, or, where these are, they may be ignored, poorly communicated, 
misunderstood, or left unimplemented.  The composite picture points to a situation in which the legal 
framework becomes a poor indicator of legislative behaviour. Though the precise reasons will differ from 
parliament to parliament and from law to law, one observes some cases in which there is a low level of 
respect for legal parameters (obligation).  In others, there is a generally low level of consensus around rules 
because these are not made more explicit (precision).  And finally, there are instances in which the 
responsibility to implement and interpret these same rules falls into the hands of those who are not yet 
able to implement these in the way the rules were intended (delegation). In the absence of this analytical 
vocabulary borrowed from international law, some Africanists might simply point to the tendency towards 
the informal, as one of the central defining characteristics of the environment concerned: “The future of the 
continent may be equivocal but it does not appear to lie in the lessening of informalisation. On the contrary, 
we are likely to witness an increase in informal practices, both domestically and internationally” (Chabal 
1999: 138).  Either way, these ideas present some reasons to believe that legal frameworks may hold more 
explanatory power in some settings than in others.  Where formal powers are well respected and 
implemented, legal frameworks offer a good proxy measure for actual behaviour. However, in regions 
where this does not hold, like much of the African continent, legal frameworks offer little insight into the 
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true nature of legislative life. This may explain the emphasis on the study of legal frameworks in OECD 
countries as found in the literature review.  
 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This study has demonstrated that the five parliaments examined are becoming more active in budgetary 
matters to varying degrees. But the legal authority available to these same parliaments was found to be 
remarkably consistent across cases. This negates the possibility that formal rules are shaping legislative 
engagement in budgetary matters. As this chapter highlights, there are a large number of inconsistencies 
between those authorities outlined in national laws and the actual behaviour of legislatures. This means 
that parliaments may be engaging more vociferously in the budget through informal means.  
 
Legal frameworks are explicit, accessible, and often public. However, in the absence of a clear 
understanding of the extent to which a given country’s legal framework serves as a measure of actual 
behaviour, false conclusions may be drawn.  As Arter (2006) has highlighted, lack of attention in this area 
can lead to the proliferation of dated stereotypes that are not reflective of the true nature of the institution.  
Nonetheless, legal frameworks will continue to aid in our understanding of institutional behaviour, even -
and sometimes particularly- when these differ from legislative behaviour in form. Where parliamentary 
behaviour differs from provisions in legislative Standing Rules and Orders, these may point to capacity 

















Chapter 6: Rising Technical Abilities as an Explanation for Action 
 
 
My examination of the legislative developments in the budget process in Chapter 4 revealed that important 
changes are underway in each of the parliaments under investigation. These range from minor to 
substantive changes, although a general trend towards increased budgetary engagement is evident across 
all cases. In Chapter 5, I tested the extent to which variation in formal legislative powers helped us account 
for the variation in the legislative budgetary activism.  However, the consistency found in terms of legal 
authority means that this is an inadequate explanation. I now turn to explore a technical explanation for 
changes in budgetary engagement.  As outlined in the literature review in Chapter 2, the technical approach 
constitutes the predominant form of analysis in literature on African legislatures. Just as weak formal 
authority is assumed to hinder the ability of African legislatures to affect national budgetary policy 
(Wehner 2006), so too are weak technical capacities. The literature thus suggests that technical 
considerations have traditionally held African legislatures back from developing into institutions of 
countervailing power vis-a-vis the executive (Nijink et al. 2006) (Barkan 2009) (Pelizzo and Kinyondo 
2014). In this chapter I test whether rising technical abilities can account for the burgeoning legislative 
developments underway.  
 
Thus, I try and assess whether or not legislatures possess the technical resources and skills that enable 
MPs, staff and the committee system to fulfil a wide variety of parliamentary functions. These include: (1) 
the number of staff relative to the number of MPs (2) the number of staffs employed relative to available 
posts, (3) the financial means of parliament, (4) presence or absence of a Parliamentary Service 
Commission, (5) specificity and precision of committee oversight, and (6) educational capacity of MPs in 
context.  The section to follow provides an overview of the data related to each of these six sub-sub-
dimensions in each parliament. This overview includes a detailed description as well as a tabular summary 
of according to rank.  If the dependent reveals legislative action that correlates consistently with a rise in 
each of the six technical sub-dimensions explored here, then the technical ‘ability’ hypothesis is 
corroborated.  
 
As in previous chapters, scoring increments range from low to high. A rank of (1) indicates a parliament of 
insufficient financial means, one with low staff numbers, high vacancy rates, no Parliamentary Service 
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Commission (PSC), highly general committee oversight of MOAs, or low levels of educational attainment 
amongst MPs. A rank order of (2) indicates a parliament of average financial means, sufficient staff numbers 
and reasonable vacancy rates, a Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) established in law, but not in 
practice, committees with a moderate degree of targeted oversight of MOAs, or the employment of some 
educated MPs. A score of (3) indicates a parliament that is well financed, well-staffed both relative to MPs 
and overall posts available, one that maintains a fully operational Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC), 
committees with a high degree of targeted oversight of MOAs, or MPs with high levels of educational 
attainment. These rank orders are relevant for the African country context. They may not be relevant for 
other developing countries and are not comparable with OECD institutions. In addition, it is not expected 
that a high prevalence of each (or any single) of the following sub-dimensions is indicative that the 
legislature is changing its engagement on budgetary matters, specifically, as an institution. Rather, the 
assumption is that without a strong showing in any of the following technical support structures, legislative 
engagement across all stage is the budget process would be challenging  
 
6.1 Analysis of Technical Ability Across Parliaments 
 
6.1.1 Staff Numbers Relative to MPs 
 
Both Members and specialized committees rely on the information and analysis obtained from support staff 
in order to meet the demands with which they are faced. This second sub-dimension is thus dedicated to 
an examination of the staff contingents of the parliaments concerned as this relates to the number of MPs 
in parliament. The numbers of parliamentary staff provide an initial reflection of the overall staff workload.  
While the quality and level of specialisation of staff is at least as important than the number of staffs, quality 
assessments are beyond the scope of this examination. Nonetheless, where information related to staff 
quality was forthcoming, this is included in the overall assessment of staff capacity. Overall, with the 
notable exception of the Parliament of Zimbabwe, whose recent increase in MPs has led to a “bloated” 
parliament, the legislatures studied here are backed up by a staff complement that meets or exceeds the 




The Parliament of Namibia has a staff contingency of 160 and the Parliament enjoys a relatively high ratio 
of staff to MPs. When compared with the number of MPs - 160 staff for some 146 Members- the numbers 
can be ranked as high (+ 110%).  However, MP’s opinions vary as to whether or not the staff contingent is 
adequate for parliament’s needs. Though the size of the staff has increased modestly in recent years many 
of those interviewed remarked that the committees still do not have enough staff to function. As of 2016, 
of a total 88 staff employed in the National Assembly, the committee staff complement was 21, with most 
committees serviced by two clerks. In addition, the legal and the research and information departments 
provide supplementary staff support to the committees as well. In total, this means that three employees 
serve each committee. As one senior staff questioned: “Is that really understaffed?” (N5).  
 
It became evident from the interviews and focus group discussion that competencies of the current 
employees represent a major institutional challenge.  Respondents observed that some committees are 
struggling- “battling” to complete simple tasks like taking minutes and writing reports (N5). Much of the 
frustration stemmed from the relatively low educational requirements for staffing positions (a grade 10 
threshold until 2000 and a grade 12 thereafter). Additional challenges reportedly relate to remuneration. 
Salaries for technical positions, like IT and legal staffers, were reported to be below market value (N13). 
Finally, that staff numbers have not seen an increase in over ten years has been attributed to poor 
management and administration, which is understood to by one staff to be the root of the problem (N19). 
For these reasons, though staffing numbers rank high in this sub-dimension, actual numbers should be 
interpreted with some caution.  
 
In terms of numbers of MPs to staff, the Parliament of Malawi also enjoys a larger number of staff relative 
to the number of MPs.  While there has been a small increase since 2006, the overall staff size has fluctuated 
sharply.  After the ‘Functional Review’ in 2007, the Parliament accepted support from the State University 
of New York (SUNY) in the development of its committee staff capacity.  When the project was completed 
in 2010, there was six to seven staff serving some twenty committees (M11).  However, the Parliament had 
a major challenge in motivating staff because there was no upward mobility.  For this reason, after 2010, 
the staff was reduced once again to five by 2014.  The Parliament continued to draw staff from other 
departments to service the committees until 2016 when they recruited new staff. From 2016 there were 




Representing a more consistent, upward, trend in staff size is the Parliament of Lesotho. In 2004, there 
were some five committee clerks in the Assembly. By the time of data collection, in contrast, this had 
increased to twelve.  Yet, over the course of interviews and the focus group discussion, staff capacity and 
morale was found to be a significant problem.  As one staff observed, the actual official figures could conceal 
much valuable information related to the prevalence of support positions when contrasted with those of 
strategic importance to the work of parliament, particularly on budget matters: “There are 120 who are 
actually working. Most of them are busy with admin and support… the establishment has been around for 
a long time and hasn’t been reviewed... The morale is low. There is a lot of pressure and little mobility” (L2).  
Nonetheless, as the numbers reveal, the parliament hosts significantly more staff than MPs.   
 
In the Parliament of Zimbabwe, the ratio of actual staff compared with the large number of MPs is low.  As 
one senior staff at the focus group meeting explained: “The staff component is not ideal. There are three 
staff per committee on average in the region for other parliaments. We have 350 MPs and 170 staff… right 
now, each clerk is serving 2 to 3 committees. In South Africa, the Clerk has two to three technical staff for 
each committee plus a researcher” (Zimbabwe FG).  Given the relative shortage of staff, relationships can 
also become strained. As one staff explained: “There is one Clerk for the PAC and potentially one researcher. 
But the researcher will not provide assistance if they are not interested in the subject matter” (Z13).  On 
the plus side, the staff the parliament does employ are viewed positively overall: “The staff is generally of 
an extraordinary quality.  Clerks are good, badly paid and struggle, and there are not enough of them” (Z23). 
However, despite repeated reports of high-quality staff, the Parliament scores low when it comes to ratio 
of staff to MPs.  
 
Finally, the largest outlier with respect to staffing issues is found in Zambia. The Parliament employs 
significantly more staff than Members of Parliament, namely 1150 staff to 167 MPs. Importantly, however, 
staff numbers include those who are now employed at the newly established constituency offices. The 
Parliament itself still notes a shortage of committee Clerks in the parliament itself, some of whom must 
service two committees at one time. Nonetheless, in terms of numbers alone, the Parliament enjoys and 




Table 6.1: Staff Numbers Relative to MP Numbers Across Parliaments 
 
 Number of Staff Number of MPs Staff/MPs as a % 
 
Zambia 1150  167  +689 % match  
 




+123 % match 
 
Namibia 160  146  +110 % match 
Malawi 161  193       83 % match  
 
Zimbabwe 171  350       49 % match 
 
 
6.1.2 Number of Staff Employed Relative to Available Posts 
 
The third sub-dimension takes a closer look at staff numbers and compares the ratio of filled to open posts 
in parliament. In other words, this aspect examines the extent to which the institution is operating at full 
capacity at the time of data collection.  Without delving too deeply in to issues of human resource 
management, the sub-dimension may provide some clues into the capacity of management to maintain 
appropriate staffing levels for its needs. As a general rule, those parliaments operating at 81%-100% 
capacity will rank high. Medium capacity is understood to fall between 51%-80%. Anything below 50% 
operating capacity is ranked as low.  
 
The Parliament of Zimbabwe whose upper and lower chambers share a common secretariat, was operating 
at some 74% of capacity (171 filled out of 237 total posts) over the course of the 2016/2017 fiscal year.  
This figure thus falls in the middle of the five-country range. The Parliament of Malawi appears to have the 
most difficulty of the five parliaments studied here in terms of maintaining staff capacities at optimal levels. 
At the time of data collection, the Parliament was operating at some 40% of capacity (161/402 possible 
posts), which includes just seven committee clerks servicing some three to four committees each. “Until 
recently the committee department has been borrowing staff from Table section” (M11) And as another 
interviewee adds: “The Hansard department has eight staff but the 2007 Functional Review called for 23 
officers.  Currently they hire staff from the Ministry of Information to cover peak time in plenary where 
they have part time staff” (M12).  Thus, although the operational capacity is set at a relatively high level, 
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the drastic contrast between the number of positions and actual postings filled, puts Malawi at a low level 
in terms of internal staff capacity.  
 
The Parliament of Zambia employs some 1150 out of a possible 1240 staff at the time of research, placing 
the Parliament in a high rank in this sub-dimension. At the time of data collection, the Parliament of Namibia 
employed some 160 staff out of a possible 207 postings or 77% of full capacity. The Parliament enjoys a 
mid-range staff employment when compared to possible posts. This could signal low levels of internal 
management capacity, as already seen in the administration of committee funding. The National Assembly 
of the Parliament of Lesotho staffs 103 out of 115 possible staff postings and the Senate employees some 
85/88. These numbers indicate that the Parliament is operating at over 90% of capacity in both houses. 
Actual staffing numbers are relatively on par with actual posts. The Parliament of Lesotho thus ranks high.  
 
Table 6.2: Actual Staff Posts Relative to Number of Posts Filled Across Parliaments 
 
Staff Numbers  
Relative to Posts 
Actual Staff Available Posts Staff/Available Posts  
as % 
 






Lesotho 188 203 93% 
 














6.1.3 Financial Means of Parliament 
 
This sub-dimension examines the National Treasury’s budget allocation to each parliament. The 
parliament’s budget can determine whether or not a legislature will have the human and administrative 
resources needed to support its activities, particularly those of its committee system. Donor funding may 
form a crucial component of the financial capacities of parliaments in Africa but this funding stream is also 
prone to drastic fluctuations and is allocated according to donor priorities. National Treasury figures, in 
contrast, represent more or less stable figures and funding allocated to the parliament can be applied to its 
own spending priorities.  Nonetheless, where external funding is reported to form a significant feature of 
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parliamentary life in the countries examined, this will be noted.  Data related to the parliament’s budget 
over longer time trajectories, will also not be discussed. It is assumed that parliament’s budgets have been 
on the general increase over time in line with a basic rise in economic development trajectories. Here again, 
however, should information regarding significant changes to the budget of parliament be emphasised over 
the course of the data gathering process, these will be incorporated in the descriptions to follow. Additional 
information related to the management of parliamentary funding will be included where this was 
emphasized in interviews. However, the rank score will be determined by the budget envelope available to 
parliament relative to the population the parliament is meant to serve.   
 
Overall, the data reveal that both the Parliaments of Zambia and Namibia rank high with regard to the 
institutional budgets available to them. The figures contrast sharply with both the Parliaments of Malawi 
and Lesotho, which are afforded much more modest budget envelopes. These two ends of the financial 
spectrum are made even more drastic when one considers the population differences between Zambia and 
Namibia on the one hand and Malawi and Lesotho on the other. Once we standardize this figure relative to 
the size of the national population, the Parliament of Namibia appears to be the most resource rich 
legislature while that of Malawi, the most resource poor. The Parliament of Zimbabwe falls between these 
two ends of the financial spectrum.   
 
In absolute terms, the budgetary allocation for the 2016/2017 fiscal year is by far the highest in the 
Parliament of Zambia with a budget of USD 45,385,535.  Feedback generated over the course of the focus 
group revealed, “In terms of oversight visits, we have not done badly. I cannot even fault the MoF, we have 
been supported adequately” (Zambia FG). The committee system in Zambia is well equipped in terms of 
financing, though some have argued that this is still not adequate for the Parliament’s needs, even if the 
provisions are relatively high when compared to other parliaments. “There is no budget for training. I think 
we can do better” (Zambia FG).  Still, the Parliament has made a practice of allocating some 30-40% of its 
funding to committee work which is the highest allocation documented from amongst the five parliaments 
studied here. This, in combination with the overall budget allocated to Parliament means that it ranks high 




The budget of the Parliament of Namibia, at USD 27,510,166, falls next in line in absolute terms.  Relatively 
speaking, when considering that the country host population of just two million, the budget for Namibia is 
outstanding. However, while the Parliament generally enjoys a generous budget relative to some of the 
other parliaments in this study, its committees are often left without sufficient funding to meet or conduct 
their orientation visits. This is due to the way in which the funding is internally managed. At the time of 
data collection, each committee was drawing funding from a common committee pool on a first-come-first-
serve basis, which has meant that those who submit requests too late were left without funding. In addition, 
the funding procedures require several weeks advance notice. When committee requests for funding arrive 
late, these are usually denied, leading to situations in which committees are led to believe that funding is 
simply not available. Poor communication related to internal procedures was reported to form the 
underlying challenge. This aspect has been included here and incorporated into the scoring arrangement 
because it was highlighted by a number of interviewees and represents an important component of our 
understanding of the technical operations of the Parliament. Despite these noted challenges, the Parliament 
still ranks high in this sub-dimension.  
 
The budget for the Parliament of Malawi is significantly smaller than both the Parliaments of Zambia and 
Namibia at USD 14,241,221, though the size of the population is roughly the same as that of Zambia.  In 
2016, the Parliamentary Service Commission increased committee funding substantially as a result of a 
briefing to committee chairpersons that outlined plans and provided opportunities to express concerns. 
This cooperative effort and exchange of information has led to a recent budget increase in funding for 
committees.  Fluctuations in donor support were reported to be most acute in the case of the Parliament of 
Malawi, and noted by interviewees as posing a significant challenge to its work. Thus, overall, despite the 
recent win on the part of its committees over the course of the 2016/2017 fiscal year, the overall funding 
envelop available to the Parliament of Malawi remains scarce. Moreover, only roughly 10% of the 
Parliament’s budget is allocated to committee services. For these reasons, its financial capacity is 
considered in the low range. 
 
Still, the Parliament of Lesotho’s budget is roughly half of this, at USD 7,931,637, operating at a fraction of 
the budget maintained by the other parliaments in this study.  This has demonstrable effects on the work 
of the committees from day to day. As one staff explained, every committee can conduct site visits but there 
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is no budget dedicated specifically to committees. In order to obtain funding staff must ask the Clerk if 
funding is available (L5). As another staff explained, adequate resources are key for institutional 
effectiveness (L33). Overall, the Parliament’s budget is relatively modest and can only accommodate the 
workload of a small number of cluster committees. For these reasons it ranks low in terms of financial 
capacity. That said, even in the face of budget shortfalls, given the on-going political upheaval experienced 
in recent years, when parliament is not sitting or when it is boycotted, significant committee funding, 
reportedly also goes unspent.  
 
The Parliament of Zimbabwe falls somewhere in-between these two extremes at USD 21,368,918. However, 
here again, the country is constrained in terms of resources. As one interviewee shared: “The budget overall 
is about USD 4 billion, which is very little for a country of this size. The budget for Pretoria is bigger” (Z12).  
The way in which the budget is allocated is another source of frustration. According to one Member, the 
president’s personal travel budget is four times that of Parliament (Z23). While the MPs and staff report a 
strong incentive to oversee the executive, MPs are “frustrated” because they don’t have the funding to 
conduct investigations (Z2). Though the Treasury funds committee activities equally, committees must still 
compete for funding from external sources.  
 
When international donors are active, only certain committees obtain support, and the selection of these 
committees is dependent on the priorities of the funding providers (Z2). In addition, interviewees 
emphasized the difficulties of becoming reliant on donor support. Once a Ministry knows funding is 
forthcoming from a donor agency, Treasury funding is allocated to other areas (Z18). 81  Overall, the 
Parliament’s budget falls between the two extremes presented by the Parliaments of Zambia and Namibia 
on the one hand, and Malawi and Lesotho on the other. For this reason, it is assigned a medium rank order 









Table 6.3: Parliamentary Budgets and Country Populations Across Parliaments 
 
 Parliament’s Budget (USD) 
2016/2017 FY 82 
 
Population83 
Zambia $ 45,385,535 16 Million 
 
Namibia $ 27,510,166 2,5 Million 
 
Zimbabwe $ 21, 368, 918 15,5 Million 
Malawi $ 14,241,221 17 Million 
 
Lesotho $ 7,931,637 2 Million 
 
 
6.1.4 Parliamentary Service Commissions 
 
In order for a Parliament to staff itself in line with its changing needs, it must have an autonomous arm 
responsible for staff recruitment and remuneration. The presence of Parliamentary Service Commission 
(PSC) represents a significant level of institutional autonomy for a parliament, which makes it a possible 
indication of a ‘coming of age’ for a developing legislature. Given the increased emphasis placed on budget 
issues in the countries sampled here, a dedicated commission has the potential to allow a legislature the 
freedom to focus on financial and economic capacities, for example, when it comes to hiring procedures 
and priorities. In contrast, the absence of a PSC could represent executives loath to support the increased 
capacity of an institution charged with overseeing its work. Thus this, fourth, sub-dimension evaluates the 
presence or absence of PSC as a possible driving force behind some of the changes witnessed in the 
dependent variable. 
 
The oldest Parliamentary Service Commission can be found in the Parliament of Malawi. Established in 
1998, the commission was “easy” to establish at the time, as the party dynamics made for a seamless 
process that would be “unthinkable” today.  Despite the presence of the institution, however, promotional 
opportunities were lacking so the parliament had a major challenge in motivating its staff (M11).  
Particularly in 2010, the institution lost a lot of staff.  As one interviewee explained: “A Parliamentary 
Service Commission without financial autonomy does not provide much benefit to the Parliament” (M11).  
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The Parliaments of both Zimbabwe and Zambia have also had Parliamentary Service Commissions in 
practice, if not in name, for quite some time. The Standing Rules and Orders Committee of the Parliament of 
Zimbabwe has functioned as a Parliamentary Service Commission since independence. In Zambia, the 
Standing Rules and Orders Committee functioned in precisely the same manner, until 2016, when the 
Parliament ushered in a Parliamentary Service Act, which was seen as “mainly a formality.”  
 
The 2014 constitutional amendment in Namibia includes a (weak) provision for a Parliamentary Service 
Commission, though at the time of research the parliament was still awaiting executive follow-through on 
implementation.84  Interviews suggested that despite the constitutional provision, the executive is still 
hesitant to establish a Commission “just” some 200 MPs and staff. Its establishment hinges, however, on 
political, not technical considerations In Lesotho, much discussion has revolved around the establishment 
of such a commission. The process of the PSC establishment had been in play for over a decade at the time 
of research. Though there was a demonstrable need vocalized for a dedicated service commission, 
interviewees felt there was not much that could be done as the Parliament remains “under the thumb of 
government” (L33).  A Parliamentary Service Bill was passed “in principle” in 2011, but as the next 
government came in the initiative was not given priority. At the time of data collection, the process was 
“stalled” again due to the instability in the country (L9 and L10). Indeed, negotiations had to be put on hold 
due to the on-going political conflicts, which have significantly disrupted parliamentary life for some years.  
 






Yes. SRO Committee est. 1964; Parliamentary Service Act (2016) 
Zimbabwe Yes. SRO Committee est. 1980 
 
Malawi Yes. 1998 
Namibia No. But weak provision in 3rd Constitutional Amendment (2014) 
 





6.1.5 Specificity and Precision of Committee Oversight 
 
One of the most telling signs of parliamentary capacity for executive oversight relates to the state of its 
committee system.  We know that committees are at least a necessary condition for budgetary scrutiny 
even if their primary functions are yet disputed. 85   Portfolio committees can be used to scrutinise 
performance, priorities, and service delivery amongst any number of other elements of executive work. 
Committees increase efficiency, which can make up for time constraints experienced by the parliament 
when the budget is adopted. They can also increase information flow. However, in order to do so effectively 
and efficiently, parliamentary committees must develop an increasing level of specificity with regard to 
their specific areas of focus.  
 
Parliamentary housekeeping committees are those that focus on the internal business of parliament. As 
committees develop, they begin to focus their discussions and analysis outward and tackle issues beyond 
their own chambers and into the realm of the executive. At this stage, committee cluster systems may be 
developed. These committees offer Parliaments the opportunity to establish some internal order to its 
work, while remaining highly generalized. These systems are likely to be found in parliaments that either 
have little financial or human resources, or those parliaments for which executive oversight does not form 
a priority work stream. As cluster committee systems begin to specialize, these break into smaller 
committees that focus on increasingly more specific subject matters. Though many committees may 
continue to focus on more than one Ministry, as they continue to evolve and as resources permit, these 
portfolio committees are mandated to focus their oversight capacities on a single ministry.  
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the technical capacity of each of the five parliaments to oversee 
the executive, the fourth sub-dimension in this theoretical cluster thus examines the level of specificity and 
precision of committee oversight. The number of portfolio committees housed within each parliament at 
the time of data collection will serve as a key indicator in this regard. The analysis assumes an equal number 
of executive MOAs across countries.86 Additional data related to the development of each committee system 
over time, committee mandates, management or financing will also feed into the rank scores where these 




Overall, the data at the time of collection demonstrates that in three out of five National Assemblies 
concerned, portfolio systems have been established for the purpose of scrutinising individual Ministries 
Organisations and Agencies (MOAs) namely the Parliaments of Zambia (11), Zimbabwe (19), Malawi (13).  
These developments took place from about the start of the millennium. Namibia and Lesotho are still 
operating with committee cluster systems, though the level of sophistication of the Namibian National 
Assembly, especially when combined with the efforts of the National Council, does yet outpace that of the 
Parliament of Lesotho. That the Namibian committee system has enjoyed nearly two decades of additional 
experience when compared to Lesotho may be a strong contributor. These differences notwithstanding, 
the data does demonstrate a clear trend towards the development of portfolio committee systems, with 
increasing levels of focus on the oversight of individual ministries and committee effectiveness over time. 
Another significant pattern is the committee development process itself, in which Parliaments in the region 
have tended to begin with cluster committees, which oversee a large number of ministries within a 
particular subset of subject matters, before transforming the committee system towards greater levels of 
specificity.  As funding and staffing resources permit, the trend is towards the establishment of fully-fledged 
portfolio committees with specialised oversight mandates.  
 
The first portfolio committee system from amongst the parliaments sampled can be found in the Parliament 
of Zambia, which was established in 1999. Before that, there were roughly eight committees, with many 
subjects “crammed” into one committee (ZAM2). Today, according to the 2005 SROs, the Parliament houses 
four general purpose committees, three housekeeping committees, and eleven (11) portfolio committees 
for a total of eighteen (18).87  Parliamentary staff are generally happy with the state of affairs in their 
committee system with one senior staff considering the development of the committee department “the 
biggest milestone” over the past 15 years (ZAM 1). However, since that time, further refinement of the 
system has been subject to delays.  Constitutional changes have necessitated an increase in the number of 
committees but this was put off at the time of data collection until 2018” (Zambia FG). Reasons for the delay 
appear to be closely related the financial repercussions of the constitutional changes (FG Zambia).  
 
In addition to the sluggish pace of reform related to the committee system, the current portfolio committees 
are not utilising their mandate to oversee their respective ministries to their full potential.88 Instead of 
conducting oversight or scrutiny visits, the committees conduct topical visits on subjects decided upon by 
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the respective committee chair. Topics are of popular importance and related to neither the national 
development plan nor national budget.  The rationale behind this is yet unclear. Focus group participants 
discussed the subject, however, and suggested that Zambian committees may not want to scrutinise 
budgets because they are otherwise not involved in budgetary matters. If MPs were more involved in the 
formulation process of the national budget, it was reasoned by one MP, further interest in overseeing 
executive implementation may be generated (Zambia FG).  Nonetheless, as previously noted in the budget 
sub-element, the Parliament dedicates some 30-40% of its budget to committee activities. In addition, the 
relationship between portfolio committees and the various Ministries, agencies and organisations they are 
meant to oversee is advancing.  Currently, each portfolio committee oversees some 1-4 MOAs each.89 While 
not the optimal 1:1 ratio, when compared with the other parliaments studied here, the result is a mid-range 
level of specificity in terms of oversight.  
 
The Parliament of Zimbabwe followed shortly after Zambia in the year 2000, shifting its formation from 
that of a cluster system of four committees to that of a portfolio committee system of twelve. From 2013 
with the entrance of an entirely new Constitution, the committee system was enlarged again to include 
twenty-seven committees, including nineteen portfolio committees alone. In addition, the Senate 
established its committees on the basis of subject ‘themes,’ for which there are six. 90 The committee system 
was widely reported as being effective, overall. However, there are some constraints. Space, for example, 
can be an issue because the committees are large, and there are 350 Members in both houses (Z4). 
Coordination can pose a problem as well. When committees don’t coordinate workplans at the start of the 
year, duplication can result (Z18).  In addition, due to funding shortfalls from the Treasury alongside the 
ambitions of many committees to conduct regular oversight visits, external aid providers are presently 
fuelling much committee activity.  This is particularly true for the ‘money’ committees and others like health 
and education that tend to receive the bulwark of the national budget. This is in line with trends amongst 
development aid providers in Africa which are presently placing a high priority on ‘good financial 
governance.’ Thus, many portfolio committees get left out of the fold, and are not as active due to lack of 
funds despite the basic funding allocated by the Treasury. 91  Nonetheless, the ratio of MOAs to portfolio 
committees is amongst the highest the parliaments sampled with no committee overseeing more than two. 




In Malawi, the Parliament established its portfolio system in 2006, with support from external development 
assistance.  With the 2014 SROs, the Parliament now has thirteen portfolio committees in addition to four 
standing committees, four constitutional committees and a Women’s Caucus for a total of twenty-one (SRO 
148). 93  Some twenty years prior, in 1999, the total number of committees was just thirteen.  There is no 
clear overview available of how many Ministries, Organisations and Agencies (MOAs) are overseen by each 
committee.  Still, the mandate of committees in Malawi is strong. 94 
 
However, only about 10% of the parliament’s budget is allocated to committee services and the committee 
system undergoes regular funding constraints. In 2016, the parliament negotiated more funding for 
committee meetings via the Parliamentary Service Commission briefing to committee chairpersons (which 
strategically includes members of the executive), but the increase was not accompanied by additional 
funding for the requisite committee staff.  Others note that the Parliament is making due with what little 
funding it has. Most of the committees are proceeding with field visits on the basis of funding normally 
applied to standard committee meetings (M7). Thus, interviews revealed conflicting information on the 
state of committee performance and ability.  On the whole, however, its portfolio committee system ranks 
in the mid-range in terms of its level of specificity.  
 
Shortly after independence in 1990, the Parliament of Namibia established a cluster committee system in 
which some six committees became responsible for shadowing a large number of related Ministries, 
Organisations and Agencies (MOAs) in 1996.  As of the close of 2016, the committee structure of the 
National Assembly includes seven ‘cluster’ committees, one Public Accounts Committee and a newly 
established Budget Committee. The National Council houses an additional five Cluster Committees. 95 Each 
is tasked with the oversight of 2-8 MOAs each. The Economics, Public Administration and Natural 
Resources Committee was split in 2015 along with the provisions of the new Standing Rules and Orders. 
Originally responsible for overseeing some 9-12 separate entities, one committee is now dedicated to the 
subject of Natural Resources, while the other maintains its focus on Economics and Public Administration 
(N6). 
 
The 2016 SROs note that parliamentary committees are responsible for the “supervision of such offices, 
ministries, agencies, or state-owned enterprises and parastatals as prescribed…” (64 (3)). Yet, the cluster 
 
 129 
system currently in place does not allow for adequate oversight of each individual government organ. In 
addition, internal coordination of committee funding prohibits regular oversight.  There is also substantial 
overlap between the committee fieldwork of the Assembly and that of the Council. This leads to 
unnecessary duplication of efforts (as well as significant gaps) with regard to the oversight of the executive. 
Overall, the Parliament of Namibia maintains a low level of specificity with regard to its oversight of 
executive Ministries, Agencies, and Organs.  
 
Although Lesotho gained independence in 1966, the Parliament established a cluster committee system in 
2007 in order to economise on the limited budget available while still “keeping up with the times.” The 
Parliament then developed a fully-fledged portfolio committee system that related to government 
ministries from there.  Currently, the Assembly hosts five such committees and the Senate, three. The five 
cluster committees are responsible for the oversight of anywhere from four to ten MOAs each.96  The 
mandate of the committees is to “monitor, investigate, inquire into and make recommendations relating to 
… the budget…” (SRO 91 (1)) (s) and “exercise an oversight function over the executive “(SRO 95 (1) (a)).  
In addition to the already insurmountable workload of each committee, there is an additional Ad-hoc 
committee on HIV and AIDS, which has clear overlaps with the Social Cluster. At the time of data collection, 
a division of labour had not been clearly developed between the two committees, though the former is 
significantly less active than the cluster itself.  Thus, the composite picture of the Parliament of Lesotho 
includes a cluster system that is not adequately funded, and one, which wields an enormous workload on 
each of its committee clusters, and one, which does not engage in oversight activities outside the 
Parliament.  The Parliament ranks low in this sub-dimension. 
 
Table 6.5: Number of Portfolio Committees Across Parliaments as of the 2016/2017 Fiscal Year 
 





Namibia 8 (cluster committees) 
Lesotho 5 (cluster committees) 
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6.1.6 Educational Capacity of MPs in Context 
 
Finally, increased activity on budgetary matters could be attributed to the educational backgrounds of 
Members of Parliament, particularly in their capacity as committee members or committee Chairs. Where 
educational levels in the country are unable to keep pace with the level of expertise required by MPs and 
committees, there is the potential that external donors or the parliament itself will work to up-skill its 
employees through trainings on budgetary matters. As much as trainings are assumed to offer widespread 
benefits to parliaments and their recipients, data on their effectiveness is lacking.  The ability of short term 
(often once-off) and superficial training moments to offer significant benefits to MPs in the absence of 
appropriate educational foundations is assumed here to be rather remote. For this reason, trainings are not 
included in the sub-dimension related to education. Experience is also closely related to education though 
it is far from clear as to whether experience leads to more education or the reverse. Such developments, 
where they do appear, may be evident amongst committee Chairs who have garnered experience in 
executive functions and bring them back to the legislative landscape.  This element is closely tied with MP 
travel and parliamentary socialisation, which will be taken up in chapter seven (7) and will not be discussed 
here. 
 
Increased activity on budgetary matters could also have something to do with more general changes in 
educational demographics. According to data from the African Legislatures Project (ALP), there is an 
upward trend in educated MPs throughout much of Africa, though there is still significant diversity between 
cases (Barkan et al.  2013). Though the authors caution that the data is not yet conclusive, based on statistics 
that demonstrate an increase in tertiary education enrolment over time, one can assume this trend extends 
also to elected MPs (Mattes and Mozaffar 2011: 5). This growth is in line with international patterns of 
legislative development. Looking back on the evolution of the American legislature, in first 75 years of its 
existence, the legislative branch was “composed of amateurs, transient and poorly educated politicians” 
(Owens and Loomis 2006: 262).  Today, in contrast, some 92% hold a Bachelor’s Degree with some 38% 
trained as lawyers (Manning 2011).   In the African context, such educational deficits are much more recent, 
yet also increasing over time. As Shaw reports, the Congo housed just 16 university graduates out of an 




The data gathered in this section will serve as testament to whether or not this general, upward, trend holds 
in the five cases examined. A detailed assessment of the educational status or knowledge level of each MP 
was not possible in the context of this study. Instead, the data gathered in this sixth sub-dimension relies 
on a combination of anecdotal evidence emanating from interviews and focus groups alongside the 
educational attainment required for each MP according to law. The composite data will then be included in 
the overall assessment of each parliaments technical capacity and compared with the changes documented 
in the dependent variable.  
 
Overall, the data suggests an upward trend in education levels across all countries. However, the number 
of university educated MPs depends on whether or not incentive structures have been put in place to attract 
the same. Due to recent reforms, the majority of MPs are reported to be University graduates in the 
Parliaments of Malawi and Lesotho. While the Parliament of Zambia has recently introduced a grade 12 
requirement for its MPs, interviewees still consider this low when compared with the present requirements 
of the job.  The Parliaments of Namibia and Zimbabwe do not have an education requirement in place for 
the recruitment of their MPs. However, in the case of the latter, educational standards are relatively high 
across the board even if shortcomings were reported in relation to the skillsets of the recently introduced 
women MPs brought in through party lists. Data gathered from the Parliament of Namibia points to the 
contrary. In addition, regardless of level of general levels of educational attainment, each parliament 
continues to struggle, specifically, with issues of financial and economic literacy amongst its MPs. MPs are 
reportedly not making use of the information that is available to them, ostensibly because budgetary and 
economic information is not easily digestible to the untrained eye. Though the rank scores will be 
incorporated into the overall rankings under technical ability, the results of this single sub-dimension are 
somewhat consistent with the findings in the dependent variable, particularly with reference to the 
behavioural aspect under investigation: Where educational standards are relatively high (or at least, not 
relatively low), demonstrable legislative activism is found within the dependent variable.  
 
Zimbabwe is commonly understood to be home to amongst the best-educated populace in Africa with free 
primary education and literacy rates at over 90%. 97 While there are no educational requirements in order 
to be an MP (2013 Constitution, 125), as one interviewee explained, the Parliament houses a large number 
of educated persons which means that one can expect to see well-executed argumentation, regardless of 
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party affiliation (Z12).98  Committee capacity is reported to have increased over the years because the 
Parliament is attracting more educated MPs (Z4).   In contrast to the other parliaments studied here, MPs 
were found utilising the library space and its resources over the course of the data collection phase.  As one 
interviewee explained, such an observation is not unusual. Some MPs do not rely on external training to 
increase his knowledge base, instead they pursue their education in their individual capacity, as needed 
(Z12).  Those in the library department also noted an increased demand for information and use of the 
library over time (Z11).  
 
However, the Parliament of Zimbabwe continues to struggle with issues of financial and economic literacy 
amongst its MPs. In the assessment of one interviewee, just 20% of MPs have an appreciation for accounting 
and business management. These are the MPs who participate in budget matters. Changes in budgetary 
activism were reportedly driven by a combination of the Speaker, the executive and the 20% of MPs who 
have the requisite knowledge (Z20).  And as another interviewee explains, there are only three to five MPs 
in each committee who have the right background for the job. The research department also has difficulty 
in analysing reports provided by the Ministry of Finance (Z18).  Fact based information and objective 
reports are not yet in demand (Z9).  And MPs claim the budget process and subject matter is too complex. 
However, as one interviewee highlighted, MPs were able to “hear the call from citizens for a CDF” (Z15). 
Finally, MPs are reportedly not making use of the budgetary information that is available to them (Z24). 
While the Parliament of Zimbabwe may have had an easier time attracting qualified MPs owning to relative 
numbers of educated persons alone, in other countries, institutional incentive structures must be adjusted 
in order to attract the fewer educated persons available.   
 
The Parliament of Lesotho noted significant changes in the calibre of its members, for example, after it 
increased the salaries of its MPs by 80% in 2006 (L9 L10). Interviewees reported that this drastic change 
has already had a positive impact on those Members elected directly.  “It’s about the calibre of the Members” 
reported two senior interviewees “Now, most of the chairpersons are former ministers and highly 
educated…. In the last two parliaments 80-90% of MPs have come in with a university qualification…” (L9 
L10).  In addition, even in the case of those MPs selected via the party list, Members tried to pick those with 
higher education.  Given the political upheaval in the country at the time, education served as an “easy 
selection criteria” (L1). Two to three parliaments prior, MPs needed only to be literate in order to be a 
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Member of Parliament (L9 L10).  The change has had an unintended effect on the dynamics between MPS. 
Now that MPs are more educated, parliamentary staff are finding it difficult to keep pace with committee 
Chairpersons, who are now finding the staff less competent (L9 L10).  Nonetheless, here again, when it 
comes to economic and financial literacy, MPs tend not understand the material.  In one assessment, some 
60% of MPs understand what is in the budget (L1).  The same dynamic is seen at the committee level where 
only certain individuals participate in discussions on technical legislation (L3).  
 
Although increases in educational qualifications likely began at a much later stage,99 the Parliament of 
Malawi represents a similar situation in terms of educational gains seen by MPs.  As one staff explained, t 
there are more degree holder than non-degree holders in the Assembly because the benefits of the job have 
been made more attractive to those with higher education. The job of an MP has also become a realistic job 
alterative n for educated people in a country where few opportunities exist (M10).  In the assessment of 
one interviewee, some 80% of MPs in the National Assembly are well educated now.  Former Speakers are 
now MPs and others come to Parliament with executive experience and personal connections with 
Ministers. The remaining 20%, “are just piggy-backers” (M8).  Overall, more MPs are reported to be looking 
for research and information (M10).  The PhD holders apply a “totally different reasoning” to their work 
compared to those MPs with secondary education (M24).  However, on matters related specifically to the 
budget, here again, MPs are seen to be lacking in terms of the skillsets needed to tackle the issues before 
them.  Committee cluster meetings held just prior to the adoption of the budget are reported to have 
notoriously low levels of participation. Though the reasons for the low turnout were not clear, the 
absenteeism in cluster meetings can be attributed to the fact that the material is too technical (M19). Thus, 
in Malawi, once again, despite educational gains evidence shows continued gaps in financial and economic 
skills.  
 
In the Parliament of Namibia lack of MP education was seen to be a hindrance to progress within the 
Parliament.  As a senior staff explained, there is no qualification needed to be an MP and sometimes their 
questions are not well understood (N9).  Benchmarks are seen as one possible way to remedy the issue, as 
instituted in each of the other parliaments studied here. Some were of the opinion that MPs in the National 
Assembly must have at least a diploma (FG Namibia). As others explain, the executive overshadows the 
parliament and a “huge” number of MPs don’t have the capacity, especially in the ruling party (N7). “There 
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is a need for an injection of energy” (N7). Many of the educational shortcomings appear to be tied up in the 
incentive structures inherent in the party system itself. MPs in the parliament lack the capacity and have a 
fear of losing their livelihoods. This leads to a situation in which Members place party loyalty at a premium 
(N7).  However as one interviewee explained: “Younger and more educated MPs do not want be gagged and 
tow party lines” (N5).  Others cited “culture” as a hindrance. MPs do not come from a culture of research so 
demand is low for information. As a result, MPs speak about what they experience in their constituencies 
over the course of budget debate. They don’t understand the importance of research (N12). And while 
educational levels of staff in Namibia were reported to be similarly low, at least one interviewee was of the 
opinion that it was not worth investing in staff capacity until Members are better educated. As the MP 
summarized, “Even if the MPs had an army of staff they would just make these fantastic speeches and there 
would be nothing behind it” (N7). 
 
Like some of the other parliaments sampled here, the Parliament of Zambia has instituted a minimum 
educational requirement for its members.  As one senior Member explains, the most important 
development in Parliament is that the calibre of MPs has “shot up” with the minimum grade 12-education 
requirement in the new constitution. Without education, MPs can “manoeuvre politically” but they can’t 
understand development (ZAM 22).  Other interviewees believe that a high school education is not enough; 
the minimum should be a degree (ZAM 12).  Like other parliaments, there is a clear recognition that the 
educational qualifications of MPs can support more general changes in behaviour like an emphasis on fact-
based arguments over the course of debate. However, on technical matters committee capacity is only as 
strong as it is able to scrutinise and analyse issues (FG ZAM).  The budget process continues to be singled 
out as an area in which individual MPs must take the initiative in order to advance their understanding. 
The onus is on the individuals to understand and analyse the budget. Right now, MPs don’t go to the library 
(FG ZAM).  Members and staff appear to put a great deal of faith in the ways in which formal institutional 
structures may change the behaviour of its Members.  At least one interviewee was confident that the PBO 
“will bring in more fact-fact-based arguments” (ZAM 21).  More than other parliaments in this study, the 
Parliament of Zambia appears to be focused on the power of processes and procedures to bring about 
change. The content of the Focus Group discussion was further testament to this.  However, like other 
parliaments, there were also complaints of MPs not reading the info they do receive. Though rather than 
interpreted as local issue, many believe this to be a problem unique to Africa (FG Zambia). 
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No educational requirement, however very high general educational standard 
Malawi 80% university trained. Parliament a competitive employer in tight job market  
 
Lesotho 80-90% have university education due to increase in MPs salaries by 80% (2006) 
Zambia Grade 12 qualification in new constitution (2016) 
 




6.2 Summary and Conclusions 
 
A review of the composite scoring of the technical sub-dimensions, found in the table below, suggests that 
the parliaments studied here are not deepening their budgetary engagement for technical reasons. Based 
on the levels of change documented in the dependent variable, we should see Zimbabwe, for example, 
scoring high on the four technical sub-sub-components and the Parliament of Namibia, correspondingly, 
low.  Although the data does support the general trend in which those parliaments that are undergoing the 
most change in budgetary engagement (Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia) also rank on the higher end of the 
spectrum than those that have demonstrated significantly less change (Lesotho, Namibia) the relationship 
to the ‘ability’ explanation is not robust.  
 
Based on the technical assessment carried out here, the Parliaments of Zimbabwe and Malawi should be 
performing worse on the sub-dimensions studied in the dependent variable. In contrast, the Parliaments of 
Zambia, Lesotho, and Namibia should each be performing better. These findings support those found by 
Oppenheimer in his study of legislatures in developing country contexts. Committee systems and 
professional staff “do not guarantee a substantial voice in policy making” (Oppenheimer 1983: 580).  And 
as Schick argues, “… adding institutional capacity does not itself ensure that legislators will stake out an 
independent position on the budget,” political capacity is also required (Schick 2002: 16). Though more 





Table 6.7: Rank Order of Technical Ability Across Cases 
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13/15 11/15 10/15 10/15 9/15 9/15 
 
The rank categories of technical abilities are characterized as follows: ‘low’ technical capacity is associated 
with a rank sum of 0-4. Parliaments understood to have only ‘minor’ technical capacities are those with 
sums totalling between 5-9. Those with ‘moderate’ technical capacities have rank sums between 10-14.  
And those parliaments with ‘high’ technical capacities are reflective of sums between 15-18. The table 
below thus depicts the relationship between changes in budgetary activism and the overall assessment of 












Table 6.8: Relationship between Legislative Change and Technical Ability Across Cases 
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A detailed analysis of the relationship between each of the technical sub-dimensions and the changes 
documented in the dependent variable reveals some potential insights. Counter-intuitively, parliamentary 
budgets show little by way of correlation with the dependent variable, the extent of budgetary engagement. 
Those Parliaments with the largest budgets, namely Namibia and Zambia rank among the lowest on 
behavioural and organisational aspects of budgetary engagement.  In contrast, those countries with lowest 
institutional budgets Malawi and Zimbabwe, are outperforming these same parliaments when it comes to 
budget related activities. Although we know that adequate funding is a requirement for any institution, it 
may be the case that lower levels of funding actually motivate the parliament to become more engaged in 
budgetary matters. In at least two cases, we know that the Parliaments of Malawi and Zimbabwe have 
managed to increase the budgets allocated to them prior to budget adoption. 
 
In staffing terms, the Parliament of Zambia is a clear outlier, but we do not see any relationship between 
number of staff and higher levels of change in the dependent variable. The fact that the majority of 
parliamentary staff are currently working outside parliamentary chambers in Zambia is of significant 
consequence to the very large staff size.  Moreover, of the parliaments studied, the Parliament of Zimbabwe 
is undergoing the highest degree of change in budgetary matters yet hosts less than a quarter of the staff 
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housed in the Zambian Parliament. Correlations are thus scarce between the two sub-dimensions on staff 
numbers and the dependent variable. In contrast, the presence of a Parliamentary Service Commission 
(PSC) does appear to be of some significance. In fact, those parliaments without a PSC are associated with 
both low staff numbers as well as less sophisticated levels of committee development. Because the presence 
or absence of a PSC speaks to the relative autonomy of the legislature, the institution may support increased 
legislative activism.  
 
With regard to levels of precision in committee oversight, a more robust relationship can be found with 
legislative activism.  The high degree of specificity and precision of the committee system in the Parliament 
of Zimbabwe could help explain the correspondingly high levels of legislative budgetary activism.  Cluster 
committee systems, like those found in the Parliaments of Namibia and Lesotho, are also parliaments where 
significantly less budgetary activism is seen. The analysis on committee systems has also demonstrated 
that parliamentary committee systems appear to develop in a particular sequence. These parliaments each 
began with housekeeping committees and then moved on to clusters systems once substantive discussions 
were required.  From there, increasingly specialized portfolio committees are introduced where these are 
both technically possible and desired.  The final stage of committee development may be the establishment 
(or restructuring) of a Budget Committee with a modern mandate to scrutinise the executive budget and 
influence spending plans.100 
 
The power of education to shape outcomes in the legislature was emphasized by MPs and staff in all cases. 
Evidence of rising education levels is corroborated by early data collected by the ALP in 2008 and this 
growth is in line with international patterns related to legislative development as a whole. A number of 
scholars (Jogerst 1993) (Norton et al.  1993) (Damgaard 1980) note the emergence of a more professional 
legislator across the globe, who sees work as an MP as a full-time job. The data gathered in this study is 
reflective of these broader legislative developments. Those parliaments reporting the highest number of 
educated MPs are also those parliaments that were found to be most successful in informally influencing 
the budget towards strategic ends. A high level of education is also correlated with more international 
travel and higher levels of experience in government. This variable is, however, closely related to 
international exchange, which will be examined in more depth in the subsequent chapter. In sum, the data 
suggests that highly specialized committee systems, Parliamentary Service Commissions, and highly 
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educated MPs may support greater budgetary engagement on the part of parliament help account for some 





Chapter 7: Norm-Based Influence as an Explanation for Action 
 
This thesis explores the recent changes in budgetary engagement underway in five African legislatures 
according to three competing hypotheses related to the legislature’s authority to act, its ability to act, and 
its attitude towards the tasks before it (Born and Hänggi 2005). The first analytical chapter thus explored 
whether or not changing formal legislative powers could provide a sufficient explanation for the changes 
underway. The second explored the possibly that rising technical capabilities could be behind these same 
developments.  In each case, however, no covariance was found between these competing explanations and 
the dependent variable.  
 
This final analytical section thus explores whether or not a norm-based, sociological, explanation can 
account for these developments. These explanations are concerned with concerned with why 
“organisations take on specific sets of institutional forms, procedures, or symbols; and emphasize how such 
practices are diffused through organisational fields or across nations (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). In this 
chapter I hypothesize that where we find substantial evidence of external influence, those parliaments will 
be more likely to exhibit changing behaviour and institutions in budget matters. In order to analyse norm 
development in a comparative context, evidence of cross-national patterns of legislative behaviour must 
first be established.  
 
The logic behind this hypothesis goes as follows. As outlined I greater detail in the literature review in 
Chapter 2, legislatures from across the globe appear to have undertaken a number of institutional reforms 
to achieve greater budgetary authority from the mid 1990’s. This trend is very similar to the processes I 
have documented in the legislatures of Southern Africa. To illustrate, Posner and Park (2007) find marked 
trends in six categories of legislative behaviour. 101  The table below provides a detailed overview of the 








Table 7.1: Comparable Changes Observed in OECD Legislatures and Southern African Legislatures  
 
Changes Documented in OECD Legislatures  
 
(Posner & Park 2007) 
Changes Documented in Select Southern African  
 
Legislatures (Heim 2019) 
• -More Time to Consider Budget Requests 
• -Portfolio Committees Reviewing Budget in 
Tandem with Budget Committee 
• -Informal Negotiations with Executive 
• -Independent Budgetary Analysis (i.e. PBOs) 
• -Increase in Performance Budgeting 
• -Increased Interest in Cooperation with Office of 
Auditor General 
• -Additional Time for Scrutiny at Adoption  
• -Budget Committees 
• -Cross Committee Collaboration at Adoption 
• -Committee Scrutiny of Reports 
• -Influence over Development/Recurrent Budget 
• -Participation in Pre-Budget Consultations  
• -Research Departments 
• -Parliamentary Budget Offices 
• -Committee Scrutiny Visits  
• -Committee Scrutiny of Local Government Audits  
 
 
The similarities highlighted on the basis of this comparison do not constitute an explanation for the changes 
underway in the five legislatures studied here.  It is therefore important to take the analysis a step further 
and establish the link between global trends on the one hand, and the incorporation of these trends in the 
legislatures studied here. In other words: how could these otherwise intangible legislative norms lead to 
tangible outcomes in the legislatures examined here?  
 
Social factors that lead to changes in MP norms in relation to executive oversight and budgetary 
engagement can have their origins in both internal and external elements. Political party dynamics have 
been held constant in the case selection and will thus not be treated here. And to the extent that MP 
attitudes have changed, the literature suggests there is little reason to believe that this was driven by 
constituent demand. Across 17 African countries, Mattes and Mozaffar (2016) report that just 7% of 
citizens list oversight as an important function in which they expect their MPs to engage. This analysis thus 
examines the impact of external factors on MP attitudes and behavioural norms.   
 
On the basis of available data, there is strong reason to believe that the diffusion of legislative practices may 
occur through the introduction of specific norms by external donors or new practices learned from 
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legislators in other African countries. 103   The conference convened by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) in 1970 (Musolf and Kornberg 1970) marked the onset of ‘capacity 
development' programmes focused on African legislatures.  Today, American-based aid organisations that 
engage in such activities take on a variety of forms. These include bilateral development agencies like 
USAID, party-based institutions like the National Democratic Institute (NDI), research-based organisations 
like the State University of New York (SUNY) and multi-lateral organisations like the World Bank Institute 
(WBI). However, not all US funding or American-based development funding can always be readily 
identified. Funding can also be pooled through multi-donor “basket funds” pooled within the UN system 
and implemented through, for example, the UNDP (Hudson and Wren 2007: 40). 
 
As outlined in the literature review, a focus on the formulation stage of the budget can be expected in US-
based organisations. Thus, one would expect to find evidence of US-based donor interventions in those 
legislatures where we see the presence of Budget Committees, Parliamentary Budget Offices, portfolio 
committees engaged in budget matters, or other activities related to legislative activism, particularly over 
the course of the formulation stage. However, rather than concluding these relationships outright on the 
basis of simple deduction, I demonstrate this through the use of available data.  
 
An empirical overview of every US donor intervention over time is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, 
those interventions that have left a significant imprint on MPs and staff will be noted, especially those 
relating directly to the budget process.  Such instances provide sufficient evidence of political norm transfer 
spurred on by interventions on the part of development agents.  The data should not be mistaken for a 
performance assessment of US donor interventions. The means by which any related institutional 
‘achievements’ ultimately were or were not reached is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this section 
documents punctuated instances of norm-based influence. In other words, points of contact with a 
particular donor from which point on it becomes clear that a ‘critical juncture’ has been reached in the 
legislature’s development (Hogan 2006).   
 
A score of one (1) indicates no evidence of US based donor interventions and no evidence of substantial 
interventions on the part of other donors on budgetary themes while a score of two (2) indicates little to 
no US based donor intervention or the modest presence of non-US based donor interventions related to 
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budgetary matters while a score of three (3) references strong evidence of uniquely US based donor 
interventions pertaining predominantly to budget matters with comparatively little, if any, support  from 
other donors.  Additional norm-based explanations will also be included in country narratives, where these 
are highlighted throughout data gathering process.     
 
But western development organisations are not the only source of external influence. Peer-to-peer 
parliamentary exchange is also a key component of parliamentary life in Southern Africa.  However, 
influences emanating from external donors operate under different incentive structures than those that are 
diffused by means of other African Parliaments.  While both are forms of ‘political transfer’ (Velde 2005), 
the role played by external donors also includes a hierarchical element that incorporates the power 
differential inherent between international development actors and the developing countries with whom 
they cooperate.  The following table depicts this dichotomy.  
 
Table 7.2: Differing Characteristics of Two Forms of Legislative Norm Diffusion  
 
Form of External 
Influence 
Level of Analysis Relationship Theoretical Base 





Global (North-South) Donor—>Legislature Political Transfer + 
Power Differential 
 
In addition, unlike donor interventions, which are executed in order to achieve particular aims, peer-to-
peer interactions often do not include targeted goals. Their general nature thus precludes the 
establishment of a causal relationship between peer-to-peer exchange and the emergence of specific 
developments within a legislature. Moreover, timing matters. African Parliaments may engage in exchanges 
with other African Parliaments which themselves have already been exposed to international donor 
interventions related to specific legislative practices.   Finally, given common geographies and institutional 
backgrounds, the parliaments in this study are each assumed to engage more or less equally in moments of 
peer-to-peer exchange. For these reasons, related information will serve as a complement to the data 




The hypothesis explored in this thus chapter reads:  where parliaments demonstrate legislative activism in 
the budget process, evidence of peer-to peer legislative engagement and US- based donor interventions will 
be found.  Specifically, one would expect to see frequent mention of new norms learned from legislators in 
other countries and reference to the key periods of US donor influence on legislative reforms. 
 
7.1 Analysis of Norm Transfer Across Parliaments 
 
7.1.1 US Donor Influence and Peer-to-Peer Exchange in Zimbabwe 
 
The Parliament of Zimbabwe has enjoyed strong donor support, particularly since 2000.  The Parliament 
of Zimbabwe began to embark on its own internal reform programme in 1997, establishing a Parliamentary 
Reforms Committee for the same.  Exchange visits were conducted with the Australian Parliament, the 
German Parliament, the European Parliament, the US Congress, and the UK Parliament, each with bilateral 
funding support from each of the respective governments and aid agencies. 104   In 2002, the UNDP 
conducted a capacity assessment of the Parliament in cooperation with the State University of New York 
(SUNY) with funding from USAID 105 and SUNY began to support parliamentary modifications from until 
2007 (Z1). During that time SUNY worked with the Budget Committee and supported the Parliament’s 
initiative to become involved throughout the budget cycle, bringing with it “international best practices” in 
legislative budget action (Z1).  The programme worked from 2001-2002 to “empower” the Budget 
Committee to the point where it became fully engaged in the budget process from about 2005 (Z1). Once 
the programme ended, a locally based implementation unit was established in the form of Southern African 
Parliamentary Support Trust (SAPST), which has been in operation since that time with continued funding 
from USAID (Z1). 
 
From about 2010, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Commission 
(EC) were reported to provide the bulwark of support to the Parliament (Z19). The Parliament’s funding 
base has since grown to include funding support from African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank 
(WB) and the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA) (Z19). The World Bank (WB) and the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), in particular, provide some USD 5 million over three years with a focus on public 
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financial management (Z1). This initiative, in particular, was instrumental in the establishment of the 
Parliamentary Budget Office because it forms part of a broader, system-wide PFM reform initiative. 
Parliament had been negotiating with the Treasury to fill the staff postings for the PBO by the time the 
initiative was tabled. The Parliament thus took advantage of the opportunity for funding and pushed for 
resources to establish a small staff contingent for the PBO over the course of five years (Z7).   
 
Support received from external sources comes with some challenges to the Parliament.  With regard to 
committee operations, donors can constrain the parliament in that their priorities come first before those 
of the committees themselves (Z4).  Where the Treasury does not fund committee activities, individual 
donor priorities dictate which committee is provided with support (Z29). Though early reforms came at a 
time when the parliament was beginning to exercise its institutional agency, the Parliament of Zimbabwe 
has bolstered its own capacity to independently fund its work over time.  As one senior staff explained 
“Malawi is dependent on DPs funding and Uganda is coming out of it.  They have resources now.  The 
Kenyan Parliament went through the same things.  We are hoping this will pass” (Z19).   
 
The Parliamentary Reform Committee (PRC) of the Parliament of Zimbabwe engaged in a broad 
consultative process in order to elicit public views on the effectiveness of Parliament in the late 1990’s.  The 
findings were “unflattering,” and included the view that parliament was a rubber stamp and that it was a 
“remote,” “inaccessible” institution far removed from the people it purported to represent.  Study visits 
were conducted to a number of countries in 1995, including to Germany and South Africa (Z7). The PRC 
recommendations lead to a process of committee system reform towards a portfolio committee system 
could make budget allocations and policy making more transparent, open, effective, and responsive to the 
needs of the people (Regional Seminar 2017).  By 2001, a fully-fledged committee system was established 
with clear terms of reference for each committee in the Parliament’s Standing Rules and Orders (Z1). 
 
Since that time, the emphasis has been placed on citizen involvement, an aspect highlighted in the 2013 
Constitution (Z18). As in the other parliaments examined here, there is pressure at the constituency level 
to obtain resources and improve conditions in a short period of time (Z20).  Thus, although many MPs claim 
that the budget process and its subject matter is too complex, as one staff explained, MPs were able to “hear 
the call from citizens for a CDF” (Z15).  The establishment of the CDF was reported to go “hand in hand” 
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with the Parliament engaging with the budget more actively and was institutionalized in the 7th Parliament 
on the basis of the examples found in other African countries (Z15). 
 
Indeed, other parliaments have proven highly influential to the operations of the Parliament of Zimbabwe, 
though not all potential changes have been taken on board.  As one interviewee explained although there 
is substantial exchange with the Parliaments of Botswana and Zambia, some ideas are difficult to 
implement because the political context is not conducive (Z16).  The Budget Committee, in its current form, 
is modelled after other Budget Committees seen over the course of early study visits conducted in the 
1990’s (Z18). These included a gathering of ‘best practices’ from the Parliaments of the U.K., Germany, 
Australia, Uganda, Namibia, Zambia, India and the EU, as part of the overall mission of the PRC to respond 
to calls from citizens for change (Regional Seminar).     
 
Study visits have recently been focused on the Parliamentary Budget Office (Z18). The model for Budget 
Office was reported by one interviewee to be based upon recommendations brought back from study visits 
conducted by the Standing Rules and Orders Committee to South Africa, Uganda, and the US in 2012 and 
2013 (Z14).  In addition to participation in a number of institutionalised for a for parliamentary exchange 
like the Pan African Parliament (PAP), the SADC-PF, the Canadian Parliamentary Association (CPA) and 
others, the Parliament of Zimbabwe meets annually with the Parliament of Zambia in the ‘ZIM-ZAM’ 
parliamentary exchange in which the Parliaments of Namibia and Botswana may also soon participate (Z1).  
 
To recap, the reforms in the Parliament of Zimbabwe began as a result of the critical review of the 
institution in the late 1990’s. From there, study visits were conducted and the Reforms Committee 
continued to make recommendations. US donor support was prominent from the start of the millennium 
through to 2007, after which point continued funding support for legislative advancements in budgetary 
matters was channelled through a local NGO. Today, the Parliamentary Budget Office is supported via a 
World Bank/African Development Bank system-wide PFM initiative. It is thus clear that external donor 
support has been of significant influence to the parliament its process of legislative “budgetary re-
engineering.”   
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7.1.2 US Donor Influence and Peer-to-Peer Exchange in Malawi 
 
Discussions with MPs and staff revealed that the Parliament of Malawi has been heavily influenced by donor 
interventions, particularly those from the US. The Parliament began to take on a multi-party dispensation 
from 1994. Prior to this, the Parliament still operated as part of the Office of the President. As one 
interviewee explained, when the Parliament first began it work in 1994, most people understood it as an 
institution that simply passed laws, but overtime, oversight became a key function (M7).  The UNDP 
introduced a general training for MPs in 1996 and shortly thereafter, the Parliament established some 
autonomy through the introduction of the Parliamentary Service Act (1998). These developments meant 
the emergence of a “new parliament” (M1).  The role of external donor agencies in shaping the legislature’s 
development was mentioned repeatedly course of the interview process. An overwhelming emphasis was 
placed on the parliament’s relationship with US-based assistance programmes from the mid 1990’s.  In 
addition, both staff and MPs demonstrated a high level of fluency in ‘donor speak,’ providing clear evidence 
that parliament is well versed in donor relations.  
 
As explained, committees began to form on a piecemeal basis from 1994, and were reported to be “mainly 
the result” of American influence (M7).  NDI was as significant presence at that time, funding committee 
meetings, study visits for MPs and staff when funding for committees was not available to the parliament.  
The first visit to the US Congress was 1997 (M7)106 However, interviewees reported that the government 
was not amicable to further NDI involvement because the organisation was seen as “too democratic” (M22). 
This appeared to be a reference to relatively strong position enjoyed by the legislature when compared to 
the executive. From there, the Americans reportedly returned via SUNY in 2006 to support the 
development of the committee department, which were apparently instrumental in getting the committees 
to be more active in producing reports (M7).  The development of the committee system and the 
subsequent evolution of their roles and responsibilities in the oversight sector has meant that the 
committees have fostered a dependence on donor funding for oversight activities like site visits (M15).  
Financial dependence on donor has also led to cases in which not all committees are funded equally.  Many 
interviewees alluded to the idea that the Public Accounts Committee receives a disproportionate of funding 




The intervention was also reported to be invaluable for Parliament’s staff development.  After the 
Functional Review in 2007, 107 SUNY supported the provision of interns while the Parliament worked 
towards establishing a true committee staff unit.  SUNY concluded its work in 2010, at which point the 
Parliament had six or seven staff serving 20 committees (M11) and over time their positions were 
integrated into the government budget (M20) (M13). The Parliament has engaged in a number of studies 
from 2007 including study visits to the US Congress, the State Legislature of New York and Uganda (M7). 
Though the US clearly had an impact, other MPs noted both Uganda and Kenya as models for the Parliament 
in terms of committee structure and decentralization (M5, M8) but also its library and research department 
(M9).  
 
In terms of PBO development, the parliament instituted its first ad-hoc structure in 2004, drawing from 
staff from other departments but the initiative was eventually disbanded in 2007.  A second attempt was 
made to establish a PBO between 2012-2014, though here again, the initiative did not enjoy sufficient 
support both from within the Assembly as well as from external donor agencies.  In 2013, a PBO visit was 
conducted in Kenya and Uganda, though this was internally funded. 
 
Despite its continued development over time, the MPs and staff of the Parliament of Malawi remain 
somewhat disappointed with its own progress as a parliament.  When exposed to the practices of other 
parliaments at regional meetings, MPs and staff report that their Parliament is not making progress at the 
same pace (M22).  A number of legislatures were of noted influence, including Uganda, Scotland, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Ireland, the UK, Zambia, and Norway.  Uganda and Kenya were often quoted as models for Malawi, 
particularly when it comes to issues of decentralisation (i.e. CDF and other forms of decentralized 
financing) and for their committee structure (M5). Those interviewed also demonstrated a keen awareness 
of the ways in which other parliaments had reached their own level of development. As with other 
parliaments, donor funding is also used strategically in the Parliament of Malawi.  Many interviewees 
reason that external donors could initially fund the staffing contingent for a PBO, placing pressure on the 
Treasury to incorporate these in the national budget thereafter once the project is complete (M7).  
 
In addition to these external influences, interviewees emphasized the role of local opinion in precipitating 
heightened legislative engagement in the budget.  Malawi has been home to a number of recent political 
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scandals which have reflected negatively on the executive (FG Malawi).  As a result, the Parliament has 
taken a particular interest in scrutinizing the budget, with strong leadership from the Speaker’s office in 
this regard (M5). In the face of mounting scandals, a senior MPs explained, citizens are expecting parliament 
to “dig more and enquire more” and are pleased when MPs raise issues about the misuse of funds (M1).108  
 
The dynamics in this challenging economic landscape has meant the expectations of constituents are 
increasing rapidly over time (M22).  The CDF was established in 2006 in order to help meet the 
expectations of citizens for more immediate results, creating employment opportunities in communities at 
the same time (M21).  With difficulties faced by District Development Funds (DDFs) to deliver, one senior 
staff reported that the public was happy that MPs were able to see the CDF budget increased (M7).  In short, 
citizen’s distaste for corruption and the mismanagement of funds has been reportedly placing pressure on 
Parliament to hold the executive to account.  
 
To summarize, the way in which the parliament of Malawi is addressing calls for the better management of 
public finances was highly shaped by early interventions on the part of US development agencies, which 
have shaped the committee system and introduced much-needed staff into the department. Though the 
Parliament continues to borrow from other parliaments in terms of the structures it is introducing like 
CDFs and PBOs, these appear to dovetail well with existing incentives and institutional needs. 
7.1.3 US Donor Influence and Peer-to-Peer Exchange in Zambia 
 
The changes underway in the Parliament of Zambia are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the 
parliament appears to be moving in line with international trends on legislative budget engagement as 
evidenced most notably in its Budget Committee work and the establishment of its PBO. On the other hand, 
the parliament has demonstrated a strong reticence to engage in the budget process in the absence of clear 
legal authority to do so.  In some cases, even when legal authority is available, the Parliament does not take 
advantage of its right to act.  
 
In terms of external influence, the Zambian Parliament has a longstanding history with development 
assistance providers. Once the country moved to a multi-party dispensation in 1990, the Parliament 
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reportedly “felt the need for change.” However, it took nine years for the process to come to fruition 
(ZAM2). A number of interviewees referenced the closed nature of the institution prior to its reform 
process. Around the turn of the century, the environment was reportedly not conducive for the exchange 
of knowledge. Members and staff and were restricted in their behaviour, the atmosphere was unduly 
formalized, and the institution housed a generally “uneasy” atmosphere (ZAM1). As one interviewee 
explained: “The institution was so closed. There were barriers to accessing parliament and the MPs” 
(ZAM19).  Internal pressures were mirrored externally as well. Prior to reforms, the Parliament would only 
engage with specific organizations. One early account of donor engagement serves to highlight this trend. 
The State University of New York (SUNY) tabled a proposal for legislative reforms in the early 1990’s but 
these were reported to be “too prescriptive” for the Parliament and too far removed from the Westminster 
model (ZAM19). 109 The Parliament opted out of the offer of support.  Now, there is an “open door policy” 
to all CSOs (ZAM1).  The development of a more publicly accessible institution was noted my many as one 
of the core achievements of institutional reforms over time (ZAM19).  The Parliament is now understood 
to be more effective now that it is open to the public and engaging with a wider variety of stakeholders 
(ZAM1). 
 
By the turn of the century, the Parliament began to implement a number of reforms including the 
development of a portfolio committee system (ZAM2). In the early 2000’s, the engagement of the 
Parliament in the budget process was negligible; there was no critical analysis by the Estimates Committee.  
Since that time there have been “major” changes. MPs have an interest now in interrogating matters and 
seeing if the budget allocated is in line with what the people want.  Even if more reforms are necessary, the 
institution is understood to be better off than it was fourteen years ago. To explain these developments, 
one senior staff explained: “I sense, generally speaking that this is coming from an outcry. MPs are 
motivated by the need to match resources to needs” (ZAM1).   
 
The institutional reform process began in 1999 with a series of study visits aimed at sourcing of new ideas 
for the Parliament.  A small cohort of Members held discussions with parliamentary delegations (the UK, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Gambia) and travelled to the Parliament of Uganda and the US Congress 
(with sponsorship from USAID) resulting in 73 recommendations.  110  These recommendations then 
formed the agenda for a newly established Ad Hoc Reforms Committee, which then tabled suggestions 
 
 151 
around strengthening the committee system, increased legislative oversight, policy analysis and public 
accountability in November 2000.  The Capacity Development Project for a ‘Real’ Parliament (2008-2011), 
which included targets around strengthening participation of the Zambian National Assembly in the budget 
process from “formulation to implementation” was supported on the basis of a basket fund including 
funding from Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the USA, and Denmark.  111 All of the reforms that 
are currently underway have their origins in the work produced by the Reforms Committee (ZAM2).  From 
2006, the Parliament analysed the budget in cooperation with experts sourced from the Economic 
Association of Zambia (ZAM19).  These and other initiatives were conducted as part of a “mood” present 
across the globe to ensure the oversight of public finances (ZAM3) and culminated in a 2009 Constitutional 
amendment that created room for subsequent legislation that would increase the role of the Assembly in 
the budget process (ZAM19).  112 
  
In the past there were donors that approached the Parliament of Zambia “with their own agendas.” 
Sometimes there was a match between objectives, but there also cases in which the agendas were too 
different to warrant cooperation.  The case of the American proposal in 2005 offers a second such example. 
As one senior staff explained, USAID approached the Parliament with an anti-corruption proposal but it 
was really aiming more at changes within the executive than the legislature.  Due to differences in opinion, 
the proposal was rejected (ZAM19).  In terms of the Parliamentary Budget Office itself, over a decade after 
the recommendation for its establishment was proposed, key staff were asked to start drafting concept 
notes on how to create the Budget Office in 2012 and 2013.  As one Budget Office staff reported: from there, 
“lucky enough,” the EU began to implement the Parliamentary Support Project (PSP) in 2014 (ZAM28) 
which included the establishment of the Parliamentary Budget Office, still in operation today.  
 
Since that time, the parliament has received support from the Swedish development agency (SIDA), the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID), UNDP, Irish Aid, the German Development Cooperation 
(GIZ), and the European Commission (EC) amongst other NGO initiatives both local and international. 
However, the Zambian parliament sees itself in “full control” over its agenda with any donor support is 
based upon their own strategic plan and reform agenda (ZAM19). This tendency was already exemplified 
in the early rejection of the SUNY proposal and, later, the USAID initiative in 2005. Today, Irish Aid is 
supplementing committee activity budget (ZAM2), though its support is modest when compared to its 
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previous funding commitments (ZAM 19).  In addition, the European Commission provides support for the 
Budget Office.  Additional support for Parliamentary development is also forthcoming from DFID and the 
UNDP.  As with the some of the other Parliaments studied here, the dangers of becoming dependent on 
donors was a noted concern (ZAM2) as well as the strong focus placed on financial committees to the 
exclusion of other portfolio committees (FG).  
 
Zambia is one of the more active parliaments in terms of exchange and socialisation with other institutions. 
The Parliament appears to have acted as an early model for other parliaments in the region and beyond. As 
one Minister explained, in 2006, the Parliament was “top notch” until party dynamics saw the parliament 
going “backwards” (ZAM25).  Zambia, as a country, was reported by one Member to be proficient in 
formulating policies but challenged in terms of implementation.  As an example, he cites that Rwanda used 
the Zambian tax system as a model in the late 1990’s for which the country itself cannot implement today 
(ZAM12). On the other hand, the Parliaments of Kenya and Botswana were noted models for budgetary 
engagement and decentralized development respectively (ZAM19) (ZAM12), the Parliament of Rwanda is 
seen as exemplary in the monitoring of executive performance (ZAM14) and executive-legislative relations 
was noted as enviable in the both Ghana and South Africa (ZAM29). Every year the Assembly may host 
visitors from five to eight different parliaments.  At the time of data collection there were visitors from the 
Parliaments of Malawi, Kenya, and Uganda (ZAM18) 
 
The Parliament appears to be fighting against a strong tendency for centralisation of power, to the point 
where it is “almost impossible” to get anything done without the support of the executive (ZAM6). However, 
Parliament does appear to have grown in confidence over time. As one senior staff shared: “I have not seen 
a change in the character of MPs in 25 years, but I have seen a change in MP’s perception of how far they 
can push the executive in asking for information” (ZAM6). Others point to the role of internal division in 
hindering progress. Some interviewees cited divisions along tribal and regional lines (ZAM25). As a whole, 
however, the political landscape in Zambia has been stable. Though interviewees reported that there are 
some tensions, these have never disrupted the system. As one interviewee explained, the nature of the 
“Zambian spirit is to rise above” (ZAM5). Others posit historical reasons for the political inertia. The 
Parliament was reportedly “frozen” in the 1970’s and 1980’s, “functioning like a department in a socialist 




To conclude, the Parliament of Zambia was once a closed institution. Early attempts to provide bilateral US-
based support in both the late 1990’s and 2005 proved unsuccessful. Recommendations based on extensive 
study visits abroad were, however, tabled by the Parliament’s Reform Committee in 2000, which led to the 
modifications in budgetary engagement seen today. Though the Parliamentary Budget Office sources its 
present support from European sources, the Reforms Committee tabled the recommendation to establish 
the institution well before these began to appear in European contexts. This suggests that early study visits 
to the US Congress were inspirational in this regard.  USAID has continued to provide support to the 
Parliament over time, though this is provided through basket funding along with other, European, donors.   
7.1.4 US Donor Influence and Peer-to-Peer Exchange in Namibia 
 
Perhaps owing to its official status as a middle-income country, the Parliament of Namibia does not engage 
as extensively as other SADC countries with external development assistance providers, though it has 
enjoyed donor support since its establishment in 1990. Currently, the European Commission provides 
medium-term funding to parliamentary capacity development efforts via in-house support across a variety 
of objectives. The Parliamentary Support Programme consists of four pillars, including the development of 
an electronic budget for use by MPs, the oversight of development aid, the scrutiny of reports from state 
owned enterprises, and the operational budget of parliament (N22). 
 
The European Union Parliamentary Support Programme (EU PSP), along with a small number of smaller 
German foundations (FES, KAS) remain active in supporting the governance sector in Namibia. Extensive 
study visits were conducted within the confines of the well-known Agenda for Change, which was 
supported by the European Commission, which included visits to the Parliaments of the UK, Ireland, Spain, 
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Zimbabwe and India, resulting in a number of recommendations 
for institutional changes to Parliament.  These range from the recommendation to establish a 
Parliamentary Service Commission to an expansion of the committee system and an increase in Member’s 
allowances (N5).113  However, unlike the other parliaments studied here, these recommendations did not 
result in the establishment of a Reforms Committee to take these further.  And though American support 
was channelled through NDI “in the early days,” interventions were limited to work in the Office of the 
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Speaker (N22) (N14) and this was not reported as pivotal to the institution’s development. However, aside 
from these few examples, the Parliament of Namibia does not tend to work with a wide array of external 
assistance providers. Thus, the role of donor driven influence does not come out strong in the analysis.  
 
Several interviewees mentioned attachments to Parliaments in Zambia, Uganda, South Africa, Scotland, the 
US, Estonia, Tanzania and Kenya, amongst others.  However, mention of parliamentary practices in other 
countries relatively few. This could indicate that only a select few MPs and staff have actually participated 
in such exchanges even if the Parliament remains relatively well socialised though participation in regular 
regional (SADC-PF), continental (PAP), and international (CPA) activities. However, curiosity with regard 
to the practices of other Parliaments was not lacking over the course of the focus group discussion. In fact, 
the discussion opened with questions related to how the Namibian Parliament compared to others in its 
budgetary engagement and questions related to ‘best practices’ from abroad.  One interviewee explained 
that there is a competitive spirit in the Parliament to improve things (N21).  Though the each of the 
parliaments examined here have demonstrated a similar tendency, this may be somewhat more 
pronounced in Namibia given its status as a newly independent nation. In adopting its particular 
constitutional arrangements, for example, the country was noted to be “politically sending a message to 
South Africa that an independent Namibia could stand as a model that would inspire confidence” (FG).  
 
However, despite such rhetoric to the contrary, evidence is scarce that the parliament has undergone much 
by way of reform since independence.  In addition, a degree of scepticism with regard to the recent changes 
proposed was also evident in some interviewees, particularly those with some tenure in parliament. As one 
senior MP summarized: “The Budget committee and the Parliamentary Service Commission will help. But 
their formation is trendy. It’s just like democracy in Africa. I am not sure about the level of commitment to 
some of these institutions” (N4). 
 
The relationship of the Namibian Parliament to the budgetary process differs from the other parliaments 
in several respects. The data reflect a growing interest amongst a small number of senior MPs and the 
Speaker to strengthen the parliament, particularly in budgetary matters.  Proposed reforms include the 
Parliamentary Service Commission, CDF, Budget Committee, and potentially, a PBO.  However, these same 
developments appear to be at odds with the much broader level of distance reported (and demonstrated) 
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by MPs and staff on the subject.  In fact, the idea that the executive holds an exclusive mandate in budgetary 
matters is so widespread that at the onset of nearly every interview it was necessary to clarify whether or 
not the subject under discussion the national budget or the budget of the parliament itself. Given the 
apparent disconnect between this basic level of awareness and the developments that are now underway, 
the changes appear to be dependent on the particular vision of the Speaker.  
 
Overall, the issue of ‘culture’ was one that was mentioned repeatedly in interview and focus group settings 
as the cause for the Parliament’s reticence to become more active in the budget process. The term was used 
to describe a variety of phenomenon, some of which related more to institutional features of the system 
itself.  MPs pointed to three different features including strong party loyalty (FG), the presence of Ministers 
and Deputy Ministers in the Assembly, as well as overall institutional design. More importantly, a ‘culture’ 
of national unity was emphasized by many of those interviewed. As one interviewee explained: “At 
independence and the making of the constitution, I don’t think the question of oversight was so 
pronounced. It was one government and one Namibia at the time” (N4).  Because all parties had to be 
considered in the drafting of the constitution a “politics of consensus” was reportedly born (FG). The 
practice of working closely together towards a common aim has meant that constructive criticism is 
understood as a part of the Namibian culture (N5).  
 
In sum, the Parliament of Namibia has seen neither significant reform nor targeted donor engagement on 
budgetary matters. Though the Parliament currently receives some support from the European Union on 
oversight related themes, the programme is not targeted at institutional reform. Tellingly, the Parliament’s 
early Agenda for Change initiative did not result in the adoption of the recommendations made or the 
establishment of a Reforms Committee. The notion of ‘culture’ was cited several times amongst 
interviewees as the reason for the widespread reticence to change. The maintenance of national unity is 
yet considered more important than a critical account of executive fiscal practices to the extent where the 
institution remains unaware that it could play a role in budgetary maters. However, despite these potential 
hurdles to change, the Parliament is beginning to send signals of institutional change from amongst the 
highest ranks.  Such a visionary shift is likely the result of peer-pressures brought about through 
parliamentary socialization.  
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7.1.5 US Donor Influence and Peer-to-Peer Exchange in Lesotho 
 
The Parliament of Lesotho has a relatively modest level of engagement with external development 
partners. Though development agencies were referred to on occasion in discussions, these were rare. And 
where referenced, this was normally in the context of support for study visits to other parliaments or 
meetings with parliamentary networks like SADCOPAC. There was no evidence of donor influence on 
parliamentary reforms on budgetary or other matters. Modest donor support has been reportedly 
forthcoming in more recent years (2010/2011) from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
Irish Aid, and the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), but the Parliament has not enjoyed 
longstanding external cooperation. 
 
While the Parliament of Lesotho remains open to influence from other parliaments, and Members and staff 
have voiced an interest in incorporating institutions like the CDF and a PBO into its structures, the 
Parliament is not yet ready to act in this regard.  The continuation of highly disruptive political conflicts 
and inherent cultural inertia with regard to oversight sets the scene for little action. Coupled with technical 
constraints, such as the lack of autonomy from the executive, the Parliament of Lesotho is thus unable to 
become more active in the budget process aside from more dramatic displays of collective opposition, as 
seen in the rejection of the budget in 2017. 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Parliament of Lesotho is not advancing in step with other parliaments 
in this study. And both the staff and is Members are cognisant, and even self-conscious about, the 
Parliament’s development relative to others.  Relative gains are rivalled in importance only by absolute 
gains: Each parliament wants to perform better than its predecessor (L21).  The decision to create portfolio 
committees in 2007 came about as a result of a benchmarking mission. As one staff explained: “There was 
a need to transform and keep the pace with the outside world” (L11). Interviewees referred to their travels 
to a number of countries including India, Uganda, Seychelles, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, New Zealand, 
the UK, France. And staff attachments to various parliaments in 2010 and 2011, supported by Irish Aid and 
the UNDP, were reported to result in the recommendation for the establishment of a Budget Committee.  
Through its work with the SADC Organisation of Public Accounts Committees, to name another example, 
the PAC becomes familiar with the work of other parliaments and the Parliament of Lesotho tries to emulate 
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some of their practices (L9 and L10). Perhaps given the relatively small size of the Parliament, the 
Parliament of Lesotho tends to compares itself with sub-national legislatures, like provincial legislatures of 
South Africa.  However, as staff explained, even then: “We went to the Gauteng Legislature and we could 
see just how far behind we were.  They are involved in the budget at a very early stage there before cabinet 
approves” (L16) (L17) (L18). 
 
Upon the return from study visits, MPs and staff table recommendations, however, these are not acted upon 
at the institutional level.  Explanations for the inertia were varied.  Some pointed to the difficulty of 
institutional change in general, citing the “rigid” legal framework and the general distaste for change: “Even 
the UK has been reforming, but Lesotho has not” (L11). Others pointed to government instability as the 
culprit: “We went to New Zealand in 2014.  The facilities were much better and the whole approach is quite 
different… but our recommendations were not implemented because there was a hiccup with the 
government and snap elections” (L32). Still others referenced the bottleneck in the Parliamentary Reforms 
Committee.  The Committee was established in 2004, and incorporated into the Standing Rules and Orders 
of Parliament in 2008. Still, the Committee has since remained inactive.  As one staff explained, she had 
come to parliament in 2008, left in 2011, and returned in 2015 to find that no reforms were undertaken in 
the interim (FG).   
 
The Parliament appears to be at a crossroads in terms of its own institutional development. The 2015 SADC 
recommendations included constitutional, security and parliamentary reforms in response to the political 
turmoil (L15). As one MP reflected, “This is the first time we have really sat down and talked about reforms. 
We made the constitution in 1965, and then built red and green houses just like in Westminster. We have 
not really said now, we will do it our way” (L24).  More senior Members and staff suggested that the 
Parliament must begin to pave its own way forward before it can engage with external donors.  “The 
struggling cow gets the help” (L20). 
 
Often referred to by MPs and staff was the question of “culture.”  Interviewees described the general 
attitude of MPs in the Parliament as “lax,” frequently describing MPs as “wheelbarrows” who require 
prodding to act.  As one respondent summarized: The culture of Basotho is not a probing culture… There 
are two to MPs who know how to “bring the fire” (L1). Though the question of culture may continue to be 
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a cross-cutting theme, MPs suggested that the most significant hindrance to parliamentary action lies in the 
political conflict in which the country is currently embroiled. Dating back to 1965 when the constitution 
was drafted, the main divide has consisted, on the one side, of those associated with traditional rule vs. 
those who support a modern parliamentary system (L25). And in the absence of reconciliation between the 
two factions, a senior MP explained, the parliament will remain in a state of paralysis (L26). The political 
landscape in Lesotho was described by one senior Member to be “very complex” (L25).   
 
At the time of research, the head of the opposition was in exile until the final day of data collection 
(ostensibly for fear of his life), which meant, amongst other things, that Parliament could not proceed. This 
incident was but a continuation of the on-going political upheaval that had escalated in 2015, when 
parliament was dissolved prematurely. The environment has proven a demonstrable distraction to more 
pressing issues. As one Member explained, in the midst of the political turmoil, the real needs of the people 
and the nation come as secondary concerns (L20).  It has proven difficult for MPs to focus their attention 
on national issues (L14). Others were of the opinion that the system itself is actually fuelling the conflict in 
Lesotho.  The incentive to engage in the budget process is understood as driven by the needs that MPs see 
in their communities.  But the whipping system was referenced as a strong hindrance to authentic activism 
(FG). 
 
Overall, the Parliament of Lesotho has not enjoyed extensive donor engagement over time. Since the 
Parliament’s reinstatement in the mid 1990’s it has also witnessed little by way of reform. Though the 
institution has been exposed to a number of parliamentary practices from across the world, its main form 
of international influence appears to stem from those organisations to which the Parliament annually 
subscribes (IPU, PAP, SADC-PF etc.).  Reported drivers behind the institutional inertia include a culture that 
lacks a drive for action as well as the on-going political conflict that has formed part of the landscape of the 
country since the mid 1960’s.   
 
7.2 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Preliminary evidence reveals that legislatures from across the globe may be becoming more active in 
budgetary matters.  Though similarities vary somewhat in terms of technical sophistication, a clear 
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relationship is evident between these and the African legislatures studied here. Further analysis suggests 
that innovations in relation to legislative budgetary engagement likely were likely incorporated into the 
legislative reform process in the wake of key periods of US intervention.  
 
US donor influence appears to have been instrumental in instigating changes in legislative budgetary 
engagement in both Zimbabwe and Malawi.  Some US support to the Zambian Parliament was also found, 
though in the form of a joint programmatic arrangement rather than through bilateral support.  Conversely, 
where American engagement was not present, as in Lesotho and Namibia, there is an equally high degree 
of congruence with the dependent variable. The table below summarizes the findings and compares levels 
of change documented.  
 
Table 7.3: Relationship Between Legislative Change and Degree of US-Donor Influence Across 
Cases 
 
 Little to No  
US Donor Influence  
 
Moderate Levels of 
US Donor Influence 
 
High Levels of US 
Donor Influence 
 




   











 Zambia   
Substantive Change  
(28-36) 
 




In addition, as evidence from the Parliaments of Namibia and Lesotho also serves to highlight, though US 
donors were not active in supporting legislative reforms, the seeds of such change have, nonetheless, taken 
root. Given the low degree of donor involvement combined with a relatively high degree of socialization 
enjoyed by each of these parliaments, these developments clearly suggest new norms were taken up as a 




However, a number of caveats apply. A focus on ‘good financial governance’ is highly prevalent today across 
international development agencies. This incorporates emerging trends related to public budgeting and 
transparency- some, but not all, of which may have US origins. The presence of an overarching convergence 
of norms means that it is possible that for some practices in legislative budgeting, their origins lie 
elsewhere.  Significantly more data is required before conclusive attribution can be drawn. 
 
The concluding analysis is also made more difficult because the relationship between peer-to peer 
parliamentary exchange and external donor influence is often indistinguishable today. Donors often utilise 
methods of peer-to-peer exchange as a pedagogical approach to a wide variety of subjects. The Working 
Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) and its successor, the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation (GPEDC), were each active in the promotion of peer-to-peer learning and exchange throughout 
numerous high-level fora.114  At the same time, peer-to-peer learning platforms, even where these are 
‘home grown,’ often seek out external donor support for their activities. The SADC-Parliamentary Forum 
(PF), the African Network of Budget Committees, and the SADC Organisation of Public Accounts 
Committees (SADCOPAC) are illustrative of just three examples here. Thus, in many cases there is but a fine 
line between these two modes of political transfer.  
 
Despite the tentative nature of the findings, preliminary results demonstrate a clear relationship between 
moments of US-based donor influence and the emergence of legislative budgetary activism. The findings 
are in line with Barkan (2009) who concludes that a combination of external donor influences and a 
“coalition” of reform-oriented MPs have been critical to the on-going development of African legislatures. 
Where evidence of US donor influence is not found, but evidence of behavioural and organisational trends 
in legislative budgetary activism are, this can be attributed to political transfer based on parliamentary 
exchange.   
 
As we recall from Chapter 2, Pekonen (2014) also highlights the role of peer-to-peer learning and the 
underlying competitive element that this ensues (Pekonen 2014: 19). The example he presents in his study 
on the early development of the Finnish legislature “illustrates the central role of foreign models in the 
work of parliaments, especially of young assemblies that are in the process of formulating their modes of 
proceeding” (Pekonen 2014: 28). Moreover, in contrasting these developments with those found in 
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legislatures in francophone Africa, Barkan (2004) finds that MPs and staff in Anglophone Africa “appear to 
be more aware of developments in peer legislatures” than those in francophone regions (Barkan  2004: 
234).  Thus, the findings of this chapter are in line with scholarly work on the subject thus far.  
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Chapter 8: Political Determinants 
 
 
The role of ‘power politics’ is perhaps most evident in cases related to the state budget and its allocation 
(Wildavsky 1961).  Political Realists place a focus on rent-seeking, individual, calculus as the primary 
determinant of political outcomes. Wildavsky, for example, advocated for incremental change 
(“incrementalism”) because he was deeply sceptical that political constraints would hinder any attempts 
at sweeping reforms (Jones and McCaffery 1994: 22).  Political calculus is also evident in the bargaining 
arrangements played out between political parties.   This comes about because in the context of the 
legislature, the “political will” of MPs as a collective is represented in party structures that demand loyalty 
to particular agendas. And as Wehner explains: “In countries with dominant parties, even powerful 
constitutional structures may not give rise to extensive legislative scrutiny” (Wehner 2014, 520).  Clearly, 
both individual and collective forms of political calculus are important behavioural components within the 
context of the budget process.  
 
However, it was not possible with this number of cases to consider every potentially important variable in 
the case selection. Three such variables include levels of democracy, electoral competitiveness, and the 
presence or absence of minority governments.  The decision to exclude an explicit treatment of political 
considerations was based on a number of considerations. The first of these relates to methodological and 
theoretical aspects that preference a relatively high level of analysis and the production of claims that are 
more easily generalizable. The second, relates to the types of explanations scholars can expect from 
changing party constellations in the legislature and the questions these are best suited to answer.  And a 
final rationale relates back to the nature of political parties in Africa in which differences between parties 
is often blurred.  Each of these arguments are discussed in more detail in the section to follow.  I also check 
to see wither each of these variables help discriminate between levels of budgetary activity through a series 
of cross tabulations with measures of the dependent variable in order to provide additional support for the 
decision to exclude these from the main body of this thesis.   
 
Because many of the of the methodological considerations relevant to the decision to exclude political 
considerations have already been reviewed in other parts of the thesis, these will only be summarized here.  
In the first place, national level political considerations were excluded because generalizable claims were 
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preferred over those only reflective of individual political considerations. 115  As described in Section 3.2 
on research design, generalizable claims were preferred because signals that legislatures were engaging 
actively in budgetary matters appeared to be indicative of a wider trend, but also because these would be 
most useful to the selected parliaments as they continue navigating their reform efforts.   In addition, the 
neo-institutionalist foundations of this thesis tend (essentially per definition) to de-emphasize the role of 
individual political calculus and utility maximisation.  Instead, the theoretical starting point is whether and 
how institutions, shape, constrain, and ultimately change the behaviour of the legislatures studied here.  (A 
more detailed discussion on theoretical considerations are further elaborated upon in the Section 3.6.)   
 
That said, what we know about legislative budgeting in established democracies tells us that the most 
obvious determinant legislative budgetary engagement relates back to the ways in which political party 
cohesion, numbers, and relative balances of power play out within the institution (Schick 2002) (Santiso 
2004) (Lienart 2005) (Posner and Park 2007) (Wehner 2010). Budgetary questions are politically 
contentious.  Executives maintain a strong preference for independent action and tend to be resistant to 
critical review of their decisions. It would therefore make sense to expect a critical mass of political 
influence to be available before formal institutional changes in legislative budgetary engagement are 
successfully ushered in.  And even once formal powers do become available, these require the continued 
support from powerful actors in order to be sustained. As Wehner (2014) tells: “Electoral systems and 
political party majorities appear to play an important role in explaining when formal powers translate into 
legislative activism” (Wehner 2014: 523).  In some cases, the rise of disciplined political parties is said to 
weaken traditional legislative control mechanisms (Schick 2002), while others recognise the role of 
“political will” (Santiso 2004: 53), the importance of the number and strength of political parties, the role 
of the opposition (Lienart 2005), or the role of “frayed party systems” (Posner and Park 2007: 23), amongst 
others.  There are many proposed conjectures in the comparative literature, but systematic empirical 
analysis is yet lacking.  Young (1999) and Leston-Bandeira (1999) provide detailed case studies on the 
Australian and Portuguese parliaments, respectively, demonstrating the strong relationship between 
political party majorities/minorities and policy influence in budgetary matters, however, these conclusions 




Wehner (2010) provides a first examination of the political determinants (i.e. the “partisan proposition”) 
of legislative budgetary powers and organisational attributes.  Assuming legislative distrust of the 
executive is likely to be higher in the absence of a “unifying partisan connection,” Wehner expects the 
presence of a divided government to increase the likelihood of legislative financial scrutiny (Wehner 2010: 
68).  In order to test this claim, he compares cases in which the parties in government hold more than 50 
per cent of the seats with formal budgetary powers and organisational attributes found in 26 legislatures 
(Wehner 2010: 68).  His findings suggest that size of the partisan coefficient is statistically significant for 
the organisational (but not the formal powers) sub-index, and concludes that “organisational features of 
legislative budgetary engagement appear to be responsive to shifts in political dynamics” (Wehner 2010: 
71, 76).  Additional support for the argument is presented on the basis of a small series of anecdotes related 
to the emergence of Parliamentary Budget Offices in the US, Mexico, South Korea and Canada.  In each case, 
the author concludes that either a period of divided government (US), democratisation and the emergence 
of competitive party politics (Mexico, South Korea) or a succession of minority governments (Canada) all 
preceded the emergence of PBOs in the countries concerned (Wehner 2010: 73-75).116 
 
While these findings do help us understand the nature of legislative budgetary engagement more fully, the 
central question being probed here hones in on a fundamentally different puzzle than that of Wehner 2010. 
Wehner (2010) places a focus on the formal ability of legislatures to influence budgets in modern 
democracies as well as broad determinants for the same.   I focus, rather, on the institutional evolution of 
legislatures in Africa, by way of example of legislative budgetary activism. This is a crucial, if somewhat 
nuanced, difference between the two research programmes.  And this difference has consequences for the 
types of explanations best suited for the task.  I study a small number of legislatures in flux, whose 
constitutional structures began with a particular (Westminster Parliamentary) model, and whose 
budgetary engagement is signalling the adoption of an altogether different constitutional style (US 
Presidential).  The result is that the puzzle addressed in this study requires an explanation that has the 
potential to account for long term institutional developments. Party-political dynamics are ill placed to 
account for such a trajectory. Changes precipitated through shifts in power within and between parties are 
temporary, rendering these unfit to explain long term developments related to changes in legislative 




Scholarship specifically related to legislative evolution supports the move to a higher level of analysis to 
account for long term change.  Pekonen (2014), for example, provides an in-depth analysis on ongoing 
influence of the Swedish Parliament on the historical development of the Finnish Parliament while Squire 
(2012) examines the evolution of American state legislatures in part on the basis of the interplay the US 
Congress over the course of time.  The conclusion to be drawn from each of these studies is that despite the 
common conception of legislatures products of national socio-political developments, legislatures across 
the globe are in fact highly influenced by institutions beyond their geographical remits.   
 
Moreover, while it is true that political party majorities are necessary in formalized legal debates, informal 
behaviours and organisational attributes, like the ones studied here, are predicated on much more flexible 
requirements.  In other words, political party majorities may lead to formalized legislative activism in 
budgetary matters, but how (and if) party dynamics influence less measurable, informal, demonstrations 
of parliamentary budgetary engagement is not clear. Given the fact that political parties are ill equipped to 
explain both long term and informal changes in legislative budgetary engagement, I thus set them aside for 
the duration of this study.  
 
I also exclude partisan politics from this study because political parties tend to behave differently in Africa 
than in more established democracies.  Political parties can play a number of fundamental roles in 
democratic politics, including: aggregating citizen interests; providing structured political choices; 
engaging citizens in the democratic process; training and socializing political leaders; developing policies 
and taking responsibility for implementing them; and facilitating coordination within legislatures and 
between branches of government (Carothers 2006).  In Western Europe, political parties developed from 
the grassroots level alongside domestically driven democratic institutions, suffrage, the introduction of 
parliamentary government and electoral systems (Rakner 2011: 1110). 
 
However, party-based politics is a relatively recent development in Africa.  There was a widespread ban on 
political parties upon independence and it was not until the 1990s that the first competitive elections were 
introduced across Africa (Carbone 2007). Parties were either established around anti-colonial 
independence movements (Carbone 2007: 8) or in response to problems like economic mismanagement 
or conflict (Manning 2005: 708).  And those that coalesced in the early 1990s faced the challenge of building 
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party institutions while at the same time competing for votes in multi-party elections (Rakner 2001: 1107). 
Overall, these components are understood to have had negative consequences for the development of 
political parties in Africa.   
 
Even after electoral reforms in the 1990’s, the political landscape remains rife with single dominant parties- 
often emerging from liberation struggles- that have won large majorities in two, three, or even four 
successive elections (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005) (Carbone 2007) (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). The 
persistence single party dominance in the political landscape is then complimented with a number of 
smaller parties that lack organisational coherence and distinct programmatic substance (Carothers 2006) 
(Rakner 2011).  Without cohesion the influence of political parties dissipates. “Party majorities only ensure 
the predictability of legislative behaviour when matched with tight party discipline, which is not always the 
case” (Wehner 2004: 10).  
 
At the same time, while party cohesion may be in short supply within the legislature, emerging evidence 
points to a great deal of consensus at the societal level.   Research in the recent multiparty era tells us that 
many countries in Africa are unusual in that their party structures are not “meaningfully organized around 
left-right ideological type of cleavage” (original emphasis de-emphasized).  Instead, campaign promises are 
“overwhelmingly valence in nature” (Young 2014, 106).  That is, public opinion is not divided in terms of 
what ought to be done: “development” is an overwhelming priority across party lines.  Consensus with 
regard to “process preferences” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001) is also evident, namely a broad 
intolerance for government corruption (Young 2014: 113).  
 
Whether or not societal preferences are homogenous or differentiated matters to the budget process.  
Wildavsky (1961) attributes conflicts over budget priorities in the US Congress to a “dissensus” in American 
society with regard to policy (Jones and McCaffery 1994: 25).  In contrast, the suggestion of a broad societal 
consensus in Africa invites the possibility that legislative reform efforts in budgetary matters may play out 
differently there than in other contexts. Agreement on the need for development could render challenges 
to the budget less of a threat.  And a strong interest in reduced corruption could, in theory, promote general 
trends towards the establishment of institutional practices that hold the potential to ameliorate the same.  
Whatever the influence of societal cohesion on budgetary matters, with little difference amongst political 
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actors in Africa, a critical function of political parties is rendered irrelevant, namely the aggregation of 
diverse policy preferences. 117  Instead, broad, societal interests appear to matter more.  In a cursory test, I 
find support for this line of argument when I compare the dependent variable with perceived levels of 
corruption in the five countries concerned. 118 As the table below demonstrates, with the exception of 
Lesotho where we might expect to see more legislative budgetary engagement, perceptions of corruption 
generally correlate with the variance found in the dependent variable in this study.  In short, higher levels 
of perceived corruption are associated with more substantive change in budgetary activity.  
 




















    
Minor Change in 
Budgetary Activity  
(10-18) 
 
Namibia (52)  
 
 Lesotho (39) 
 
 
Moderate Change in 
Budgetary Activity  
(19-27) 
 
  Zambia (38)  












To summarize thus far, the role of political calculus is constrained first by the choice to focus on macro 
rather micro level determinants of change. That is, priority is given to the production of generalizable, 
rather than individualized claims.  These methodological considerations are rooted in ontological, 
theoretical and practical considerations.  The role of political parties is also not examined here because 
their fluctuating dynamics are unable to account for long term change and better suited for study of formal- 
rather than informal- legislative behaviour and organisational attributes. Finally, political parties are also 
set aside for now because these tend to be less cohesive and less distinct (tending more towards issues of 




With the exclusion of individual political calculus and party dynamics from this thesis, political 
considerations may appear to be lacking in this work.  However, the “political” in this study remains 
ubiquitous if mainly implicit.  Political calculus -like many other drivers of behaviour- is not unique to the 
sub-national level, but can found across national, and international levels of analysis as well.   In focusing 
on legislatures collective ability to wrest a higher degree of autonomy from the executive in budgetary 
matters, and in examining these legislatures in a (highly politicized) development context there is much 
scope to consider the balancing of political power. Political aspects are thus found within the basic 
scaffolding of this thesis and if these are not more explicitly discussed, it is only a reflection of the limited 
scope in which to do so.  
 
Still, despite the many considerations outlined here, critics may be unconvinced that electoral 
competitiveness could be excluded from a study related to legislative life.  It is possible that internal 
political dynamics may yet play a role in determining certain aspects of the institutional reforms in the 
legislatures studied here (e.g. their timing).  And in one-party dominant contexts (e.g. Mozambique, South 
Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe), it would be also reasonable to expected that “the arrogance of the numbers” 
would strongly discourage attempts by the legislature to act as an independent check on its budgetary 
authority (even if only formally). Although it is not necessary to measure control variables in order to 
control for them (Gerring 2007: 133), I do so in order to dispel any doubt that that electoral 
competitiveness or party-political dynamics are behind the changes under investigation.  Thus, for now, I 
assume the power of existing propositions to maintain their applicability in this part of the world and test 
the relation between the dependent variable and three measures of political qualities commonly thought 
to support legislative involvement in budget matters. These include democratic credentials, the presence 
of minority governments, and alternations in political power over time.  Each will be reviewed and 
analysed, sequentially, in the section to follow.  
 
Authoritarian regimes are generally understood to be bad for legislative development.119  For this reason, 
I first investigate the relationship between levels of democracy and measures taken of the dependent 
variable of this thesis. In order to do so, I use the Freedom House ratings for each of the countries concerned 
as these align with the timing of data collection efforts in the 2016/2017 fiscal year.  The “Freedom Rating” 
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used below consists of the average scores once both Political Rights and Civil Liberty sub-dimension of the 
rating system have been added together. The scores range from 1 to 7, with lower scores indicating more 
freedom and higher scores indicating less. 
 
Table 8.2: Relation Between 2016 Freedom House Ratings and Measures of Budgetary Activism 
 
 
 Freedom Rating  
(1-2) 
Freedom Rating  
(3-4) 
Freedom Rating  
(5-6) 
 




   
Minor Change in 
Budgetary Activity  
(10-18) 
 





Moderate Change in 
Budgetary Activity  
(19-27) 
 
 Zambia (3,5)  




 Malawi (3) Zimbabwe (5) 
 
Source: World Freedom Report 2016 (Sourced online August 2019)  
 
 
As the table above testifies, there is no clear relation between increased legislative budgetary engagement 
and commonly accepted measures of democratic governance. Based upon the high freedom rating assigned 
to Namibia, one would expect to see more signs of increased legislative engagement. Whereas in the case 
of Zimbabwe, where the freedom rating is particularly low, we would expect to see significantly less. This 
suggests a relationship whereby countries with less freedom experience more change in legislative 
budgetary activity.  Though this is merely a cursory test conducted on a small number of cases, the result 
does support the probing of alternative explanations for clues as to why legislative budgetary engagement 
is on the rise in Southern Africa.  
 
Next, I apply the same metric used by Wehner (2010) and probe the presence or absence of a minority 
government in each of the cases concerned for the electoral period under which data was collected.120  
Where the party of the executive holds power in less than 50% the legislature, this is considered a minority 
government. Where the party of the executive holds more than 50.1% of the possible seats, this is 
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considered a majority government. This simple dichotomy is represented in the table below, and cross 
tabulated with the dependent variable in each of the legislatures studied.   
 
Table 8.3: Minority and Majority Governments and Measures of Budgetary Activism Compared 
 
 




Majority Government  
FY 2016/2017 ** 
 





Minor Change in 
Budgetary Activity  
(10-18) 
 
Lesotho (DC 39%) Namibia (SWAPO 74%) 
 
Moderate Change in 
Budgetary Activity  
(19-27) 
 
Zambia (PF 48%)  




Malawi (DPP 26%) Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF 73%) 
 
*percentage of seats of the largest opposition party   **percentage of seats of the ruling party 
Source: Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) PARLINE Database (sourced online August 2019) 
 
As per the table above, there is no clear relationship between the presence of a minority government and 
increased legislative budgetary engagement.  Although Lesotho would be a strong candidate for stronger 
budgetary engagement based upon its history with minority governments from 2012, only minor changes 
were witnessed over the course of the 2016/2017 fiscal year. Even more tellingly, however, is evidence of 
increased legislative budgetary activism in the Parliaments of Namibia and Zimbabwe, despite the ¾ 
majority held by the ruling party in each case.  Based upon this cursory test, there is little reason to believe 
that the presence of a minority government is responsible for the changes at hand.  
 
Third, I apply Huntington’s (1991) ‘two-turnover-test” to the electoral results in each of the five 
parliaments from 1990. 121  Although Huntington applies this test in order to measure “democratic 
consolidation” in a particular polity, I apply the test more modestly. Instead of democratic consolidation, I 
interpret regular power alternations as sign this is a sign that political actors have “accepted the rules of 
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the electoral game” (Bratton 2004: 155).  The value of the test is that it moves beyond short-term political 
constellations like the presence of minority and majority governments, to those which provide potential 
long-term incentives for elites, who, “facing the real prospect that they will eventually find themselves 
leading the opposition may incline leaders to be more circumspect in allocating powers to the ruling party 
and strengthen mechanisms of accountability” (Cho and Logan 2009) (Moehler and Lindberg 2009: 1469). 
The ‘two-turnover-test’ thus marks a potential threshold for the appreciation of what it is like to be on the 
losing side of the political game. It is demonstrated after two cycles of peaceful electoral turnover, in which 
once the previous ruling party and the party that defeats it have each experienced both a win and a loss 
(Huntington 1991).   
 
In order to score each country, I examine the electoral history from the first competitive party elections 
(ca. 1990) to see if there is evidence that power alternations are in play (see Appendix 3). I use the coding 
applied by Cho and Logan (2009) in order to measure the data. Specifically, in countries where Presidents 
are elected directly, I consider a power alternation to be present if the party of the president changes (and 
not necessarily the president himself) after a general election.  In a parliamentary system like that of 
Lesotho, I count a turnover when there is a new majority party or coalition of parties after a fresh election. 
Each instance of turnover is coded as 1. No evidence of party turnover is coded as 0. In addition, as in Cho 
and Logan (2009) where there is no alternation in the party of the president, but the opposition achieves a 
majority in the legislature this is counted as .05 points.  However, I also apply the corollary to this in 
parliamentary systems. That is, if the legislative majority or coalition constellation remains relatively 
stable, but the party of the Prime Minister undergoes a change, I also assign this a .05 score.  Finally, while 
Cho and Logan (2009) begin their counts before the first multi-party elections, I use Huntington’s measures 
instead. That is, I count the number of turnovers starting after the first multi-party election.  The table 









Table 8.4:  Huntington’s Two-Turnover-Test and Measures of Budgetary Activism Compared 
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Source: Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) PARLINE Database and Wikipedia for 2018 Zimbabwe Elections (each sourced online August 
2019)  
 
While one would expect alternations in power to be a critical prerequisite to legislative engagement in 
budgetary matters, both Zimbabwe (to a much greater extent) and Namibia (to a much lesser extent) 
demonstrate increased legislative budgetary engagement in the face of de facto one-party rule. Periods of 
authoritarian rule are widely understood to have prohibited the development of legislatures acting as 
‘institutions of countervailing power vis-à-vis the executive’ (Barkan 2009).  But evidence reveals that even 
the most ‘closed’ systems are demonstrating a broad array of change in legislative budgetary engagement. 
Indeed, how and why this is the case, is a subject worthy of further study at more detailed level. In fact, 
individual cases studies on the subject are thus essential if we are to push our understanding of the subject 
further along.  In the meantime, the search for alternative explanations is supported in the context of this 









Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
  
This research began with a surprising observation: parliaments in Southern Africa seemed to be 
signalling the intention to be more involved in budgetary matters, particularly at the formulation 
phase. The observation was striking for several reasons.  In the first place, such engagement would be 
antithetical to the Westminster parliamentary model inherited at independence.  Budgetary 
engagement is also an unlikely activity for legislatures stemming from histories of authoritarian rule.  
Moreover, in the face of executives with technical competencies that vastly surpass those of 
parliaments, the growth of the recurrent expenditure, increasing numbers of influential external 
interest groups and a host of other factors that relate back to the development context in which these 
parliaments are housed, the activity level of African legislatures in the budget process would generally 
be expected to be minimal, at best.  
 
Overall, this investigation demonstrated that initial impressions were indeed true and we witnessed 
more systematic evidence that the parliaments under study are tending towards greater activity in the 
budget. Contrary to reigning assumptions, Africa legislative developments in the budget process 
appear to be mirroring the growth of the same in other legislatures internationally. However, in order 
to reach this proposition, it was first necessary to move beyond a rule-based approach to their 
understanding.  That is, while legislatures in Africa may be more similar to parliaments elsewhere than 
previously thought in this particular area, in order to come to that conclusion, they first had to be 
studied differently. Through a data collection process that included extensive interviews, focus group 
discussion and regional dialogue, this research was able to document a number of informal budget-
related changes underway in five Southern African legislatures. In doing so, this research has helped 
to update and refine our understanding of a small number of African legislatures, bringing their 
activities into the fold of international legislative scholarship and re-aligning dated stereotypes with 
current realities. 
 
Behavioural changes were found across all sub-dimensions examined with just slightly more activity 
in organisational matters. While tentative, the initial finding already suggests a significant departure 
from behavioural and organisational attributes of these legislatures at the onset of the multi -party era. 
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The Parliament of Zimbabwe provides the most striking example of an Assembly that has made 
significant headway with regard to its budgetary engagement, with the Parliament of Malawi following 
closely behind.  The Zambian Parliament is less engaged than these first two, though the institution is 
making incremental progress across all sub-dimensions. The data suggest that the Parliaments of 
Namibia and Lesotho are significantly less active, but nonetheless demonstrate an initial push in the 
same direction. Clearly the stereotype depicting African legislatures as rubber-stamp institutions no 
longer serves.  
 
Though tentative, the data suggests there may be particular sequencing in terms the institutional 
development of these legislatures whereby Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) are established 
first, followed by Budget Committees, and finally Parliamentary Budget Offices. The data also revealed 
a unique element: committees appear to expanding their oversight activities to span executive 
implementation of the budget.  The practice expands upon and complements the traditional emphasis 




The study has also addressed question of why these developments are underway on the basis of three 
competing theoretical propositions. Overall, legal frameworks proved to be a poor predictor of 
legislative behaviour.  The analysis revealed hardly any variation in terms of available formal powers 
and legal reforms, leaving the differences found in legislative change in budgetary matters across cases 
unaccounted for.  A common legal template of formal budgetary powers appears to be in play. Where 
high levels of activity were found, legal prerogatives for the same tended to lag behind. In other cases, 
available legal powers were simply not taken up by parliaments despite the freedom to do so.  The data 
suggests that both the Parliaments of Zimbabwe and Malawi are be outperforming their legal mandates 
while the Parliaments of Zambia, Namibia and Lesotho, suggest a counter trend. The findings also 
reiterate the importance of including informal behaviours in studies related to legislative influence, 
power and strength. 
 
Just as the legal explanation proved to be an inadequate predictor of legislative behaviour and 
organisation in budgetary matters, so too did the technical hypothesis. The findings revealed that 
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technical considerations, on the aggregate, do not co-vary in a meaningful way with the documented 
changes in budgetary matters.  Collectively, the findings marry well with those of Oppenheimer (1983) 
and Schick (2002) who find that technical capacities do not, on their own, lead to increased policy 
influence. However, the data is also suggestive that some elements are worth further exploration.  
Rather than a block to African legislative engagement in budgetary matters, for example, financial 
scarcity could actually serve to prompt legislative activism in the same. Parliamentary Service 
Commissions, portfolio committee systems and high educational requirements also appear to be 
associated with increased levels of budgetary engagement, though these each warrant further 
investigation across a broader number of cases.  
 
Finally, a review of the power of norm-based drivers of change provides some encouraging leads.  
Preliminary evidence reveals that the developments found in the legislatures studied here are in line 
with legislatures from across the globe. Further research is necessary across all geographies. However, 
the prospect invites the practice of taking a global perspective for a richer understanding of national 
and regional developments.  Portfolio committee systems, Budget Committees and PBOs hold clear ties 
to US congressional modes of legislative practice.  And US-donor influence and peer-to-peer 
parliamentary exchange were each probed for their ability to complete the story of how trends in 
legislative budgetary activism could reach parliaments in Africa. Significant co-variance was found 
between legislative activism in budgetary matters and US-based donor interventions in Zimbabwe, 
Malawi and Zambia from about the turn of the millennium. The data thus suggests that rather than 
locally or regionally transferred, such norms were likely to have made their way to the parliaments 
through the influence of these interventions. Further research is, however, required in order to 
decipher the origins of other institutional components, like CDFs, that cannot be traced back to US 
practice. 
 
However, a history of US influence cannot account for the rise in budgetary activism found across all 
cases. While significantly less active than the other three, the Parliaments of Namibia and Lesotho are 
also poised for growth in this area. The analysis suggests that where donors are absent, peer-to-peer 
learning and exchange serves to diffuse trends in legislative budgetary engagement.  The results are yet 
tentative given the limited number of cases examined here. Still, given what is known about legislative 
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learning and the competitive element inherent between parliaments, trends are likely to take root once 
other legislatures in the region have put new behaviours into practice. As one Member candidly 
remarked during a recent study visit related to the growth in European PBOs: “I thought  PBOs were an 
African thing!”   
 
The findings have consequences on a number of fronts. In the first instance, an increase in legislative 
budgetary activism could be accompanied by the risk of overspending. There is some reason to doubt 
this claim. In the first place, Wehner (2010) finds that legislatures are prone to increase spending limits 
only in those countries where legislatures hold the formal powers to do so (Wehner 2010). The data 
revealed that the legislatures studied here do not yet yield the necessary formal powers to warrant 
such a concern. However, the evidence does demonstrate instances in which the legislatures here have, 
defacto, influenced increases (and decreases) in spending policy via informal means. We don’t yet 
know enough about these individual parliaments to know whether fiscal discipline is truly at risk.  
 
An alternate outcome is that increased engagement in the budget may also genuinely hold executives 
more accountable for spending.  The process of budget making and oversight could also become more 
transparent as a result. However, there is no guarantee that increased involvement and oversight over 
the executive budget will have the intended effects. At least for now, “Hardly anything systematic is 
known from comparative work about the relationship between legislative financial scrutiny and other 
outcomes, such as government accountability or corruption, which are posited in the applied literature as 
central benefits of stronger legislatures” (Wehner 2014: 520)  
 
Moreover, the goal behind increased legislative influence over the budget is yet far from obvious. Such 
developments may appear to be a net positive for proponents of ‘strong’ legislatures but budget 
process remains just that: a process.  We are yet unable to predict the relationship between modes of 
legislative involvement in budgetary matters and outcomes like poverty reduction, service delivery, 
and economic development (Wildavsky 1961) (de Renzio and Wehner 2017).  Thus, whether or not 
citizens will benefit from increased budgetary activism on the part of their representatives is far from 
clear.  Rather than emulating practices from other legislatures that promise institutional strength, a 
more effective approach may be to circumvent process altogether and focus on the most direct means 
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of reaching targeted development goals for citizens.  
 
Finally, the results of this investigation suggest that these legislatures are well on their way to changing 
their overall function. In some ways, this is to be expected: legislatures are mercurial institutions and 
are subject to change over time. The practical repercussions of such drastic shifts in legislative identity 
and function are, however, important.  We do not yet know enough about the challenges and benefits 
that could lie on the horizon as a result.  And given the pace at which such changes are unfolding, 
legislative scholars ought to begin asking such questions.  If developments continue to advance along 
the same trajectory, the practice of legislative-executive ‘mixing’ may require reconsidering, for example.  
But even before constitutional tenants are addressed, legislatures must decide on the level of budgetary 
influence they want to achieve. Whether a legislature is interested in influencing spending policies or 
simply strengthening its ability to oversee and account for executive spending is an aspect that will 
require careful consideration.  Either way, if responsibilities in this area continue to expand, the work 
of parliament could be increasingly focused on technical expertise and less so on political judgement 
(Schick 2002: 35).  
 
In documenting legislative transformations from a comparative perspective, the study encourages 
reflection on the type of legislature these institutions wish to become. In order to move forward with 
confidence, a coherent vision is required. Further comparative research would help orient such aims. 
The power of internationally based norms to effect significant change in African legislatures is also 
worth considering.  Results of this study could have African legislatures thinking twice about with 
whom they socialize. The subject thus offers both scholars and parliaments an opportunity to 
interrogate and reflect upon both the consequence of legislative change in budgetary matters as well 
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1 The conceptualisation of the UK Parliament unable to influence government policy is challenged in Russell and Cowley (2016). The 
authors explore and demonstrate parliamentary influence at various stages of the decision making process and on the basis of less 
visible signs of engagement (Russell and Cowley 2016).  
2 There was an early attempt between 1912 and 1914 to establish a Budget Committee for the purpose of reviewing the heavy 
spending during wartime and work in tandem with the Public Accounts Committee.  However, the initiative ultimately failed because 
“ministers who must answer to Parliament for their departments cannot share with a committee the responsibility for estimates or 
for the policy behind the estimates” (Courtenay 1911, 88).  In other words, the legislative-executive mixing inherent in parliamentary 
systems precluded the focused deliberation of budgetary issues in the parliamentary setting. 
3 Though short in function and mandate of a fully-fledged Parliamentary Budget Office, the parliament did introduce an Office of 
Budget Scrutiny (OBS) in 2012. 
4 These six dimensions are divided according to two distinct sub-dimensions, namely, formal legislative powers on the one hand and 
organisational capacities of parliaments on the other.  Under the formal powers category, amendment rights, budgetary reversion, 
and executive flexibility during implementation are each included and accompanied by relevant scoring arrangements. Institutional 
characteristics used to measure organisational capacities include time available for budgetary scrutiny before adoption, committee 
expertise (including the presence or absence of portfolio committees, a Budget Committee and a PAC), and analytical support on 
budgetary matters.  
5 A narrative version of the 2007 OECD study referenced could not be sourced. Instead, survey results can be publically accessed here: 
https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=7F309CE7-61D3-4423-A9E3-3F39424B8BCA. It is assumed that Anderson conducted 
the analysis separately, and the results summarized in this 2009 article.  
6 Some 33% of the cases studied relate specifically to Parliamentary Budget Offices. 
7 A further discussion of CDFs can be found in section 4.2.3 
8 The ‘Triad of A’s’ appears to have been first introduced by George and Morgan (1999) as initially referenced in Born and Hänggi 
(2005).  
9 The legacy is made even more difficult for parliaments in small countries like Namibia, where the National Assembly consists of just 
72 MPs and additional Ministries are often created alongside on-going government expansion efforts.  With more than half of the 
Members doubling as Ministers, this ossified conflict of interest makes it difficult for the legislature, as an institution, to scrutinise the 
budget effectively.   
10 This includes 100 Senators, 435 Representatives, four Delegates, and one Resident Commissioner. 
11 Mattes and Mozaffar (2011) find that the educational levels of MPs in the 18 African countries examined are actually much greater 
than those at the national level.  
12 See George and Bennet (2005) Hall (2003) for a discussion on the importance of ontology in research design as well as Jackson 
(2011). The latter pushes our understanding of ontology to include researcher’s „hook up“ to the rest of the world as part of a wider 
philosophical ontological understanding as well as what is ‘out there’ in the world. The former is introduced here, while the latter is 
incorporated into the relevant sub-sections to follow. 
13  Its corollary is referred to as “mind-world monism” in Jackson-speak. Monists, in his assessment, include Analyticists and 
Reflectivists 
14 As one parliamentary budget staff once mused: “Everything in government is private, until it is deemed public; everything in 
parliament is public, until it is deemed private.”   
15 See Coleman (1986) Schelling (1978) and Mezey (1994)  for a discussion on the  ‘macro’- ‘micro’ divide, or the “process through 
which individual preferences become collective choices…” (Coleman  1986: 1321). 
16 With the percentage of backbenchers comprising between 60% - 92% of each Parliament at the time of data collection, this 
allowed ample space for further selection.   
17 Less important, though still influential, are the role of strong committee chairs and additional staffs in key areas such as clerks of 
powerful committees like the PAC, Budget Committee or ad-hoc Legislative Reform Committee. 
18 In doing so, the research served a practical purpose that was (apparently) very much in line with the thinking put forth by Wildavsky 





‘existential situation’ in which the participants find themselves under our political system, proposals for major reforms must be based 
on a woefully inadequate understanding” (Wildalvski 1961: 190).   
19 Specifically, those situated outside Southern Africa (Uganda, Kenya, Ghana), have different colonial origins (Mozambique), or were  
unable to participate in the capacity development project to which this research was married (Tanzania), each were deemed   
ineligible. 
20 “Many case study researchers feel that to compare societies with vastly different cultures and historical trajectories is meaningless. 
Yet many cross-case researchers feel that to restrict one’s analytic focus to a single cultural or geographic region is highly arbitrary, 
and equally meaningless. In these situations, it is evidently the choice of the researcher how to understand case homogeneity/ 
heterogeneity across the potential populations of an inference. Where do like cases end and unlike cases begin? “ (Gerring 2007: 53) 
“It follows that case-selection procedures in case study research may build upon prior cross-case analysis and depend, at the very 
least, upon certain assumptions about a broader population. This, in turn, reinforces a central perspective of the book: case study 
analysis does not exist, and is impossible to conceptualize, in isolation from cross-case analysis” (Gerring 2007: 90). 
21 While both Wehner (2006) and Barkan (2009) share the same basic philosophical-ontological commitments, this investigation is 
predicated upon more specific ontological assumptions (about what actually exists in the world) that differ in important respects 
from each of these bodies of research.  In contrast to Wehner (2006/2010) my landscape of inquiry moves beyond formal measures 
to include informal behaviours and organisational components. And, in contrast to Barkan (2009), my explanatory scope is extended 
to include legislatures beyond the African continent.  
22 Budget Committees are understood here to be synonymous with “Estimates” or “Finance” Committees. 
23 A second aspect of this sub-dimension involves just how the parliament chooses to utilise this time. This element is subsumed under 
the behavioural dimension of the dependent variable related to committee coordination. 
24 Though Wehner (2010) also proceeds to probe four potential explanations, these are not incorporated into this study.  This is 
because colonial legacy, system type, and age of democracy are each controlled for in the case selection of this investigation, while 
questions of political party constellations are outside its scope. 
25  As Jackson explains “Charles Sanders Pierce, the philosopher perhaps most responsible for theorizing abductive inference, 
introduced the notion in part as a way of accounting for the uncanny way that scientists were able to formulate hypotheses for testing 
that were at least plausible; this suggested to Pierce that scientists were engaging in some kind of process of pre-selection for their 
conjectures, and only putting forward for evaluation those conjectures that were likely to be true. This pre-selection, rooted in 
scientists’ practical experience with the tools of their trade (which means: their equipment, both physical and conceptual), helped to 
explain why science made progress in understanding the world” (Jackson 2011: 83). 
26 These may be convened through African parliamentary networks such as SADC-Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) and the Pan-
African Parliament (PAP). In such networks every member parliament in Southern Africa delegates up to five MPs to participate in 
official activities and report back to parliament. Broader regional organisations like the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Joint 
Africa-Caribbean-Pacific-European-Union Parliamentary Assembly (ACP-EU JPA) and networks related to the British Commonwealth 
such as the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) offer additional 
opportunities for exchange. These organisations convene meetings that are organised on an annual or bi-annual basis for which a 
rotating cohort of MPs from each member parliament participates. In addition, there are networks unique to staple Westminster-
based legislative institutions like Public Accounts Committees (SACOPAC, AFROPAC), in which Chairs or Members of these specific 
committees are regularly engaged. Hudson and Wren (2007) provide a more detailed account of UK-based parliamentary 
strengthening organisations.  They note, for example that CPA organises some 2-4 seminars per year for its member parliaments 
(Hudson and Wren 2007: 35)  
27 However, the number of exchanges far exceeds parliaments’ capacity to document and analyse the same.  
28 Please refer to Appendix 2 for an overview of the number of MPs/staff and their positions.  
29 As George and Bennett reflect on the trade-off involved in such a process: simplifying continuous variables or variables that have 
been found to have in-determinant answers into nominal measurements significantly reduces the complexity of the variable at hand 
and also leads to potentially misleading patterns when these variables are confined to summary tables (George and Bennett 2005: 
235). 
30 Because Parliamentary Service Commissions are not reflective of legislative budgetary powers per se, and because their authority 




31 Research Departments differ drastically from Parliamentary Budget Offices (PBOs) in this regard. While, in principle, internal 
staffing arrangements are the reserve of parliament, PBOs are difficult to establish and maintain.  
32 In the case of Namibia, the legal framework is also not explicit in terms of parliament’s overall authority with regard to budget 
matters and there is also no mention of the ways in which the development and recurrent budget is or is not put to a parliame ntary 
vote.  The Speaker did concede over the course of the Regional Seminar (May 2017) that decreases were permitted, but it is unclear 
at this stage whether this relates to both statutory and non-statutory expenditure.  The Annual Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure 
presented to parliament includes both but because the reigning convention until the point of data collection did not permit 
amendments to the development budget, it is assumed this convention applies at least equally to recurrent expenditure which i s 
traditionally more difficult to amend.  In Lesotho, the Constitution (2011) states that “Except with the consent of cabinet, neither 
house shall proceed upon any bill (or amendment) that makes provisions for tax or a charge other than by a reduction” (79 (i)  (ii)).  
In addition, the Lesotho Public Financial Management and Accountability Act (2011) confirms that the annual Appropriation Act “shall 
not include authorizations for statutory expenditure” (14 (4)). In the case of Malawi, sstatutory expenditure is included in the budget 
estimates but not submitted to the National Assembly for vote because these refer to payments which the government has a 
constitutional obligation to pay. “Details of statutory expenditure shall be included in the Estimates in order to present th e total 
expenditure proposed in the Government’s programmes or activities, but shall not be submitted to the vote of the National Assembly” 
[PFM Act 2003 (21) (4)]. In Zimbabwe, The votes of expenditure contained in the estimates other than statutory expenditure (emphasis 
added) shall be included in a Bill to be known as an Appropriation Bill which shall be introduced into the House of Assembly to provide 
for the issue from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the sums necessary to meet the expenditure and the appropriation of those sums 
to the purposes specified therein” [Zimbabwe PFM Act (28) (3)].  The 2016 Budget Statement confirms that some 92% of the budget 
consists of recurrent expenditure (80% employment costs and roughly 13% for interest payments and operations). Finally, in Zambia, 
while the parliament is legally permitted by the Constitution to amend expenditures, the Financial Regulations (2006) prohibi t the 
transfer of funds in personal and non-personal emoluments as well as from department to department or project to project in the 
absence of approval from the Minister of Finance. Moreover, under Activity Based budgeting (which still comprises nearly half  of the 
Votes on Expenditure), recurrent and non-recurrent expenditure is not clearly separated. Finally, because emoluments and debt 
comprise some 90% of budget totals, effectively only roughly 10% of the budget can be amended (personal email exchange with 
Parliamentary Budget Office, 21 August, 2019) 
33 Again, the number of such exchanges far exceeds parliaments’ capacity to document and analyse the same. 
34 Factors that could influence the relative participation of each parliament include, amongst other possibilities, short sitting periods 
or competing priorities of the parliament. That is, some variation is expected in terms of the availability of each parliament to 
participate in the activities to which they are invited.  
35 The Parliaments of Kenya and Uganda were provided with financial support by development agencies and the success of their PBOs 
is attributable to this, coupled with political leadership and strong economies (M8). 
36 See Appendix 1 for a letter of attest, from the former Director of Research and Evaluation of AWEPA. 
37 As outlined previously, the data collected consists of a combination of some thirty individual interviews with MPs and staff in each 
parliament in addition to documentation relating to the individual legal frameworks and other relevant publications. In addition, as 
separate focus group discussion was convened to discuss and vet the data collected from each parliament, resulting in a ‘country 
report.’ Once vetted and reflected upon at the national level, the five country reports were then compiled and shared with Members 
and staff from the parliaments concerned over the course of a regional seminar whereby additional feedback and insights were 
obtained.  
38  A sample of these proposals includes the adoption of the submission from the Portfolio Committee on Justice, Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs and Committee on Finance and Economic Development to “resuscitate Constituency Development Funds” 
whereby Treasury allocated USD 10 Million for the CDF (Paragraph 65 of Budget Speech); the adoption of the submission from the 
Portfolio Committee on Transport and Infrastructural Development that advocated the “procurement of state of the art radar 
equipment for air traffic controllers” to which the treasury appropriated USD 5 million for the radars in Harare and Bulawayo 
(Paragraph 230); and the proposal from the Portfolio Committee on Environment, Water, Tourism and Hospitality and Finance and 
Economic Development Committee to “provide raw water to agriculture and industries through completing critical dam projects as 
well as increasing access to potable water for rural and urban populations” to which the executive earmarked USD 25.8 million for 




sanitation programmes (Paragraph 254).  http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/administration/clerk-of-parliament/clerk-s-
blog/parliament-of-zimbabwe-making-a-difference-in-the-2017-budget-formulation-process (Accessed 20 August 2018) 
39 However, the refusal to pass the budget was as tactic used in order to expedite the No Confidence vote that was passed shortly 
thereafter.  As such, the manoeuvre speaks more to the parliament’s dissatisfaction in government rather than the budget per-se. 
40 For example, in countries stemming from the Francophone or Lusophone tradition, the Budget Committee function may be combined 
with the functions of the Public Accounts Committee (Mozambique) or be relegated to a subcommittee of a related committee, as in France.  
41 In the meantime, in recent years, the Senate has arranged workshops with the Reserve Bank in order to review specific topical 
themes in the budget or particular ministries, though the upper house does not engage with committees in the National Assembly on 
budgetary matters. 
42 Pubic Hearings could also be applied in the context of budgetary activism. However, in practice, these can be be used for multiple 
purposes. For this reason, the sub-dimension was excluded in the behavioural aspect of the dependent variable.  
43 Because these are informal institutions in the parliaments surveyed, their presence or absence will be confirmed anecdotally. In 
addition, the process is separated from moments where the parliament has influenced appropriations more generally. This is because 
the practice of instituting CDFs holds institutional consequences beyond that of strengthened budgetary engagement and thus worthy 
of examination in their own right.  
44 As of August 2018, the Parliament was reported by one senior staff to have obtained funding from the Treasury to recruit two staff 
to form a PBO contingent.  
45 The data gathered within this sub-dimension can only be considered tentative given the fact that it was not possible to interrogate 
local councils or other local level officials on the subject at the time of data collection.   
46 SROs Parliament of Zimbabwe (1995): A period not exceeding 85 hours in the aggregate shall be allotted tot he business of supply 
on the main estimates (82) (1).  
47 The index related to formal powers developed by Wehner (2010) was considered here, but ultimately not applied. This is because 
its coding is not suitable for the African context. Moreover, I focus on legislative powers exclusively, while his index includes an 
assessment of executive powers alongside those of the legislature.  
48 Research Departments differ drastically from Parliamentary Budget Offices (PBOs) in this regard. While, in principle, internal 
staffing arrangements are the reserve of parliament, PBOs are more difficult to establish and maintain.  
49 Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) and Parliamentary Budget Offices (PBOs) are institutions that require legal backing in 
order to be maintained over time. One reason for this may relate to the nature of these activities, both of which fall on the threshold 
of traditionally executive mandates. The role of the PBOs relates back to budgetary formulation and economic analysis, a role 
traditionally enjoyed exclusively by executives in Westminster systems. Both the appropriation and execution of the CDFs encompass 
both the traditional executive role of budget formulation as well as service delivery.  
50 Zambian Constitution (2016): the National Assembly may vary estimates but shall not amend the total amount (201 (4)) 
51 Zambian National Assembly SROs (2005): Portfolio Committees may study, report and make appropriate recommendations; carry 
out detailed scrutiny of certain activities being undertaken by Government ministries, departments and agencies; make 
recommendations (157 (2) (i) (ii) (iii)) 
52 Zambian SROs (2005): Committees shall have the mandate to examine annual reports of Government ministries and departments 
(157 (2) (iv)) 
53 The task was previously delegated to a subcommittee of the PAC.  From 2016, the new SROs (2016) provide for a Local Government 
Accounts Committee that will take on this role.  
54 Zambian SROs (2005): There shall be a sessional committee to be designated the Committee on Estimates (156) 
55 Parliament of Zimbabwe SROs (2015) The House must not proceed upon a Bill, which makes provision imposing or increasing any 
charge on the public funds of the State or varying any such charge otherwise than by reducing it (116 (1) (a) (ii) 
56 Zimbabwe Constitution (2013): Parliament must monitor and oversee expenditure by the State and all commissions, institutions 
and agencies of government at every level; Parliament must define mechanisms for such oversight (299 (1) (2)). 
57 Zimbabwe Public Finance Management Act  (2009): Every ministry shall submit monthly report to respective committees within 
30 days of the end of the respective month (34 (2))… quarterly financial within 60 days of the end of the quarter (33)… within 90 days 
of the end of the financial year, submit unaudited annual financial statements (35 (9)).  
58 Zimbabwe Constitution (2013): Function of the Auditor General is to audit all accounts of all provincial and metropolitan councils 




59 Parliament of Zimbabwe SROs (2016): There is hereby established a Budget Committee (156) (1)  
60 Parliament of Zimbabwe SROs (2016): Thematic and portfolio committees may hold joint sittings (21(1)).  
61 Malawi Constitution (1993): The National Assembly may not make an amendment that provides for taxation, an increase the public 
revenues or funds, for the payment or withdrawal from public revenues or for any debt (57 (a)). The National Assembly may only 
increase funds in the Protected Expenditure Fund to accommodate the expenditure to be charged (183 (2)). 
62 Constitution Malawi (1993) The National Assembly and any committees shall have the power to conduct investigations of any 
person or office holder as required (59 (3)). Parliament of Malawi SROs (2013): Portfolio Committees may study the effectiveness of 
a programme and policy implementation of Ministries (166 (1) (c)). 
63 Parliament of Malawi SROs (2013): Any committee may make any inquiry into annual reports (166 (1) (b)). The Budget Committee 
shall engage the Ministry of Finance in … monitoring the budget throughout its cycle (158 (f)). Portfolio committees may study the 
effectiveness of a programme and policy implementation of ministries (SRO 166 (1) (c)) 
64 Malawi Local Government Act (1998): District/Town/City Assembly accounts shall be audited by the Auditor General (54)  
65 Constitution of Malawi (1993): There shall be a Budget Committee (56 (7)) and Parliament of Malawi SROs (2013): A Budget 
Committee shall be appointed (158). 
66 Constitution of Malawi (1993): Parliament may establish any committees of its members and may for joint committees for the 
scrutiny of legislation and performance of other functions, except voting on motions and Bills (56 (6)) and Parliament of Malawi SROs 
(2013): The Budget Committee shall scrutinize budget proposals and consider recommendations by other committees (158 (d) (h)). 
67 Lesotho Constitution (2011): Except with the consent of cabinet, neither house shall proceed upon any bill (or amendment) that 
makes provisions for tax or a charge other than by a reduction (79 (i) (ii)).  In addition, the Lesotho Public Financial Management and 
Accountability Act (2011): An annual Appropriation Act shall not include authorizations for statutory expenditure (14 (4)). 
68  National Assembly of Lesotho SROs (2008): Portfolio committees shall… oversee the executive (95) (1) (a) and… monitor, 
investigate, enquire into, and make recommendations relating to the… budget… or other government matter (95) (d). 
69 Lesotho Public Financial Management and Accountability Act (2011): A spending unit of government shall prepare quarterly and 
annual reports ... (34 (1)); Ministers shall present annual reports to Parliament within four months of the end of the financial year (34 
(9) (a)). 
70 Lesotho Public Finance Management Act (2011): A local authority shall submit audited annual reports to the minister responsible 
for local government, who shall table the reports before Parliament (34 (3)).  
71 National Assembly of Lesotho SROs (2008): The committee considering the estimates shall have the powers as prescribed in 
Standing Order 95 (68) (1).  
72  Namibian National Assembly SROs (2008): For Bills that increase taxation, increase Government expenditure, or reduce 
Government income, the must be moved or seconded by the Minister of Finance (33 (b)). With regard to reductions, there is no 
mention.  Instead, the Constitution (2014) states: The National Assembly shall consider estimates and pass Appropriation acts  as are 
in its opinion necessary to meet the financial requirements of the State from time to time (126 (2)). 
73 Namibian National Assembly SROs (2008):  the National Assembly may enquire into and make recommendations on matters that 
may directly or indirectly affect the economy of the country (72) (4). Namibian Council SROs (2015): cluster committees have the 
mandate to monitor budget implementation of Offices, Ministries and Agencies falling under their respective ambit (156) (157) (158) 
(159) while the Committee on Public Accounts and Economy maintains the mandate to scrutinize the governments financial proposals 
and examine incidents of financial mismanagement (155) (2) (3). 
74 Constitution of Namibia (2014): The National Assembly shall receive reports from the executive and from time to t ime require any 
senior official to appear before committees to account for and explain acts and programmes (63 (2) (f)). 
75 Namibian State Finance Act (1991) Section 27 (4) 
76 On the occasion of the regional dialogue convened as part of this capacity development and research project, the Speaker of 
Parliament reviewed the legal provisions and interpreted this to mean the Parliament could, indeed, move to decrease the 
development budget, in line with regional practices in this regard (R). 
77 Zambian Constitution (2016) Article 63 (2): The National Assembly shall oversee the performance of executive functions by—(a) 
ensuring equity in the distribution of national resources amongst the people of Zambia, (b) appropriating funds for expenditure by 
State organs, State institutions, provincial administration, local authorities and other bodies, (c) scrutinizing public expenditure, 
including defence, constitutional and special expenditure, (d) approving public debt before it is contracted, and(e) approving 




78  Although the description does not explicitly cite the role of Parliament to be that of an oversight institution, the Zimbabwe 
Constitution (2013) Article 299 (1) does note that: Parliament monitors all levels of government. 
79  Zimbabwe Public Finance Management Act  (2009): Minister may seek the views of Parliament AND “appropriate” portfolio 
committee to conduct public hearings to illicit the opinions of stakeholders (28 (5)). Thus pre-budget consultations remain an 
informal act.  
80 No specific legal backing but the Parliament references the Constitution (2013): The Standing Rules and Orders Committee can 
appoint staff as necessary (151 (c)). 
81 DPs referred to here stands for‚Development Partners,’ the most recent incarnation of the term used to describe external aid 
providers, or ‚donors.’ 
82 All figures derived from country Appropriation Acts for the 2016/2017 Fiscal Year and converted to US dollars on the basis of 
exchange rates according to the month in which the Act came into effect. 
83 Population figures taken from the Database: “World Population Prospects 2015” and rounded for ease of reference. UN Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division website. https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/ 
84  The Constitutional amendments of 2014 included the enlargement of both Houses of Parliament, a decision that was widely viewed 
amongst interviewees as a political compromise between the executive and the legislature.  The enlarged chambers served as 
‘compensation’ for the absence of a service commission specifically for Parliament along with the weak provision for its eventual 
establishment. 
85 Thus far, scholars have identified informational, partisan and distributional explanations for their creation (Wehner 2010: 40-41) 
86 Ideally, the number of MOAs overseen by each committee would be used as a measure of oversight specificity. However, this data 
was mired by large inconsistencies across cases. The most consistent information was found in the Parliaments of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. On-going fluctuations with regard to the creation, split, or disbandment of government MOAs was often cited as a rationale 
for these discrepancies. The number of actual Ministers in parliament is not reflective of the additional organs and agencies the 
committees are tasked with overseeing and the extent to which Ministers double as MPs also fluctuates from parliament to parliament. 
For these reasons, the analysis is best conducted on the basis of the number of portfolio committees. 
87 New SROs of 2017 provide for additional committees including 14 portfolio committees, 4 general purpose committees and 4 house 
keeping committees, however in line with the 2005 SROs, only 11 portfolio committees were in operation at the time of data collection.  
88 Portfolio Committees may make recommendations upon scrutinising government activities, studying government management and 
operations or policies (Standing Orders 2005; 157 (2) (i) (ii) (iii)) “Study, report and make appropriate recommendations.” “Carry 
out detailed scrutiny and make recommendations”. Despite this mandate, committees are not scrutinising annual reports or 
conducting sight visits. 
89 Agriculture and Lands (2), Economic Affairs and Labour (4), Communications, Transport, Works and Supply (2), Health, Community 
Development and Social Services (2), Information and Broadcasting Services (1), National Security and Foreign Affairs (3), Education, 
Science and Technology (2), Local Governance, Housing and Chief’s Affairs (1), Legal Affairs, Governance, Human Rights and Gender 
(2), Sport, Youth and Child Affairs (1) Energy, Environment and Tourism (2) 
90 The SROs were in the process of being revised to reflect the provisions of the new constitution at the time of data collection. In the 
meantime, the 2005 SROs served at the basis for committee work. Specifically, “it shall be the function of… committees to examine 
expenditure, administration, and policy of government departments and other matters falling under their jurisdiction (SRO 2005 159 
(2)) 
91 (USD 2,000,000 in 2016) – 0.04% of total annual budget 
92 Transport and Infrastructure Development (1), Defence, Home Affairs and Security Services (2), Environment, Water, Tourism and 
Hospitality Industry (2), Mines and Energy (2), Higher Education, Science and Technology (1), Public Service, Labour and Social 
Welfare (2). Finance and Economic Planning (2), Communication Technology, Postal and Courier Services (1), Justice, Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs (1), Health and Child Care (1), Foreign Affairs (1), Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development (1), 
Industry and Commerce (1), Lands, Agriculture Mechanisation and Irrigation (1), Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 
(2), Media, Information and Broadcasting Services (1), Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Development (1), Youth, 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (1), Education, Sport, Arts and Culture (2) 
93 Portfolio committees include:  Agriculture and Irrigation; Commissions Statutory Authorities and State Enterprise; Education, 




Relations; Local Authorities and Rural Development; Media, Information and Communication; Natural Resources and Climate Change; 
Social and Community Affairs; Transport and Public Infrastructure 
94 The Constitution states at the “the National Assembly and a committee shall have the power to conduct investigations of any person 
or office holder as required (Constitution 59 (3)). The 2013 SROs expand on this, noting that: “portfolio committees may study the 
effectiveness of a programme and policy implementation of ministries” (SO 166 (1) (c ). 
95 Assembly cluster committees include: Committee on Audit; Committee on Pubic Accounts and Economy; Committee on Security 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs; Committee on Rural and Urban Development; Committee on Gender, Youth and Information 
Communications Technology; Committee on Habitat; Committee on Women’s Caucus. 
96 These five include the: Social Cluster (4), Economic Development Cluster (5); Law and Public Safety Cluster (4); Natural Resources, 
Tourism and Land Cluster (6-10); Prime Minister’s Ministries (6) 
97 See the UNESCO eAtlas of Literacy at: https://tellmaps.com/uis/literacy/#!/tellmap/-601865091 (February 2019) 
98 In addition, while no educational requirement is stipulated, the new constitution did usher in an initiative to ring-fence 70 seats for 
women within the party list system.  The result of the initiative was unpopular with many of those interviewed. “The women selected 
under PR system have low level of education, don’t understand concepts or what is expected of them”(Z28). The level of debate is 
reported to have suffered as a result (Z5) (Z28).   
99 In terms of staff qualifications, one senior interviewee reported “in 2012 there were few graduates but now it’s a norm” (M11). 
100 Budget Committees may have been present from independence, as was the case in Malawi and Zimbabwe, for example. However, 
their mandate was substantially weaker- to the extent that such a committee cannot be compared with a Budget Committee in its 
modern understanding.  
101 These include: (1) Legislative Approval of Ex Ante Fiscal Frameworks (2) Expanded Portion of Budget Subject to Legislative Review 
(3) Strengthened Institutional Budget and Deliberative Process (4) Increasing Legislative Budget Capacity (5) Changing Appropriation 
Structures and Budget Execution (6) Enhanced Ex-Post Oversight. 
102 In addition to those changes documented in the table, Posner and Park (2007) include the scrutiny of entitlement spending, 
restrictions on executive spending at implementation, and review and approval of overarching fiscal frameworks and targets (MTEFs) 
to this list. With the exception of Lesotho and its engagement with the recurrent budget over the course of the 2016/2017 Fiscal Year, 
evidence of change was not found amongst the legislatures studied here in these categories. At the same time, those legislatures 
sampled by Posner and Park (2007) did not report evidence of CDFs or the establishment of formal links to local budget formulation 
in their study.  Despite these discrepancies, a strong pattern is evident between the two.  
103   Legislative exchange can be facilitated between Members of Parliament (MPs) from developed countries (North-South 
Cooperation) or between MPs from developing countries (South-South Cooperation). I place a focus here on South-South Cooperation 
as a complement to the North-South exchange emanating from western donor interventions. It is possible at North-South 
Parliamentary exchange has acted as a conduit for changing legislative norms in budgeting, however, these take place much less 
frequently than those of South-South exchange, reducing the likelihood.  
104 Executive Summary: Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Zimbabwe, A Foundation Report By the Parliamentary Reform 
Committee, Parliament of Zimbabwe, Volume 1: Findings and Recommendations (May 1998) 
105 Capacity Assessment Report, Parliament of Zimbabwe, Administration of the Parliament of Zimbabwe, with support from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), May 2003. 
106 This report is no longer available. It was lost as parliament changed buildings.  
107 Some interviews indicated that the ‚Functional Review’ took place in 2009 (M9) Clarity on the timing was not possible to obtain. 
However, it was clear that the review resulted in the creation of a position fort he 2nd Deputy Clerk and Financial Controller, a separate 
budget envelope for parliamentary committee work, the establishment of an HIV/AIDS Committee, amongst other changes.  
108 The ‘Cash Gate’ scandal was the most recent financial scandal receiving public attention at the time of data collection. 
109 Not all American-based development funding or influence can be readily identified, as Hudson and Wren 2007 explain funding can 
also be pooled through multi-donor “basket funds” pooled within the UN system and implemented through, for example, the UNDP. 
Hudson and Wren (2007) provide one example whereby basket funding was preferred by the recipient parliament because US 
involvement was seen as too “political” (Hudson and Wren 2007: 40). 
110 Report of the Parliamentary Reforms Committee on Reforms in the Zambian Parliament entitled: Approved Recommendations on 




111 Programme proposal entitled: National Assembly of Zambia Capacity Development Project for a ‚Real’ Parliament Component of 
Parliamentary Reform Programme III (2008-2011). The report on the Parliamentary Reforms Programme Phase III (2007-2010) 
indicates that support for the parliamentary reforms stemmed from a basket fund dedicated to a system-wide PFM reform process. 
Some 15% of this basket fund was allocated to reforms within the Parliament. It is, however, unclear from the documentation how 
long this funding modality remained relevant. The Report of the Parliamentary Reforms and Modernization Committee for the Third 
Session of the Eleventh National Assembly Appointed on 25th September 2013 indicated, for example, that the Parliament was receiving 
bilateral support from KfW, Irish Aid, UNDP, and the EU. 
112 However, the draft Bill subsequently produced did not foresee a strong role for the Parliament. 
113 Agenda for Change: Consolidating Parliamentary Democracy in Namibia, A Report to Parliament by a Working Party of the National 
Assembly and the National Council, July 1995 
114 There are a number of declarations and statements to back this up. The Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action 
(2008), the Busan Declaration (2010) and that, which emerged from discussions in Mexico (2014), each provide ample evidence of 
support.  
115  To reduce the examination of the legislatures studied here to yet smaller parts (i.e. ruling party, opposition, backbencher, 
frontbencher etc.)-parallel to that of a higher level of analysis- would be to muddy the waters in an already complex terrain, and 
thereby jeopardize the identification of broad patterns of political behavior across much longer time trajectories.   
116 In depth treatments of both the US and Mexican Congresses conducted by Schick (2000) and Santiso (2006) respectively, are used 
to back the arguments Wehner presents for these cases. It can only be assumed the author applies his professional experience to the 
cases of South Korea and Canada to support these additional claims. 
117 The significance of political parties in Africa is a subject worthy of additional study. Just because they do not appear to fulfil a 
traditional function does not imply that parties in Africa do not fulfil a meaningful role, but rather serves to highlight just how little is 
understood and known about African political parties in the first place. 
118 “The index ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and 
businesspeople. The index uses a scale of 0-100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean” 
119 Though, more recent research on legislatures across the globe has highlighted the fact that many authoritarian regimes are also 
home to many legislatures. Their function and purpose require further probing (Schuler and Malesky 2014). 
120 A detailed overview of party power distributions in each legislature from ca. 1990 to today can be found in Appendix 3. 
121 Though there is still scope to challenge this claim and some have done so (Patel and Wahman 2015) additional support appears to 
be steadily accumulating.  For a thoughtful treatment on the important effect of electoral turnover and citizens’ trust in democracy 
see Moehler and Lindberg (2009). For related perspectives see also Cho and Logan (2009) Bratton and van de Walle (1997) Lindberg 














Appendix 1: Letter of Attest in Support of Data Use 
Prof. Thiven Reddy  
Chair, Ethics Committee  
University of Cape Town 
South Africa  
1 December, 2017 
RE: AWEPA Approval for Use of Data Collected under the BOS Project 
Dear Prof. Reddy, 
I write in my capacity as the former AWEPA Director of Research and Evaluation as well as a senior 
employee of AWEPA for nearly thirty years.  
As Ms. Kristen Heim’s line manager since 2008, we have worked jointly in the development and roll 
out of a large number of donor- supported projects related to parliamentary capacity and support.  
The Budgetary Oversight and Scrutiny (BOS) Project was the most recent of such endeavours. However, 
the project was unique in its design in so far as its aims were concerned. These included both the 
attainment of project objectives as well the collection of primary data for Ms. Heim’s academic research 
under the auspices of the University of Cape Town.  
The approach enjoyed my full support, and I was then and remain aware that the data collected under 
the BOS Project, which was managed by Ms. Heim, was ultimately intended for academic publication.  
Should you have any further questions with regard to the above mentioned, please do not 
hesitate to contact me at the following email: ja.balch25@gmail.com  
Sincerely, 





Appendix 2: Overview of Interviewees 
 
 Members Total 
Interviewed 
 















































































































Deputy Clerks (2) 
Committee Clerks 















































7 from ruling 
PF 






1st Deputy Speaker 





Various Unit Heads  
Committee Clerks 
 
*Interviews with 2 EU parliamentary development consultants and 1 staff from the National Planning Commission are also included 
in this total.  
**An interview with a parliamentary support NGO was also conducted as part of this total 
*** An explicit request was made for party diversity with each of the Speakers and Clerks who were, together, end responsible for 
ensuring interviews were conducted from the Parliaments’ end.  












Appendix 3: Political Party Seat Distribution according to Parliament 
 
Namibia (1989-2014)  
 













Election Number #6 #5 #4 #3 #2 #1 
 
Year 2014 2009 2004 1999 1994 1989 
 






















5 2 4 7 15 21 
Rally for Democracy and 
Progress (RDP) 
3 8     
United Democratic Front 
(UDF) 




2 2 3    
All People's Party (APP) 2 1 
 
    
Workers Revolutionary 
Party (WRP) 
2      
South-West African 
National Union of 
Namibia (SWANU) 
1 1     
United People's Movement 
(UPM) 
1      
Radical Party 1  
 
    
Republican Party  1 
 
1    
Congress of Democrats 
(COD) 
 1 5 7   
Monitor Action 
Group(MAG) 
  1 1 1  
Democratic Coalition o 
Namibia (DCN) 
    1  
Action Christian National 
(ACN) 
     3 
National Patriotic Front 
(NPF) 
     1 
Federal Convention of 
Namibia (FCN) 
     1 
Namibia National Front 
(NNF) 
     1 
TOTAL Seats 104 72 72 72 72 72 
 
Majority/Minority MAJOR (1) MAJOR (1) MAJOR (1) MAJOR (1) MAJOR (1) MAJOR (1)  
 



















Lesotho (1993-2017)  
 
 
















Election Number #7 #6 #5 #4 #3 #2 #1 
 
Year 2017 2015 2012 2007 2002 1998 1993 
 
 














   









    
Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD) 













Alliance of Democrats (AD) 9    
 
   
Movement for Economic 
Change (MEC) 
6       
Basotho National Party 
(BNP) 




Popular Front For 
Democracy (PFD) 
3 2 3     
Reformed Congress of 
Lesotho (RCL) 
1 2      
Basotho(land) Congress 
Party (BCP) 
1 1 1 1 3  65 
 
100% 
Marematlou Freedom Party 
(MFP) 
1 1 1 1    
National Independence 
Party (NIP) 
1 1 2     
Democratic Party of Lesotho 
(DPL) 
1       
Lesotho People's Congress 
(LPC) 
 1 1  5   
Lesotho Worker’s Party   1 10 
 
   
Basotho Democratic 
National Party (BDNP) 
  1 1    
Basotho Batho Democratic 
Party (BBDP) 
  1 1    
National Independence 
Party (NIP)  
   21 
 
18% 
5   





    3   
Others     6  
 
 
TOTAL SEATS 120 120 120 120 120 80 65 
 


































Election Number #7 #6 #5 #4 #3 #2 #1 
 














4   
 
 











    
 
 





















People's Party (PP) 5 26 
 
13% 
0     
 
Maravi People’s Party  0 1     
 
United Democratic Front 
(UDF) 












Alliance for Democracy 
(AFORD) 







Chipani Cha Pfuko (CCP)  1 0 
 
    
Malawi Forum for Unity and 
Development (MAFUNDE) 
 0 1     
Mgwirizano Coalition  0 0 25 
 
13% 
   
United Transformation 
Movement 
4       
Others    24  
 
  
TOTAL SEATS 193 193 193 193 193 177 141 
 
Majority/Minority Minor  Minor  MAJOR  Minor  Minor  Minor  MAJOR  
 
Turnover (2,5)  0 
 






















Zambia (1988-2016)  
 
 















Election Number #8 #7 #6 #5 #4 #2 #1 
 
Year 2016 2011 2006 2001 1996 1991 
 
1988 











   






29  49 
 
33% 




3 3 1 
 























Forum for Democracy 
and Development 
(FDD) 
1   12    
Alliance for Democracy 
and Development 
(ADD) 
 1      
United Democratic 
Alliance (UDA) 
  26     
United Liberal Party 
(ULP) 
  3     
National Democratic 
Focus (NDF) 




   13  25 136 
 
91% 
Heritage Party (HP)    4    
Zambian Republican 
Party (ZRP) 
   1    
National Party (NP)     5   
Agenda for Zambia 
(AZ) 
    2   
Zambia Democratic 
Congress (ZDC) 
    2   















































President (Party) ZANU ZANU ZANU/MDC ZANU ZANU ZANU ZANU 
 
Election Number #7 #6 #5 #4 #3 #2 #1 
 




































    







MDC Alliance 88 
 
33% 
      
MDC (MDC-AM)   10 
 
    
Independents  1 1 1 1 
 
  





      2 
National Patriotic 
Front 
1       
TOTAL 270 270 210 150 150 120 120 
 
Majority/Minority MAJOR MAJOR Minor MAJOR Minor MAJOR MAJOR 




*(W) Sourced from Wikipedia. All other data taken from IPU PARLINE Online Database August 2019  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
